






Title of Document: DO ECONOMICS TRUMP CULTURE? 
EFFECTS OF WOMEN’S WORK AND 
RELATIVE ECONOMIC RESOURCES ON 
MARRIED WOMEN’S AUTHORITY IN 
HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING IN 
JORDAN 
  
 Gheda Khodr Temsah, Doctor of Philosophy, 
2013 
  




The effects of work on women’s household decisionmaking authority have been 
documented in many empirical studies. However, few studies have explored its 
effects in a social context where women’s labor force participation is low. Little is 
known about the conditions through which women’s work enhances authority within 
the household. Using 2007 Jordan Demographic and Health Survey I explore the 
effects of women’s work and relative economic resources on their authority in 
household decisionmaking net of culturally relevant sources of power. The country 
has enhanced its human capital base, developed new industries and promoted 
women’s work, but it also remains a bastion of tradi ional gender norms. Drawing on 
resource theory, gender performance theories, theories f institutionalized patriarchy 
and bargaining approaches, I argue that women’s work and relative economic 
resources matter more for some dimensions of househld decisionmaking than others. 
Engagement in the labor market confers exclusive control over matters of personal 
wellbeing, while enhancing women’s leverage to participate in family management 
  
decisions. However, only women in nuclear households experience the benefits of 
productive work on authority in household decisionmaking. Results confirm the 
multidimensionality of household decisionmaking power, and a possible causal effect 
of work participation. While individual factors matter, regardless of women’s 
economic resources and other characteristics, living in regions with high socio-
economic development and less patriarchal norms is a sociated with greater 
decisionmaking authority. The results of this research contribute to our understanding 
of women’s empowerment by empirically demonstrating he conditions under which 
economic resources may trump cultural scripts, when cultural factors may matter 
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 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), like much of the developing 
world, have experienced profound demographic changes since the 1950s. Among the 
most notable changes in the region that are likely to revolutionize gender relations 
both within the home and workplace are the decline in fertility, improvement in 
maternal and child health, increase in women’s educational attainment, rise in 
women’s age at marriage, and the narrowing of the spou al age gap – not 
withstanding great intra-regional and intra-national variations (Tabutin and 
Schoumaker 2005).   
One aspect of women’s status that has confounded researchers and policy 
makers despite these demographic changes has been th  persistently low rates of 
women’s labor force participation. In this regard, MENA stands out among 
developing regions in that women’s labor force participation rates are the weakest 
(Blau et al 2006) and gender disparities are among the largest in the world (Shafik 
2001). The increased cost of living and higher standards of consumption linked to 
globalization, economic crises and structural adjustment policies, which would 
otherwise favor an increase in women’s labor force participation, seem to affect Arab 
women’s work differently.  
 The focus of research on women’s low labor force participation and structural 
level explanations - such as the downsizing of the public sector, poor economic 
growth, insufficient job creation, and the mismatch between skills and labor market 
demands (Miles 2002; Moghadam 1998; Spierings and Smits 2007; World Bank 
2004; World Bank 2013b), partially emanates from the notion that participation in 
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productive work, especially paid work, empowers women. The underlying 
assumption is that participation in productive work confers both material and non-
material resources which women can leverage to enhance their bargaining position 
within the household. Yet, in predominately traditional cultural contexts, engaging in 
productive work may have negative consequences as well – for example, concern for 
safety by families and a backlash within the household resulting from gender bending 
behavior.   
Significance And Relevance To The Present State Of Knowledge 
Using the 2007 Jordan Demographic and Health survey, a nationally 
representative survey covering 14,564 households an 10,876 ever-married women 
aged 15-49 years, I explore the effects of women’s work and advantages in relative 
economic resources on their empowerment within the household operationalized in 
terms of women’s control over or participation in a umber of decisions that relate to 
their own wellbeing and the daily management of their households, including 
financial, organizational and social ones. My focus on women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking is based on the conceptualization of women’s 
empowerment as access to and control over material and non-material resources that 
facilitate the ability to decide and act free from the control of others (Dixon-Mueller 
1978; Dyson and Moore 1983; Mason 1986).  
This research makes three contributions. First, research on Arab women’s 
status has been concerned with the causes underlying their low labor force 
participation with very little done to empirically test the underlying assumptions of 
the effects of women’s work on empowerment within the household in societies 
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where women’s work is rare and traditional gender norms persist. Most research on 
the effects of women’s work on authority in household decision-making has been 
conducted in developing countries where more than one quarter of women of working 
age are engaged in productive work1. Jordan offers a unique opportunity to test 
whether women’s work and other economic resources increase their authority within 
the household in a society where women’s work is not the norm. The country has 
undertaken efforts to enhance its human capital base, develop new industries and 
promote women’s work, but it also remains a bastion of traditional gender and family 
norms. Additionally, this study empirically tests the importance of women’s 
participation in productive work for their authority in household decisionmaking vis-
a-vis culturally relevant sources of power, such as women’s position within their 
households, and other characteristics that confer prestige in this social context. 
Second, existing literature from other developing re ions has underscored the 
complexity of the relationship between women’s work and empowerment, but it 
remains unclear under what conditions women’s work contributes to their authority 
within the household. By incorporating measures of w men’s employment status (e.g. 
unpaid versus paid), relative income and relative occupational status, this study 
expands our understanding of the conditions under which women’s work increases 
their authority within the household. Controlling for education alone does not account 
for differences in other relative economic resources that have been empirically linked 
                                                
1 Studies on the effects of women’s work on authority in household decisionmaking 
have been conducted in several countries in Africa, South East Asia and Latin 
America and include Nigeria, Ghana, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua. With the exception of Pakistan, women’s labor 
force participation in these countries ranges betwen 35% and 60%. 
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to intra-household gender dynamics in other country/regional contexts. For example, 
relative earnings can impact martial quality (Brenna , Barnett, and Gareis 2001), 
marital power (Izraeli 1994; Rodman 1967), the household division of labor (Brines 
1994) and women’s leisure time (Cinar and Anbarci 2001).  
Third, this study distinguishes between different types of decisions in keeping 
with the conceptualization of empowerment as multidimensional (Kishor 2000; 
Malhotra 1997; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Mason 1986; Narayan 2005). For the 
sake of simplicity, research on women’s authority in household decisionmaking has 
relied on summative indices, with some exceptions (Heaton, Huntsman, and Flake 
2005). In this dissertation, I make two broad distinctions between decisions that are 
personal and related to interpersonal power and decisions that have to do with family 
management. 
Finally, scholarship on the intersection of gender, work and family in the 
Middle East is limited despite the recognition that gender stratification is 
multidimensional and a function of mutually reinforcing relations of power both 
within and outside of the home (Collins, Chafetz, Blumberg, Coltrane, and Turner 
1993; Presser and Sen 2000; Sen and Batliwala 2000). Rarely has research on MENA 
examined the relationship between differences in women and men’s economic 
resources and power relations within the Arab household. With a few exceptions 
(Cinar and Anbarci 2001; Kishor 2000) research on women’s empowerment have 
been mostly qualitative (Miles 2002) and focused on its benefits in terms of child and 
maternal health outcomes (Al Riyami, Afifi, and Mabry 2004; Kishor 1995). Studies 
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on intra-household decisionmaking and gender relations in Arab society have been 
mostly qualitative (El-Kholy 2002; Nadim 1985). 
To what extent does productive work enhance women’s authority within the 
Arab family, net of the effects of culturally relevant sources of power and other 
individual and household characteristics? Do women’s advantages in economic 
resources, such as income and occupational status, enhance their authority in 
household decisionmaking? Do the effects of women’s work and relative economic 
advantages vary by dimension of decisionmaking? Is women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking subject to contextual effects such tat living in more 
socioeconomically developed regions with less restrictive gender norms is associated 
with higher levels of authority regardless of women’s own characteristics? And are 
positive effects of women’s work even bigger in more developed regions with less 
patriarchal norms? 
In developing hypotheses about these relationships I draw on a number of 
theoretical perspectives – namely, resource theory, performance theories, theories of 
institutionalized patriarchy and bargaining approaches. Work, even unpaid, develops 
women’s self-esteem, communication and negotiation skills and sense of 
responsibility, which can be leveraged for greater uthority in household 
decisionmaking.   I argue that the effects of women’s work and advantages in 
economic resources (income and occupation prestige) on women’s authority within 
the household are conditioned by the broader social context.  Certain dimensions of 
women’s authority within the household may be influenced by women’s work and 
advantages in relative economic resources while othrs are not. In more traditional 
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societies governed by patriarchal gender and family norms, culturally relevant 
sources of power, such as women’s position within te family (e.g. married to head of 
household, number of living sons, etc…) may be more d minant sources of domestic 
power (Mason 1997).  
I explore these research questions using a variety of quantitative techniques. I 
use principal components factor analysis to examine the underlying structure of 
household decisionmaking. Factor analysis has been us d elsewhere to distinguish 
between different dimensions of empowerment (Agarwala and Lynch 2006; Kishor 
2000). I conduct ordinary least squares, logistic and ordered logistic regressions of 
women’s authority in household decisionmaking on women’s work, relative income 
and relative occupational status controlling for culturally relevant sources of power 
and other background characteristics. Culturally reevant sources of power refer to 
characteristics of women that in their social context confers upon them prestige and 
respect given their gender and place within the household or family.  
I use multilevel modeling to explore whether averag levels of women’s household 
decisionmaking authority and the effects of work vary ccording to the structural 
characteristics of the regions in which women resid. 
My analytical framework rests on the assumption that work affects women’s 
empowerment. However, I cannot rule out issues of selectivity in who works and that 
women who are more empowered within their households are more likely to 
challenge social norms and participate in productive work. I address the issue of 
endogeniety in two ways. First, I conduct a propensity score matching procedure to 
estimate the effect of work on women’s household decisionmaking power. Because 
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household characteristics can influence both women’s decision to participate in work, 
especially formal sector work outside of the house, and women’s authority within the 
household, I use within-household fixed effects modeling to control for unobserved 
household characteristics for which propensity score matching techniques are not 
suited.  
Since I conceptually approach women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking from the perspective of empowerment, in Chapter 2 I outline the 
historical backdrop in which the concept of women’s empowerment emerged, the 
rationale for research on it, and key issues in its conceptualization and measurement. 
In Chapter 3, I review theoretical perspectives and empirical evid nce specific to the 
dimension of women’s empowerment which is the focus of my analysis – namely, 
women’s authority within the household. Four strands of literature stand out: 
resources theory, gender performance theories, and theories of institutionalized 
patriarchy and bargaining approaches. Because my dissertation explores the effects of 
women’s work and the conditions under which women’s work increases their 
authority within the household, in Chapter 4 I address the question of who works and 
whether work enhances women’s authority within the household. This chapter 
provides a conceptual and methodological note on women’s work in developing 
countries, a summary of how work theoretically enhances women’s empowerment 
within the household, and a review of empirical evid nce on the effects of women’s 
productive work in developing countries. I also address the issue of endogeniety 
between women’s work and authority within the household. In Chapter 5 I make the 
case for the inclusion of occupational prestige in the analysis of the effects of 
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women’s work on authority within the household in so far as it represents non-
material resources (social prestige) conferred by work participation which can 
enhance women’s sense of empowerment. Chapter 6 provides a background on 
gender work and family norms and patterns in Jordan, highlighting some intra-
regional variations as well. Chapter 7 summarizes the issues raised in the preceding 
chapters, gaps in existing literature and relevance of the current study. In this chapter 
I present my research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 8 provides information on 
the sample, dependent, independent and control measures and analytical methods. I 
present the results of my analyses in Chapter 9. The conclusion and discussion of 
findings are presented in Chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 2. WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
Women’s authority in household decisionmaking in developing countries has 
been approached from the framework of women’s empowerment. Since I adopt this 
conceptual framework, in the following sections I review key issues in the 
conceptualization and measurement of women’s empowerment. 
The Rationale For Interest In Women’s Empowerment 
Within the international development field, interest in “women’s 
empowerment” initially stemmed from research highlit ng the linkages between 
women’s standing in their homes and communities to demographic processes and 
outcomes (Mason 1986). Early scholarship in this area is rife with a multiplicity of 
terms such as ‘status of women’ (Dixon 1975), ‘female autonomy’(Dyson and Moore 
1983), ‘patriarchy’ (Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979) and ‘men’s situational 
advantage’ (Caldwell 1981).  
Irrespective of terminology, from the 1960s onward, evidence from the field 
and empirical research on developing countries documented the correlation, and 
sometimes feedback effects, between women’s empowerment and age at marriage 
(Dyson and Moore 1983), contraceptive use and fertility (Cain 1982; Cain, Khanam, 
and Nahar 1979; Caldwell 1981; Dixon 1975), infant d child mortality and 
morbidity, and the gender gap in infant and child mortality (Dyson and Moore 1983). 
The growing recognition of the impact of women’s status on demographic outcomes 
and processes inspired an paradigm shift in the 1990s from a macro-level family 
planning approach aimed at population reduction, to a more micro-level 
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individualistic approach grounded in the discourse of women’s rights and 
empowerment (Finkle and Crane 1985; McIntosh and Fikle 1995).  
Although the new paradigm largely ignored the meso sphere, or the influence 
of institutions, on demographic processes and outcomes (Presser 2000), the 
institutionalized focus on women’s empowerment herald d in a new wave of 
scholarship that expanded our understanding of women’s empowerment by 
explicating its meaning, dimensions, conditions andcorrelates, and providing a more 
nuanced understanding of its complex relationship to demographic processes and 
outcomes (Balk 1997; Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001; Dharmalingam and Morgan 
1996; Hobcroft 2000; Kishor 2000; Malhotra, Vanneman, nd Kishor 1995; Morgan, 
Sharon, Smith, and Mason 2002; Sen and Batliwala 2000).  
Conceptualizations Of Women’s Empowerment 
Women’s empowerment has been conceptualized in terms of freedom and 
choice, condition versus process and agency versus str cture. Differentiations along 
other axes have also been articulated, such as responsibility versus rights (Basu and 
Koolwal 2005), or stated differently,  empowerment as a means or as an end in-and-
of-itself (Narayan 2006). Here, I focus on the forme  two differentiations, as they 
constitute mainstream approaches in existing literature. 
Women’s empowerment: condition versus process 
 Women’s empowerment as a condition has been defined in terms of: (a) 
prestige (Epstein 1982); (b) female autonomy, or freedom from control by others 
within the family and household to decide and act for oneself (Dyson and Moore 
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1983); and (c) the distribution of power and resources that favors men and renders 
women dependent on them (Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979).  
The conceptualization of empowerment as control over different types of 
resources was first articulated by Dixon (1978) andl ter developed by Mason (1986) 
as the extent of women’s access to (and control over) material resources (i.e.  food, 
income, land, and other forms of  material wealth) and social resources (i.e.  
knowledge, power and prestige) within the family, the community and broader 
society. Empirical evidence has led to refinements in his conceptualization by 
distinguishing between access to resources and control ver them (Kishor 1995). For 
example, participation in paid employment ensures women’s access to income but 
does not necessarily imply that they will control hw their income is spent. Access to 
and control over material and social resources are, arguably, the most pervasive 
operational definitions of women’s empowerment (Basu nd Koolwal 2005; Desai 
and Johnson 2005) alongside freedom to do things (autonomy), and these definitions 
appear in several prominent empirical studies (Agarwala and Lynch 2006; Balk 1997; 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001).  
The above conceptualization of women’s empowerment suggests that 
women’s empowerment is a condition or ‘state’. Yet, it can also be construed as a 
process (Kishor 2000) whereby the powerless gain greate  control over the 
circumstances of their lives including control over r sources (i.e. physical, 
intellectual, financial) and ideology (i.e. beliefs, values, and attitudes) (Batliwala 
1994; Sen and Batliwala 2000). Some decisions requi the life-long accrual of 
negotiation skills while other decisions are affected by more immediate conditions 
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(Malhotra and Schuler 2005). Most scholarship focuses on outcomes rather than 
processes (McDonald 2000), partially because they ar  e sier to capture in 
quantitative methods.  
Women’s empowerment: agency versus structure 
The conceptualization of women’s empowerment in terms of the ability to 
decide and act on free accord and bring about change in one’s own life frames 
empowerment in terms of agency (Batliwala 1994; Malhotra and Schuler 2005). 
However, structure may circumscribe the extent of individual agency (Agarwal 1994; 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). There is great difficulty in disentangling structural (i.e. 
community-level) dimensions of women’s empowerment from individual aspects 
(Desai and Johnson 2005; Mason and Smith 2003). The complementarity of the 
perspectives of agency and structure (Kabeer 1999) has been substantiated by 
empirical evidence pointing to the importance of individual characteristics net of the 
effect of community-level variables. In some cases, most of the variation in 
dimensions of women’s empowerment can be explained by structural factors such as 
cultural differences in family and gender norms (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). A 
cross-cultural study of over 56 communities in 5 Asian countries illustrates that 
structural effects may outweigh the influence of household and individual level 
characteristics, such as education, and employment (Mason and Smith 2003). For 
example, women’s educational attainment may facilitte formal sector paid 
employment, but the level of economic development and economic structure in 
women’s area of residence influences the availability of (suitable) jobs.  
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(How) does context effect women’s empowerment? 
I use context and structure interchangeably to refer to several factors that are 
pervasive and institutionalized within the social, cultural, economic, legal and 
political fabric of society which can influence indviduals’ behavior, life chances and 
outcomes. Contextual factors are located at the levl of the community, market and 
state. Operationalizations of context include, but are not limited to, level of social 
development (e.g. literacy, mortality and access to health care) (Malhotra, Vanneman, 
and Kishor 1995) ; level of economic development (e.g. community has a bank, level 
of agricultural productivity , degree to which economy is non-agricultural) (Malhotra, 
Vanneman, and Kishor 1995; Marion 2004); and degree of patriarchy or traditional 
gender norms (e.g. median age at first marriage, gender gap in infant mortality; 
women’s share of the labor force; village mean for w men’s mobility, village mean 
for gender attitudes) (Balk 1997; Kishor 2000; Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 
1995). Figure 1 depicts how context or structural factors are conceptually expected to 
influence women’s authority within the household. 
Context shapes the causes and correlates of any given d mension of women’s 
empowerment (Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996) . Context also conditions the 
magnitude of the effects of the causes or correlates of women’s empowerment 
(Heaton, Huntsman, and Flake 2005; Malhotra and Mather 1997). For example, in 
traditional societies, duration of marriage, number of sons, and being married to the 
head of the household are more important predictors of women’s economic 
decisionmaking authority and other dimensions of empowerment in contrast to more 
egalitarian societies where women’s education, and to some extent productive work, 
are important (Jejeebhoy 2000; Kulik 2011; Mason 1997).  
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Similar findings in support of the salience of contextual effects on women’s 
empowerment are available from developed countries. In a cross-country study of 
intra-household gender dynamics in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
and the United States the effects of men’s education, income and occupation on their 
authority vis-à-vis their wives is conditioned by context defined in terms of the extent 
of patriarchal norms (Rodman 1967; Rodman 1972). In commenting on the work of 
Blood and Wolfe (1960), who conducted one of the earliest studies on intra-
household power dynamics in the United States, Gillisp e (1971) argues that 
structural factors matter more for marital power than individual characteristics. While 
relative and absolute levels of husbands’ and wives’ income, education, occupational 
prestige and social status matter, men dominate not as individuals but as a class 
because of institutionalized male supremacy (Gillespie 1971). Scholarship on 
women’s work decisions in advanced countries has increasingly incorporated 
structural factors, such as the ideological and politica  context or regime type, family 
policies (e.g. public childcare) and tax regime (individual or non-individual) (Lippe 
and Dijk 2002). 
Women’s empowerment as a multidimensional concept 
Often, operational measures of women’s empowerment ar  tallied into a 
summary index of women’s empowerment. However, evidence from a number of 
developing countries spanning Africa, Latin America and South Asia, East Asia and 
the Pacific, illustrates while it is possible to be disempowered in more than one 
dimension, women’s empowerment is also orthogonal; namely, equality or 
empowerment in one dimension is not necessarily correlated with other dimensions 
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(Malhotra 1997; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Mason 1986). This line of reasoning 
parallels the notion of the multidimensionality of gender and gender stratification 
(Collins et al. 1993; Presser and Sen 2000).  
Women’s (dis)empowerment derives from multiple systems or relations of 
power that operate on different levels such as the household, community, market and 
government (Sen and Batliwala 2000). Accordingly, the extent of women’s 
empowerment can also differ by level of social organiz tion. For example, women 
with low freedom of movement outside the household d  not necessarily suffer from 
low empowerment within the household in terms of authority over household 
decisionmaking (Desai and Temsah 2013).  
Since women’s empowerment varies by context, dimension and level of social 
organization (Narayan 2005), the conditions or correlates of empowerment also differ 
by dimension (Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996; Heaton, Huntsman, and Flake 2005; 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; Mason 1986). For example, education may empower 
women in household decisionmaking but educated women in some contexts may also 
be less likely to be employed than uneducated women (D sai, Dubey, Joshi, Sen, 
Shariff, and Vanneman 2010), reducing their financil independence.  
Methodological Note On The Measurement Of Women’s 
Empowerment 
 My analysis of the effects of women’s work and other relative economic 
advantages on women’s authority within the household relies on household survey 
data and quantitative methods. In order to qualify my results, in this section I discuss 
several methodological issues in the measurement of women’s empowerment. This 
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discussion is organized around five broad topics: (a) quantitative versus qualitative 
methods of data collection; (b) selection of culturally relevant questions; (c) wording 
of questions and the issue of empowerment vis-à-vis whom; (d) selection of 
respondent and perceptions of authority; and (e) on dimensional measures and 
summative indices.  
Quantitative versus qualitative methods of data collection 
The method by which information is obtained influenc s results; observation 
by investigator or participatory research introduces objectivity concerns and field 
survey questionnaires can lead to both social desirability and interviewer effects 
(Narayan 2005; Rodman 1972). Some studies incorporate a combination of 
quantitative (survey data) and qualitative methods (e.g. focus groups) (Jejeebhoy and 
Sathar 2001; Malhotra and Mather 1997). Mixed methods approaches can provide 
greater confidence in results, such as when focus group discussions confirm 
differential patterns of women’s authority in decisionmaking revealed by factor 
analysis (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001).  
While survey data enable an analysis of women’s empowerment that is not 
possible by qualitative methods due to sample size restrictions (Desai and Temsah), 
the latter are able to get at the complex processes underlying relationships in a way 
that quantitative analysis does not. Focus groups on women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking among Indian and Pakistani women reveal the complexity of the 
process and women’s shrewd understanding of power play (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 
2001). An ethnographic study of the effects of migrant labor on Sri Lankan women’s 
empowerment within the household reveals a variety of ranging from outright 
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aggressive confrontation, making concessions in some areas to gain in others, and 
more “feminine” approaches of engaging men as the ost nsible head of households to 
achieve desired outcomes (Handapangoda 2012). A mixed methods study of the 
effects of education and women’s labor force participation on household 
decisionmaking in Sri Lanka highlights how women deploy threats, resources and 
social networks to get their way (Malhotra and Mather 1997). 
Selection of culturally relevant questions 
Another issue in the measurement of women’s empowerment has to do with 
the selection of questions that are culturally relevant to women’s empowerment, to 
women across the life course, and the socio-economic spectrum. The ‘standard’ set of 
questions concerned with women’s empowerment usually cover the following: (a) 
freedom of movement to visit a variety of places; (b) degree of authority in a range of 
household decisions, including financial, social, organizational and interpersonal 
ones, and (c) freedom from experiencing domestic violence.  These questions are 
asked alongside other information considered to be indictors or sources of women’s 
empowerment such as access to and control over resources, level of education, 
women’s participation in paid employment, and a host of other individual and 
household characteristics. 
While a standard set of questions facilitates cross-national and international 
comparison, the cultural relevance of questions is important if any meaningful 
conclusions about women’s empowerment are to be made (Rodman 1972; Safilios-
Rothschild 1970). What it means for a woman to be empowered in a developing 
country context is qualitatively different from a developed country context (Basu and 
 18
Koolwal 2005). Within developing nations, variations i  family systems and kinship 
patterns may also imply different notions of empowerm nt and therefore a need for a 
different set of measures (Malhotra and Schuler 2005).  The relevance of decisions to 
the dynamics of marital power differs across the life course and from one couple to 
the next (Rodman 1972). The range of household decisions would also differ for rich 
versus poor women (Malhotra and Mather 1997). 
Wording of the questionnaire: empowerment vis-à-vis whom? 
 In addition to the selection of culturally relevant questions, wording of 
questions can mask the extent of empowerment, and empowerment vis-à-vis whom. 
The wording of questions on authority in household decisionmaking (“who has the 
final say in….”) ignores the issue of veto power and that the final decision maker may 
have been delegated as opposed to self-appointed (Rodman 1972). The response 
categories are also important in tapping into generational and gender power relations 
rather than assuming that household dynamics are confined to the conjugal pair 
(Malhotra and Mather 1997; Sen, Rastogi, and Vannema  2006). 
In asking “who has the final or sole say in…” it is difficult to ascertain who 
has the power, the person who makes the decision, or person who decides to let the 
other be the final decider (Safilios-Rothschild 1970)? A spouse may relegate some 
decisions to the other spouse because s/he finds them cumbersome; thus the 
relegating spouse is not necessarily less empowered (Safilios-Rothschild 1970). Nor 
is the implementing spouse more empowered in the sense that having the final 
authority imposes the burden of responsibility (Basu nd Koolwal 2005).  
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Selection of respondent and perceptions of household authority 
Studies have found that husbands and wives do not always agree on who 
makes decisions in the household. Comparisons of husbands and wives’ responses to 
questions pertaining to household decisionmaking authority and freedom of 
movement in five Asian countries reveal significant differences(Ghuman, Lee, and 
Smith 2006). Husbands are likely to report greater uthority for wives than wives 
attribute to themselves. Couples’ differences in repo ting on marital authority can be 
due to social desirability effects and/or random measurement error (Ghuman, Lee, 
and Smith 2006; Rodman 1972). Differences in the semantic and cognitive meaning 
of responses for women and men are responsible for couple disagreement and lead to 
different levels of women’s empowerment depending o whose response is taken into 
consideration (Ghuman, Lee, and Smith 2006).  
One dimensional measures, summative indices and the multidimensionality of 
empowerment 
The final methodological issue I review relates to the multidimensionality of 
empowerment and is both a critique of one dimensional measures (Agarwala and 
Lynch 2006) and summative indices of women’s empowerment. One dimensional 
measures are too simplistic, and more accurately serve as indicators or sources of 
empowerment (e.g. women’s education or paid work) rather than (evidence of) 
empowerment itself (Kishor 2000). Additionally, uni-dimensional measures fail to 
highlight the mechanism through which empowerment operates and ignores the 
complexity and multidimensionality of women’s empowerment in so far as each 
dimension is determined by and affects a different s t of socio-economic and 
demographic variables (Agarwala and Lynch 2006). Summative indices ignore the 
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fact that empowerment in one dimension is not commensurate with other dimensions 
(Malhotra and Schuler 2005).  Women who control financial decisions do not 
necessarily have authority over other decisionmaking aspects (Malhotra and Mather 
1997). The inappropriate combining of items may mask effects and relationships 
between conditions of empowerment and their consequences (Malhotra and Schuler 
2005). Equal weighting of items in summative indices ignore variation in the 
importance and/or frequency, and therefore relevance of these items to marital power 
(Agarwala and Lynch 2006; Gillespie 1971). 
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CHAPTER 3. WOMEN’S AUTHORITY IN HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
  In this chapter, I review major theoretical perspectives and empirical 
evidence pertaining to the dimension of women’s empowerment that is the focus of 
my analysis – namely, women’s authority in household decisionmaking.  
Theoretical Perspectives On Household Decisionmaking 
In this dissertation, I focus on the role of married women’s productive work 
and relative economic advantages in shaping their household decisionmaking 
authority in a context where women’s work participation is low and traditional gender 
norms prevail. Several strands of literature are rel vant to this discussion and can be 
grouped into two broad camps – one that emphasizes micro-level interactions and 
individual characteristics, and the other that underscores the role of social context in 
influencing decisionmaking patterns within households. Resource theory underscores 
the role of individuals’ relative economic resources in shaping intra-household 
decisionmaking. Performance theories focus on household decisionmaking as an 
arena in which husbands and wives deploy cultural gender schemas. In contrast to 
these more micro-level theorizations, stand theories of institutionalized patriarchy and 
bargaining approaches. Theories of institutionalized patriarchy suggest that women’s 
disadvantages are institutionalized and create long-term patterns of intra-household 
inequalities that have little do with resources, and whether a woman is employed or 
not. Bargaining approaches challenge unitary models of household decisionmaking 
arguing that household decisionmaking is a bargaining process in which who can be 
bargained with, what can be bargained over, and the extent of bargaining are shaped 
by broader structural factors.  
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Resource theory: economic advantages and household decisionmaking 
Early theorizations of intra-household gender relations focused on efficiency 
in decisionmaking assuming that individuals most qualified to make decisions would 
do so. This is based on the assumption of neoclassial economics that decisionmaking 
is a unitary process carried out by an altruistic head who makes decisions for the 
entire household based on common preferences and tastes in order to maximize the 
household’s utility (Becker 1991). The most efficient way to maximize utility is 
through specialization and exchange based on comparative advantage in economic 
resources (Becker 1973; Becker 1974; Becker 1991; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2010).  
Resource theory underlines the role of economic resources in shaping 
household decisionmaking and was first articulated by Blood and Wolfe (1960) in 
their seminal study of marriage dynamics among couples in Detroit, Michigan in 
which they explore husbands’ and wives’ authority in household decisions. Although 
Blood and Wolfe (1960) define resources “as anything that one partner may make 
available to the other, helping the latter satisfy his needs or attain his goals,” resource 
theory has generally been framed in terms of comparative advantages in economic 
resources.  
Variation in decisionmaking patterns between couples can be explained 
mostly by differences in their relative educational levels, occupational prestige and 
income (Blood and Wolfe 1960). Education is a source of power in so far as it confers 
skills and knowledge useful for decisionmaking and lso facilitates opportunities to 
engage in employment, which generates resources. Similarly, work participation 
confers knowledge and interpersonal skills, in addition to income. Occupational status 
matters in so far as more prestigious jobs generate self-confidence, and involve 
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communication and negotiation skills and responsibility, which can be leveraged in 
decisionmaking at home (Blood and Wolfe 1960).  
Blood and Wolfe argue that cultural scripts for gend r roles play a trivial role 
in martial power dynamics by pointing to deviations from traditional norms among 
sub-groups of the population whom we might expect to have a more patriarchal 
balance of power, such as farm families, Catholics families and immigrant families. 
The authors conclude that cultural scripts for gender roles do not define power 
dynamics; rather ideologies emerge to justify a particular pattern which can only be 
based on ‘pragmatic’ resources (Blood and Wolfe 1960).  
Resource theory in a cultural context: resources as culturally relevant 
Empirical evidence highlights the limitations of economic resources in 
explaining household decisionmaking patterns. The rev rsal of the effects of 
education, occupation and income on husbands’ authority in Greece and Yugoslavia 
compared to the United States, France, Germany and De mark, where they are 
positively related, indicates that economic advantages only partially explain martial 
power. The theory of resources in a cultural context, articulated by Rodman (1967; 
1972) underscores the importance of context (patriarchal norms) in giving meaning to 
resources.  
Performance theories: deference as gender performance 
The hypothesized relationship between relative economic resources and intra-
household gender relations breaks down when women’s conomic standing (e.g. 
relative earnings or relative contribution to household expenditure) exceeds that of 
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their husbands, highlighting the importance of performing cultural gender scripts 
(Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, and Matheson 2003; Brines 1994; Tichenor 1999).  
The idea of gender performance was first articulated by Goffman (1976) and 
later developed by West and Zimmerman (1987) and West and Fenstermaker (1995). 
Gender is articulated in a series of daily interactions that give meaning to what it 
means to be a woman or man. The salience of gender scripts in intra-household 
gender dynamics has been documented in research on the household division of labor. 
For example, in a sample of married couples in the United States, men’s share of 
housework is positively correlated with women’s contribution to household expenses 
so long as women do not contribute more than one-half. Dependent men’s 
contributions to housework decreases as their dependency increases beyond this 
point; and this is true for men in poor households r long-term unemployment (Brines 
1994). Two mechanisms are at play here: women do not pressure men to do more 
because they do not want to emasculate them, or men assert their masculinity by 
doing less housework (Brines 1994). Similar findings of gender deviation correction 
behavior are reported for a sample of Australian couples. Men’s share of housework 
is positively correlated to women’s relative earnings up to a certain point, thereafter 
the gender gap widens and this is due to Australian women putting in more time 
(Bittman et al. 2003).  
More recent research on gender has challenged its salience as a master 
category, arguing that certain social interactions a d social institutions can render 
gender less important and therefore offer resistance to mainstream gender roles 
(Deutsch 2007). While gender scripts may be salient in given conditions, some have 
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tried to highlight women’s cooption of traditional scripts to gain concessions and 
resources underscoring both conformity and resistance to power relations that 
subordinate women (Gallagher 2007).  Others have maintained the master status of 
gender but demonstrated conditions under which interac ions with different social 
institutions result with different implications for gender equality (Ridgeway 2009). 
While gender performance theories have mostly been used to explain the 
household division of labor, they can be extended to marital power relations. In 
patriarchal societies, or societies in transition toward egalitarianism, women’s 
advantages in economic resources can translate intolower authority in 
decisionmaking (or particular aspects of decisionmaking) either because women 
choose to relegate more power to their husbands to reify their claims to masculinity, 
or men exercise greater veto power or annex more authority over decisions to assert 
their masculinity.  
Institutionalized male authority and bargaining approaches 
Feminist scholarship has raised important blind spots in the assumptions of 
neoclassical model of the family which underpin resource theory (Agarwal 1997; 
Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2010; England and Budig. 1998). It ignores conflict of 
interests and power asymmetries, assuming a shared utility function for all members 
of the household (England and Budig. 1998; Folbre 2001). Resource theories on 
marital power dynamics also ignore other resources that are traded in marriage such 
as love, sex and affection (Safilios-Rothschild 1970).   
More relevant to the discussion at hand, feminist theories of power underscore 
the role of interlocking systems of power or gender stratification that reinforce 
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women’s inferior position within the household, community, market and broader 
society (Collins et al. 1993; Sen and Batliwala 2000). While individual resources such 
as education, income and occupational status matter, men’s continued dominance is a 
result of institutionalized male supremacy (Gillespi  1971). The distribution of 
economic resources has to do with institutionalized male authority; comparative 
advantage is not necessarily innate but influenced by public policies such as tax and 
social security (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2010). Contextual factors such as social 
norms and gender ideologies influence who is involved in the process of household 
decisionmaking; what can be bargained over; and the extent of bargaining permissible 
(Agarwal 1997).  
Bargaining approaches construe household decisionmaki g in terms of 
bargaining based on game theory (Agarwal 1997; Manser and Brown 1980) in which 
household members have different interests and act strategically to advance their own 
wellbeing (Osmani 2007). The term ‘patriarchal bargain’ was first coined by 
Kandiyoti (1988) to refer to the strategies women adopt despite asymmetrical power 
relations. Women negotiate their identities, roles and responsibilities by adopting 
different strategies ranging from acquiescence and collaboration to subversion, co-
option and flagrant opposition (Kandiyoti 1988). Thus, household decisionmaking 
can involve both conflict (Ulph 1988) and cooperation (Manser and Brown 1980; 
McElroy and Horney 1981), and the gains of cooperation are not necessarily equally 
shared; the person with greater bargaining power gets a bigger share. Factors that 
improve women’s fallback position - the situation that would arise if cooperation 
breaks down, enhances women’s leverage within the household (Osmani 2007).  
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Empirical evidence on the determinants of women’s decisionmaking 
authority 
Empirical evidence from developing countries illustrates that authority in 
household decisionmaking is associated with women’s absolute and relative material 
and non-material resources Contextual factors, which include gender norms and 
economic structure, are also influential in determining sources of women’s household 
authority and the size of their effects.   
Among Ghanaian couples, spouses’ relative educational a d occupational 
levels are correlated with different decisionmaking modes (i.e. syncratic, autonomic 
or autocratic) (Oppong 1970). Formal education, access to work and contributions to 
household expenses enhance women’s authority in house ld decisionmaking among 
Nigerian couples (Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye 1999). The magnitude and 
statistical significance of the effects of women’s economic resources can vary by 
dimension of decisionmaking. Empirical evidence from Sri Lanka indicates that 
women’s education and earnings enhance their participa on in financial decisions, 
but not in decisions regarding the household’s social and organizational life, which 
historically and culturally are relegated to men (Malhotra and Mather 1997).  
A cross-country comparison of the determinants of wmen’s autonomy in 
Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua indicates that the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the effects of women’s education and income on their decisionmaking authority 
varies not only by dimension of decisionmaking, buty country as well (Heaton 
1996). Multicounty studies of women’s empowerment in India, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines and Pakistan find that in more traditional settings, the number of sons, 
age, marital duration, dowry, nuclear residence and women’s family position (married 
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to household head) are more important predictors of women’s authority in economic 
decisionmaking and access to/control over own and fmily resources than education 
or labor force participation (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; Mason 1997). In societies 
characterized by strong natal kinship ties, frequency of contact with natal kin is 
positively correlated with authority in household decisionmaking and control over 
finances (Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001). For rural Guatemalan households, 
structural factors, such as the type of economic production (e.g. agricultural versus 
non-agricultural, export manufacturing etc…) and leve  of economic development are 
more important predictors of husbands’ authority in household decisionmaking than 
spouses’ or households’ characteristics (Marion 2004).  
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CHAPTER 4. WOMEN’S WORK PARTICIPATION: WHO WORKS AND DOES 
WORK ENHANCE WOMEN’S HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING 
AUTHORITY? 
Because I am interested in the effects of women’s work and other economic 
resources on authority in household decisionmaking in a context where women’s 
work is rare and traditional gender norms prevail, in this chapter, I expand my 
discussion of women’s labor force participation. I provide a conceptual and 
methodological note on women’s work in developing countries and MENA region. 
Since there is some selectivity in who works, I review theoretical perspectives on 
women’s work in developing countries. I explicate th  process by which productive 
work is theorized to increases women’s household authority. I also address the issue 
of endogeniety between women’s work and authority in household decisionmaking 
since it is possible that women who are empowered within their households are more 
likely to overcome social and cultural barriers to participating in productive work. 
Conceptual And Methodological Note On Women’s Work In 
Developing Countries 
To qualify the results of my analysis, which rely on household survey data and 
quantitative methods, a note on issues in the measur ment of women’s work in 
developing countries and MENA in specific is required. 
In developing nations, most of women’s productive work is unpaid work in 
family farms and businesses, subsistence farming, self-employment, home-based 
work or informal work and is not reflected in national labor statistics leading to an 
undercounting (Anker 1983; Beneria 1992; Boserup 1970; Das 2005; Donahoe 1999). 
Distinctions between primary and secondary activity contributes to underreporting; 
most women report their primary activity as being a housewife so they are reported as 
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being economically inactive (Donahoe 1999). Other reasons for the undercounting of 
women’s economic activity in official statistics includes phrasing of the question 
which lead to self-exclusion by women respondents, and interviewers deciding on the 
basis of sex and their own stereotypes of work (Boserup 1971; Boserup 1970; Das 
2005; Donahoe 1999). 
The 1993 Systems of National Accounts (SNA), which establishes an 
internationally agreed upon framework and guidelines for the compilation of 
economic activity data, provides a revised definitio  of economic activity which 
includes a narrow range of unpaid work - mostly goods produced for self-
consumption and subsistence that could otherwise be sold (Beneria 1992; Vanek 
1996). Unpaid work, such as child and elderly care, cooking and cleaning are 
excluded (Vanek 1996). The expanded definition still leads to underreporting, and in 
some cases governments do not adhere to it (Hirway 2000). Expanded definitions of 
productive work combined with time-use surveys may help achieve a more accurate 
picture of the extent of women’s participation in productive work (Donahoe 1999; 
Hirway 2000).   
Although time-use surveys have gained popularity since the 1990s, and have 
been conducted in 64 developed and developing countries, only 5 countries in MENA 
have implemented time-use surveys – namely, Iraq (2007), Morocco (2011-2012), 
Oman (2007-2008), Palestinian Territories (2000), and Turkey (2006) (United 
Nations Statistics Division 2012). Time-use surveys can be costly and time-
consuming. Other measurement techniques such as activities lists provide more 
comprehensive and accurate levels of women’s participa on in productive work 
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compared to standard keyword questions (Langsten and Salen 2008) because they 
eliminate prior assumptions about work by the interviewer and respondent (Anker 
1983). Despite revisions to concepts and definitions f work and new measurement 
techniques, a focus on paid formal sector work persists because data on formal sector 
paid work are available and more reliable (Moghadam 2005). The lack of detailed and 
reliable data has contributed to a narrow focus – namely, whether women work or 
not. Other measures, such as differences in ear ings, occupational status, and quasi-
work experience, are largely absent in labor market analysis and sociological analysis 
of family dynamics. 
Data issues on women’s work participation in MENA 
Some additional methodological notes on the collection of data on women’s 
work in MENA are worth making in order to outline the challenges of doing 
empirical research in this region and put the contribu ions of this dissertation into 
context. 
With a few exceptions (Cinar 2001a; Doumato and Posusney 2003; Salehi-
Ishfahani 2001), most information on women’s work in MENA is from ethnographic 
studies (Ibrahim 1985; Lobban 1998; Moghadam 2005). Standard conceptualizations 
of productive work, operationalizations and measurement techniques place a 
downward bias on women’s participation in productive activities. The lack of data on 
women’s productive work due to the conceptual and methodological shortcomings 
discussed above, coupled with the lack of time-serie  data and inconsistent definitions 
of work preclude the analysis of trends (Moghadam 2005). The absence of gender-
disaggregated data limits analysis of gender differences in income and wages 
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(Moghadam 2005; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia 2007; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
2012).  While international sources of data are avail ble, inconsistencies among these 
sources and between national and international ones, (Moghadam 2005) can influence 
confidence in results.   
Who works? Theory and evidence on women’s work in developing 
countries 
Two theoretical streams on the determinants of women’s labor force 
participation stand out. The first emphasizes individual (i.e. personal endowments) 
and household level characteristics, and the second underscores the role of structural 
factors, such as gender and family norms, economic structures, legislation (labor 
laws, social protection, family policies), capital accumulation, population density and 
access to land which shape whether women work and the nature of their work 
(Beneria and Sen 1981; Boserup 1970; Cinar 2001b).  
 According to neoclassical economic models, women’s labor force 
participation is influenced by preferences or tastes, the wage rate and nonwage 
income available. Women work when the market wage rat is higher then the value 
placed on their time at home. Women’s education increases the opportunity cost of 
staying home. Increases in men’s relative wages have an income effect and are 
negatively related to women’s labor force participation. Increases in women’s relative 
wages have a substitution effect whereby women scale b ck nonmarket time and 
increase their hours in market work. A change in women’s relative wages affects both 
their labor force participation and hours worked, although the effect on hours worked 
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is less predictable relative to the effect on women’s labor force participation. 
Countervailing forces such as substitutes for childare, whether formal (paid 
childcare) or informal (family), may also increase women’s labor force participation 
(Blau et al 2005).  
Individual and household level characteristics  
Several inter-related and mutually reinforcing factors account for women’s 
participation in paid work and the formal sector in MENA. These include individual-
level factors such as age, education, socio-economic class, delays in age at marriage, 
marital status, presence/absence of the husband, fertility, size and the size and 
composition of the household (Lloyd 1991; Moghadam 2005). An empirical study of 
the nature of women’s labor market participation and level of participation (hours) in 
Egypt finds that women’s age, education, marital sttus and the employment status of 
male household members are important predictors (Asaad and El-Hamidi 2001). 
Structural factors 
Women’s participation in paid employment and the formal sector in MENA 
are also shaped by structural factors (Cinar and Anbarci 2001) which include level of 
economic development and type of economic structure, pervasiveness of religious 
institutions and traditional gender and family forms.  
Economic structures and the pull toward productive work 
Feminist political economic perspectives highlight t e role of economic 
structures in creating a distribution of opportunities and resources suitable for 
women’s participation. For example, differential patterns of women’s participation in 
paid work and by type of sector in Jordan, Iran andTunisia can be partially explained 
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by different economic structures – non-oil, oil economy and mixed oil economy, 
respectively.  Export manufacturing economies are more likely to create female-typed 
jobs than oil export economies (Moghadam 2005).  
The rise in women’s labor force participation and the feminization of 
manufacturing elsewhere in Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and South 
Korea were a response to a number of push and pull factors. The supply of suitable 
(female-typed) jobs generate a pull factor while low males wages create a push factor 
(Moghadam 2005). With the exceptions of Morocco andTunisia, we do not observe a 
feminization of manufacturing in the Arab region commensurate with that of East 
Asia (Karshenas 2002). Not all MENA countries pursued export-oriented 
industrialization, many continue to depend on oil exports, foreign exchange and 
remittances (Moghadam 2005). Historically high male wages in the non-agricultural 
sector allowed for the persistence of the single-breadwinner patriarchal family 
structure (Karshenas 2002).  
Cultural norms, legislation and government policies 
Economic structures do not operate on their own but rather interact with other 
structural factors such as cultural norms, legislation and government policies that can 
reinforce women’s place at home or encourage women’s participation in productive 
work in the market. Women’s economic activity and economic resources are shaped 
by their productive and reproductive roles and the int raction between the two 
(Beneria 1979; Beneria and Sen 1981). The political economy of the Arab region 
along with the pervasiveness of patriarchal norms create what Moghadam (2005) 
terms a “patriarchal gender contract” in which men r main the breadwinners and 
women the homemakers. The rise in religious orthodoxy among the predominately 
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Muslim populations may also play a role (Miles 2002). The persistence of patriarchal 
laws such as fathers’ and husband’s control over women’s mobility (e.g. permission 
to travel) or the ability to access credit is one aspect (Moghadam 2005). While 
structural adjustment policies have had both positive and negative effects on women’s 
labor force participation (Moghadam 2001), women’s low participation in the formal 
paid sector and their marginalization into low paying jobs have been linked to the 
failure of the region’s family systems to catch up with contemporary economic 
realities (Karshenas and Moghadam 2001). Even if patriarchal norms reinforced by 
political Islam are not necessarily incompatible with women’s work, a study of 
women’s labor force participation in urban Turkey finds that they shape the nature of 
women’s work leading to the concentration of women in a small segment of formal 
sector jobs and informal work that do not require travel, late and overnight work 
(Okten 2001). Cultural norms and gender systems perpetuate men’s control over 
women and enforce a modest demeanor, which may result with seclusion from the 
public sphere and partially explain women’s concentration in self-employment, 
home-based production and unpaid work in family businesses (Moghadam 2005).  
However, economic necessity can overpower norms of m desty and 
seclusion, as reflected by the participation of low-income Egyptian wives and 
daughters in factory work (Nadim 1985). A study of women’s labor force 
participation in the Palestinian territories illustrates that women’s low labor force 
participation rates and concentration in marginalized sectors (informal work, 
domestic services and low paid agricultural work) has more to do with limited 
economic opportunities than cultural restrictions o women’s work (Hammami 2001). 
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State policies to invest in women’s health, education and employment matter 
in terms human capital formation. Women’s educational attainment in the Arab 
region has increased over the decades, and in several countries women’s enrollment 
in tertiary education exceeds that of men (Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia 2004). However, women’s labor force participation in MENA is about 
20 percent and is the lowest in the world (World Bank 2012). The issue of women’s 
labor force participation in the region is not necessarily an issue of human capital 
endowments per se (Robinson 2005), but rather the lack of pull factors or supply of 
suitable jobs and an overarching environment that is conducive to women’s work.   
Labor laws, such as maternity leave and equal pay are instrumental in 
institutionalizing support for women’s paid employment and formal sector work. 
Discrimination in the labor market in hiring practices and wages, especially given the 
preponderance of high male and youth unemployment in the region, contributes to 
women’s low participation in paid and formal sector work in the Middle East 
(Moghadam 2005). Amendments to family law abolishing existing restrictions on 
women’s ability to accept employment, travel, and take out a loan without the 
approval of fathers and/or husbands are also needed (Karshenas and Moghadam 
2001). 
Does work increase women’s household decisionmaking authority? 
Issues of endogeniety between women’s work and empowerment 
Research on women in MENA has focused on explaining their low levels of 
labor force participation – the lowest in the world. The focus on women’s 
participation in paid work stems from two underlying assumptions – the first being 
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that access to and control over economic resources (such as income generated by 
employment) is “…the most important and achievable (though certainly not the sole) 
independent variable affecting gender stratification at a variety of “nested” micro and 
macro levels ranging from the couple to the state” (Blumberg 1991). The second is 
the assumption that what was emancipatory for women in developed countries would 
apply to women in developing countries (Malhotra and Mather 1997). The purpose of 
this dissertation is to empirically test whether women’s work and relative economic 
advantages increase their authority in the household in a setting where women’s work 
is rare and traditional gender norms prevail. My analytical strategy rests on the 
following theorizations of how work participation is expected to increase women’s 
authority within the household. 
 Participation in productive work, especially paid employment, is expected to 
influence women’s empowerment in general, and authority in decisionmaking in 
particular by: (a) providing material resources (income) and knowledge; (b) freeing 
them from subordinate unpaid positions within the family; (c) enhancing 
communication and negotiation skills; (d) improving self-confidence and feelings of 
self-efficacy; and (e) providing social prestige esp cially in occupations that are 
socially regarded in high standing (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Kabeer, Mahmud, and 
Tasneem 2011; Malhotra and Mather 1997). Figure 2 illustrates the pathways through 
which women’s work is theorized to impact women’s authority within the household. 
 Broadly speaking, there are two distinct perspectiv s on the effects of 
women’s work and income-generating activities on their empowerment within and 
outside of the household (Pearson 2004). The notion that work or income-generating 
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activities increase women’s empowerment, or leads to greater bargaining power, is 
supported in the work of several scholars (Bergmann 2005; Blood and Wolfe 1960; 
Blumberg 1991; Goode 1963; Kessler-Harris 2001; Manser and Brown 1980). Other 
scholars find that the effects of work are not always positive for women (Bahramitash 
2007; Greenhalgh 1991; Hartmann 1979; Kopinak 1995; Mason 1986).  
Results of empirical studies suggest that the effects of women’s labor force 
participation on their authority in household decisionmaking depends on the 
following: (a) the nature of work (e.g. formal sector and outside of the home versus 
informal and in the household) and process by which women come to work; (b) type 
of decision (e.g. financial versus personal and child-related); and (c) contextual 
setting (e.g. gender norms).  
Effects of women’s work by employment status and process through which women 
come to engage in productive work 
Evidence from Bangladesh and Nigeria suggest that the nature of women’s 
work is likely to impact their voice and agency; formal and semi-formal work and 
work outside of the house are related to the most pitive outcomes for women’s 
decisionmaking authority (Kabeer, Mahmud, and Tasneem 2011; Kritz and Makinwa-
Adebusoye 1999). Whether work is empowering for women has to do with the 
process in which women come to be engaged in paid work (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 
2001). Employment has a different meaning for poor versus rich women; for the 
former it may very well be a family responsibility due to need rather than the basis for 
independence (Sathar and Desai 2000; Sharma 1980).  
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Effects of women’s work by type of household decision 
For a sample of Sri Lankan women, current, past and quasi work experiences 
are important for bolstering women’s authority in fancial decisions but not social 
and organizational ones (Malhotra and Mather 1997). Similarly, among a sample of 
Bangladeshi women, women’s participation in regular fo mal-sector work is 
positively correlated with greater authority in economic decisionmaking, but not 
personal or child related matters (Kabeer, Mahmud, an  Tasneem 2011).  
Effects of women’s work by contextual setting 
While participation in paid work outside of the house may be an important 
predictor of women’s authority in household decisionmaking, the size and statistical 
significance of effects differ by the extent to whic  gender and family norms are 
patriarchal (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001), and the overall country context (Heaton, 
Huntsman, and Flake 2005). In rural Bangladesh, family position (i.e. relationship to 
the head of the household) is the most important covariate of women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking while women’s work has no effect (Balk 1997). The 
differential effect of work on women’s empowerment by context may partially have 
to do with contextual variations in the acceptability of work and the type of work 
opportunities available, as well as conceptual and methodological variations in 
women’s empowerment and work (Kabeer, Mahmud, and Tasneem 2011).  
Endogeniety between women’s work and women’s authority within the household 
The positive correlation between women’s participation in productive work 
and empowerment within the household could be due to the fact that women who are 
empowered within the household are those who are likely to overcome social cultural 
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barriers to their participation in paid work (Kabeer, Mahmud, and Tasneem 2011). 
The endogeniety between women’s work and empowerment (Balk 1997) can be 
addressed methodologically in a number of ways, which I discuss in the Chapter on 
Data and Methods.  
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CHAPTER 5. DOES OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE MATTER FOR WOMEN’S 
HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING 
Because this dissertation aims to broaden our understanding of the conditions 
under which women’s work increases authority in household decisionmaking, I make 
the case for including relative spousal occupational prestige. First, I provide a 
background on occupational status in the social sciences literature. Next, I review 
empirical evidence on the relationship between occupational status and various 
dimensions of women’s empowerment. I provide an overview of how occupational 
status has been operationalized in research (i.e. measures) and why occupational 
prestige scores, specifically Treiman’s Standard International Occupational Prestige 
Scores, are a suitable for the study at hand.  
Occupational status in sociological research  
 Starting the 1960s, occupational status featured pominently in scholarship on 
social stratification and social mobility in advanced countries (Faunce 1990; Gusfield 
and Schwartz 1963; Treiman 1976). Within family studies, research on occupational 
status has explored its impact on a number of gender and family outcomes and 
dynamics including: wife and child abuse (McCloskey 1996); marital satisfaction 
(Richardson 1979); psychological wellbeing (Carlton and McCullough 1981); shifts 
in marriage (i.e. dissolution) and wives’ work trajectories (i.e. labor market exit, 
move to traditional or lower status job or advancement) (Philliber and Hiller 1978; 
Philliber and Hiller 1983; Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1996); and household 
decisionmaking patterns (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Oppong 1970).  
 42
Empirical evidence on occupational status and intra-household 
gender dynamics 
Empirical evidence on the strength of the relationship between occupational 
status and gender dynamics within the household is mixed and varies depending on 
our operationalization of occupational status, and whether we are considering wives’ 
or husbands’ status separately or jointly. The relationship between occupational 
prestige and time spent doing housework is less conistent than the impact of other 
measures of relative resources, such as earnings and education (Shelton and John 
1996). Men’s occupational status can have a negative impact on their housework time 
(McAllister 1990), a positive association (Deutsch, Lussier, and Servis 1993) or none 
at all (Coverman 1985). Women’s occupational status may matter more than men’s. 
Men married to women in decisionmaking/authority positi ns are likely to share more 
equitably in housework in both Sweden and the United States (Aytac 1990). 
Alternatively, women’s relative occupational authority decreases their housework 
time (Brayfield 1995). Men’s share of housework increases when both spouses are in 
professional/managerial occupations compared to those in which neither spouse is in 
such occupations, although the difference in housework is really more of a decrease 
in wives’ contribution than an increase in husbands’ (Presser 1994). A study of equal 
occupational status dual-earner couples with children found that equality in public 
roles does not necessarily translate into more egalitari nism at home (Biernat and 
Wortman 1991). 
 43
The case for occupational status in research on household 
decisionmaking 
Despite the mixed evidence on the association between occupational status 
and intra-household gender relations, the inclusion of occupational status in research 
on women’s authority in household decisionmaking can be made on two premises: (a) 
notion of occupational prestige as another resource (Deutsch, Lussier, and Servis 
1993); and (b) women’s authority in decisionmaking as a factor of both relative 
resources and gender identity.  
In so far as employment confers resources other than income, occupational 
status provides confidence and self-efficacy. Certain occupations, especially white-
collar jobs in which women tend to be concentrated, enhance communication and 
negotiation skills which can be leveraged in household decisionmaking (Blood and 
Wolfe 1960). The operationalization of occupational status in terms of occupational 
prestige may be a good measure to include over and above economic activity status 
(i.e. working or not working) and relative income in that is a proxy measure of social 
prestige (Adler and Kraus 1985). 
If men’s sense of masculinity and authority in patriarchal societies derive 
from making the largest economic contribution, relative occupational status matters in 
terms of gender performance (McCloskey 1996). For example, research points to a 
positive correlation between wives’ occupational superiority and the likelihood of 
experiencing wife abuse (Carlton, McCullough, and Sugimoto 1981). While the 
experience of wife abuse represents an extreme attempt by men to enact their gender 
identity and gain power, by the same logic, in patriarchal societies, wives’ 
occupational superiority may be correlated with reduced authority in some household 
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decisions. The mechanisms of gender deviation corretion behavior described in my 
discussion of the effects of women’s economic advantages on the gender gap in 
household labor can also be extended to authority in household decisionmaking. 
Either women relegate greater power in decisions to men and/or men exercise greater 
veto power or annex authority over a larger share of household decisions. 
Operationalizing occupational status in terms of ocupational 
prestige 
Occupational status can be operationalized in several ways, here I make the 
case for its operationalization in terms of Treiman’s Standard International 
Occupational Prestige Scale. I provide a background o  the classification of 
occupations, discuss various measures of occupational status, and summarize the 
advantages of using prestige scores over other measures of occupational status. 
Classification of occupations  
Classifications of occupations have been developed based on a combination of 
objective and subjective criteria. Some of these classifications are status-based 
categorizations of occupations (e.g. occupational prestige) while others are meant to 
map job titles, requirements, and conditions into broad categories (Gottfredson 1980). 
In general, occupations have been classified along the following dimensions: 
occupational status; job characteristics and requirments; self-direction or work 
autonomy; census categories, occupational reinforcers or rewards; and global 
occupational environment characteristics (Gottfredson 1980). 
Efforts to produce internationally comparable data on occupations has resulted 
with international standards, such as the Internatio l Standards for the Classification 
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of Occupations that was developed by the Internatiol Labor Organization (ILO) in 
the 1960s (ISCO-68). ISCO has undergone two revisions resulting with ISCO-88 and 
ISCO-08. The latest revision (ISCO-08) was adopted in December 2007 and the ILO 
only recently released the mapping of ISCO-88 to ISCO-08 (ILO 2010)2. ISCO-88 is 
a four level classification of occupations based on skill requirements. The first digit 
distinguishes nine major occupational groups which are: (1) Legislators, Senior 
Officials and Managers; (2) Professionals; (3) Techni ians and Associate 
Professionals; (4) Clerks; (5) Service Workers and Market Sales Workers; (6) Skilled 
Agricultural and Fishery Workers; (8) Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; 
and (9) Elementary occupations. These nine major grups breakdown into another 
twenty-eight sub-major groups, one-hundred sixteen minor groups and three hundred 
ninety unit groups (ILO 2010).3 ISCO-88 does not differentiate occupations by 
employment status – that is, employer, employee or self employed, and it also blurs 
some industry distinctions (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996).  
Classifications of occupations by status 
ISCO provides an international standard for the classification of occupations 
by skill level (objective criteria). Standards for the classification of occupations based 
on normative criteria (e.g. status) have been developed and mapped to ISCO 
occupational categories to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Of the two main 
classifications of occupational status – occupationl prestige and socioeconomic 
                                                





indices (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996), I focus on the former and explain why 
below. 
Occupational prestige 
Occupational prestige is the most widely appraised an used framework in 
social science research and is based on public perce tions of desirability of an 
occupation (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996; Gottfredson 1980). It is a societal 
evaluation of occupations based on their standing in society and arguably “the best 
indicator of family social position in modern industrialized societies” (Otto 1975). 
Occupational prestige scores are calculated through a weighted average of ranking 
scores over all raters (Zhou 2005). They can have a subjective basis (i.e. ask raters 
why they rated occupations as they did), or an objectiv  basis by providing raters with 
scales on which to rate occupations (e.g. benefit to society, power, skill, social 
standing etc…) (Wegener 1992). 
The Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) was 
developed by Treiman in the late 1970s from secondary analysis of occupational 
prestige data from 86 studies from over 60 countries ranging in level of development 
from western and eastern Europe, north and south America and Asia (Ganzeboom 
and Treiman 1996). The construction of prestige scores follows as similar 
methodology across all countries whereby raters are provided a number of 
occupations to rate and then ratings are aggregated into a mean score.  An analysis of 
the prestige scores from these studies reveals similar rankings in occupations 
irrespective of questionnaire wording, raters’ social standing and countries’ 
occupational structure (e.g. country has few pilots or professors but raters still provide 
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similar ranking for these occupations as raters in countries where these occupations 
are more prevalent). The results were generalized to other countries using the ILO 
International Standard of Classification of Occupations (Treiman 1976). 
Applicability of prestige scores in developing countries  
The universality of prestige scores across industrialized countries has been 
substantiated by some research (Inkeles and Rossi 1956). Within industrialized 
countries, some studies point to different ratings by the age, race and educational 
level of raters (Guppy and Goyder 1984) while other research indicates occupational 
prestige is independent of education and has more t do with the collective 
consciousness of urban and industrial populations which lead to similar evaluations of 
occupations (Balkwell, Bates, and Garbin 1982). This raises the issue of the 
applicability of prestige scores in contexts marked by different economic structures, 
such as non-industrialized countries or rural areas (T nnenbaum and Treiman 1979). 
Political systems and structures different than those f advanced countries may confer 
different levels of social prestige to occupations (Sharlin 1980).  
Prestige scores of occupations are strikingly similar across countries 
irrespective of the level of development, and this ha been attributed to the diffusion 
of Western evaluations of occupations and Western occupational structure due to the 
proliferation of industrial technology and organizat on (Haller and Bills 1979; Haller 
and Lewis 1966; Thomas 1962; Treiman 1976). Research on national prestige scores 
in Chile (Carter Jr and Sepulveda 1964), Iran (Abdollahyan and Nayebi 2009) and 
urban China (Lin and Xie 1988) corroborate the universality of occupational prestige 
rankings.  
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Another critique of occupational prestige measures is that they are not neutral 
to the gender of the incumbents in the occupations or the gender of raters (Haug 
1975; Hawkins and Pingree 1978; Powell and Jacobs 1984; Powers and Holmberg 
1978; Touhey 1974; Xu and Leffler 1992). Research on gender and occupational 
prestige have highlighted differences in occupational prestige given to women and 
men within the same occupation; differences in occupational prestige of sex-typed 
occupations (female-typed are always less prestigous than male-typed jobs even if the 
latter are not more complex) (Haug 1975; Powell and Jacobs 1984), and gender 
difference in the correlates of occupational prestige (e.g. income and education) 
(Bose and Rossi 1983). Some studies show no differenc s in occupational prestige of 
women and men (England 1979). 
In light of concerns with popular-rated prestige scores discussed above, some 
studies on occupational status favor the use of socio-economic indices over the use of 
popular-rated prestige scores because the former are based on objective criteria (i.e 
education and income) (Goyder 2005; Grasmick 1976; Spaeth 1979). Although 
occupational prestige may be correlated with other socio-economic indicators, “a 
fundamental sociological insight is that prestige, like other social statuses or social 
honors, is related to but distinctive from one’s economic resources or structural 
positions” (Zhou 2005: 92).  
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CHAPTER 6. THE COUNTRY CONTEXT: GENDER, WORK AND FAMILY IN 
JORDAN 
Several studies have addressed the effects of women’s work on women’s 
authority within the household. One contribution of this dissertation is that it 
empirically explores the relationship in a context where women’s work participation 
is low and traditional gender norms prevail. The purpose of this chapter is to provide 
an overview of gender, work and family issues in Jordan. I focus on socio-economic 
and demographic indicators of development and gender orms that are relevant to 
women’s productive work and empowerment within the household. I also highlight 
some intra-regional differences in levels of socio-ec nomic development and gender 
norms, linking them to historical differences between religious, ethnic and local 
groups, as well as geography and natural resources which may have influenced the 
development trajectories of different parts of the country. 
Research on women’s labor force participation in Jordan has focused on its 
determinants and correlates, and its relation to ecnomic growth. Jordan has 
implemented extensive reforms to promote its private sector, including investment in 
its human capital base (World Bank 2005). About 5 percent and 9 percent of GDP is 
spent on education and health, respectively (World Bank 2005). These investments 
have translated into some tangible gains for women described below.  
Family formation: marriage and fertility 
Median age at first marriage has increased, but one-half of Jordanian women 
today marry by the age of 22 (Department of Statistics Jordan and Macro 
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International Inc. 2008).4 Childbearing commences soon after marriage; one-half of 
Jordanian women have their first baby by the age of 23.9 (Department of Statistics 
Jordan and Macro International Inc. 2008).5 Although contraceptive use among ever-
married women increased significantly since the 1990s from 40 to 57 percent, rates 
have stabilized since 2002 (Department of Statistics Jordan and Macro International 
Inc. 2008). Mean ideal family size remains relatively high at 3.9 children per woman 
(DOS and Macro Intl. 2008). Total fertility rate inJordan decreased from 7.4 in the 
late 1970s to 3.6 in 2007 (Department of Statistics Jordan and Macro International 
Inc. 2008), but remains among the highest in the region (World Bank 2005). 
Women’s literacy and educational attainment 
Literacy levels and educational attainment among women have improved and 
the gender gap has narrowed. Less than 4 percent of Jordanian women cannot read or 
write and almost 30 percent have a post-secondary degree (Department of Statistics 
Jordan and Macro International Inc. 2008). The gender gap in enrolment in tertiary 
education has been slightly in favor of women (Jansen 2006; Kawar 2000) since the 
early 1990s (UN MDG database 2010). However, Jordanian women and men 
continue to specialize in gender-typed areas (Department of Statistics Jordan 2009). 
Women’s completion rates at the tertiary level remain low and are about one-third of 
that of men, and high drop out rates from both high sc ool and post secondary 
education persist with the primary reason being marriage. (Hendessi 2007) 
                                                
4 Kawar  (2000) places age at marriage in the 1970s at 17 and the DHS (1990) 
estimates women’s median age at marriage in 1990 to be around 19. Also, median age 
at first marriage pertains to women aged 25-49 years 
5 Median age at first birth pertains to women aged 25-49 years. 
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Historical overview of women’s labor force participation in Jordan 
Prior to the 1950s, most of women’s work was as domestic help in private 
households and in light industries (Harris 1958). The lack of industrial production in 
the country combined with the availability of employment opportunities in 
neighboring countries facilitated outward male migration. In the 1970s most male 
migration from Jordan was into Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia (Moghadam 2005). 
High male wages made possible by the oil boom during this period translated into 
sizable remittances that had an income effect on women’s participation in paid work 
(Moghadam 2005). In the 1980s and into the early 1990s, with rising debt and 
changes in the global economy, non-oil producing countries, such as Jordan, switched 
to export–based growth in manufacturing and agricultura  (Moghadam 2005). During 
this period, Jordan beefed up its manufacturing sector (UNDP 2002), focusing on 
textiles, garments, and pharmaceuticals, which today are among the country’s top 
exports along with jewelry, electrical appliances, machinery, chemicals, minerals and 
plastic products (Jordan Investment Board). Jordan h s also worked to develop its 
services sector (i.e. banking, tourism and telecommunication (Moghadam 2005). In 
2007, more than one-half of the country’s GDP came from services, transportation 
and communication, 17 percent from industry and 3 percent from agriculture (Jordan 
Investment Board).  Less than 3 percent of Jordan’s l d is arable and 11.5 percent is 
used for agriculture so employment in this sector is low; in 2009 1 percent of 
women’s employment was in agriculture compared to 2.2 percent of men’s 
employment (World Bank 2013c).  
The correlation between export-led growth and women’s labor force 
participation in manufacturing that was observed in other Asian countries and Turkey, 
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did not occur in Jordan (Moghadam 2005). In 2010, 9.3 percent of employed women 
worked in industry compared to 21 percent of employed men (World Bank 2013c). 
The majority of female employment (90 percent) is in services (World Bank 2013c). 
This may have to do with the nature of the country’s export industry which was not 
conducive to women’s participation.  
The period following the implementation of structural adjustment policies 
(1990s) was particularly harsh on women. During this period women’s 
unemployment was double that of men, and educated women were more likely to be 
without a job than similarly educated men or less educated women as job growth was 
in areas that did not require a high degree of skill or education (Moghadam 2005).  
Current economic activity levels: employment, unemployment and 
underemployment 
Jordanian women’s labor force participation is lower than countries with 
similar levels of socio-economic development (World Bank 2005). Official sources 
put Jordanian women’s labor force participation at about 14 percent (Department of 
Statistics Jordan 2009).6 Moreover, only 12 percent of married Jordanian women are 
employed (Department of Statistics Jordan 2009). Although women’s participation in 
paid work doubled between 1980 and 2000 (Kawar 2000), it is estimated to be at one-
half its potential level (World Bank 2005). Unemployment levels are generally high 
in the country; about 10.3% among men and 24.1% among women according to 2010 
                                                
6 Author’s calculation based on the figures reported by the Jordanian Department of 
Statistics Labor Force Survey results for November 2009. The following data were 
reported: female population aged 15-60 (18,384); femal  population aged 15-60 
employed (2,089); female population aged 15-60 unemployed (531).  
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World Bank data (World Bank 2013c).7 In addition to high levels of unemployment, 
underemployment is pervasive in Jordan and partially related to the mismatch 
between labor market demands and skills (World Bank 2005).  
Occupational segregation, wage and non-wage gender differentials 
When Jordanian women work, they enter highly segregated sectors and 
occupations. This is partially related to the education l curricula, which continue to 
perpetuate traditional gender roles (Hendessi 2007; World Bank 2005). It is also 
related to women’s self selection into traditional majors (e.g. education) or training 
programs (e.g. secretarial work) (Hendessi 2007) which is reinforced by traditional 
cultural norms discussed below. 
 Significant levels of vertical and horizontal occupational segregation impede 
women’s labor force participation (Hendessi 2007; World Bank 2005). Occupational 
segregation in Jordan is estimated to be the highest in MENA (World Bank 2005). 
Women tend to be clustered in the professional and associate professional categories 
while men tend to be more evenly spread out across occupations (Department of 
Statistics Jordan 2009). Additionally, most working women are in the educational and 
health sectors while most men are in public administration and defense sectors, and 
whole sale and retail trade and related fields (Department of Statistics Jordan 2009).  
                                                
7 Unemployment rates for men and women in the fourth quarter of 2011 were 10.7 % 
and 18.3%, respectively according to the Jordan Department of Statistics (2012) 
Department of Statistics Jordan. 2012. "Press Releas  on Unemployment in the 4th 
Quarter of 2011." Accessed at 
http://www.dos.gov.jo/dos_home_e/main/archive/Unemp/4th_quart.pdf on 
10/19/2012.   
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As in most developing countries, the public sector ontinues to be the largest 
employer of women in Jordan (Moghadam 2005; Said 2001; World Bank 2005), 
despite downsizing in recent years (Miles 2002). Government jobs offer better pay, 
job security and longer paid maternity leave (Hendessi 2007). However, women in 
the public sector are clustered in “soft” ministries such as health, education and social 
services (World Bank 2005). Moreover, government regulations on the private sector 
reduce incentives to hire women by increasing direct and indirect costs of hiring them 
(Hijab 1988; Miles 2002). These regulations include paid maternity leave, the 
provision of childcare facilities if the establishment employs more than 20 women, 
and other expenses (Hendessi 2007; World Bank 2005). 
While the purpose of such regulations is to protect women, they create a 
backlash that includes not only occupational segregation, partially related to crowding 
into more female-typed and low(er) paying jobs, but also wide gender wage 
differentials (Hendessi 2007; World Bank 2005). The World Bank (2005) estimates 
that if discrimination were removed and women were paid commensurate with their 
education, then women’s wages would increase by 45 percent in the private sector 
and 13 percent in the public sector (World Bank 2005). Significant nonwage 
differences exist as well. For example, men receive family tax allowances, 
irrespective of the employment status of their spoues. However, female employees 
need to verify that their husbands are incapacitated, d creased or old (World Bank 
2005). 
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Cultural attitudes, gender and family norms 
Gender differentials in the country’s labor market are partially related to 
traditional gender ideologies and norms that curtail women’s public life participation. 
Honor killings are particularly problematic in Jordan and are related to a culture that 
values women’s modesty and seclusion (Moghadam 2005). Jordanian family law 
remains very conservative. Women require the permission of their husbands and/or 
fathers to look for a job and remain in it. Paternal authority continues post marriage; a 
father can prevent his daughter from working even if her husband approves (Sonbol 
2003).  In recent years, the country has witnessed a ratcheting up of Islamic discourse 
emphasizing women’s domestic role, and this has been linked to widespread male 
unemployment (Miles 2002). 
Cultural attitudes and family norms are particularly constraining for women of 
low-income groups (Miles 2002), but have had no impact on women’s enrolment in 
universities (Jansen 2006). Jordanian society places  high value on education (Jansen 
2006; Hendessi 2007), for both girls and boys (Allaf 2008) as a status symbol of 
modernity and culturedness (Janson 2006). Women’s education is meant to increase 
their attractiveness in the marriage market rather t an the labor market (Janson 2006).  
The notion that business and work are for men, and that women belong in the house, 
contributes to low completion rates in tertiary education, and consequently low labor 
force participation (Hendessi 2007). Attitudes about appropriate work, stemming 
from concerns for safety and modesty, further limit women’s work options (Kawar 
2000). For example, teaching and embroidery are accptable in so far as they are 
consistent with motherly roles or ‘natural’ abilities (Kawar 2000). Distance of 
workplace from home, transportation, sex segregation in the workplace and work 
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schedules that permit women to return home before da k are among the factors that 
affect whether Jordanian women work and what kind of w rk they do (Kawar 2000; 
Miles 2002, Hendessi 2007). Focus groups of Jordanian men reveal great concern for 
the increasing power working wives show within the ousehold. Husbands felt 
particularly threatened if wives made more money or, if they were unemployed but 
their wives worked. In such circumstances, husbands feel it is warranted to divorce 
their wives (Miles 2002).  
Traditional gender norms and inequalities within the Jordanian family are 
reproduced in the workplace, as discussed in the previous section. Employers prefer 
not to hire women because of their perceived commitent to family and lack of 
experience (Ali, Mustafa, Khouri, and Markaz al-Buhuth 1990), and the additional 
costs of hiring them discussed above. When employers hire women it is at a lower 
pay and position even for the same qualifications as reflected in the gender gap in 
wages (World Bank 2005).  
Intra-regional variations in socioeconomic development and social 
norms 
 There are intra-regional differences in levels of cio-economic development 
such as women’s literacy rates, school enrolment rates nd attainment levels, and 
variations in gender norms such as women’s work participation. (United Nations 
Development Programme and Ministry of Planning and Interational Cooperation of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2011). For example, the proportion of women who 
cannot read or write is highest in the Southern governorate of Karak and lowest in the 
Central governorate of Madaba (United Nations Development Programme and 
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Ministry of Planning and Interational Cooperation of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan 2011). The smallest gender gap in adult literacy is in the Central governorate 
of Amman and the Southern Governorate of Aqaba, while t e widest gap is in the 
Southern governorate of Ma’an. These rates mask urban-rural differences which are 
even wider – rural women have the lowest literacy rates (United Nations 
Development Programme and Ministry of Planning and Interational Cooperation of 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2011).  
Access to vocational training, which can facilitate employment, and the 
distribution of medium and small enterprises which can offer employment 
opportunities, are also uneven across Jordan’s regions (United Nations Development 
Programme and Ministry of Planning and Interational Cooperation of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan 2011). Women’s access to short vocati nal training course is 
lowest in the South, and the concentration of medium and small enterprises is the 
highest in the Central region of Amman and Zarqa and the Southern region of Aqaba 
(United Nations Development Programme and Ministry of Planning and Interational 
Cooperation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2011).  
These intraregional differences may be partially reated to divergent 
development trajectories that have to do with geography and natural resources that 
lead to the concentration of development resources in certain areas. For example, 
Amman has historically been one of the centers of industry (Harris 1958). However, 
intraregional differences may also be linked to profound historical differences 
between the country’s Bedouin tribes, village dwellers and urban comminutes, and 
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the presence of ethnic and religious minorities with historical ties to the West (Harris 
1958).  
 Although Jordan is predominately Arab and Muslim Sunni, there are a few 
religious and ethnic minorities8.  The largest religious non-Muslim minority are 
Christians – mostly Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholics (Harris 
1958). The largest non-Arab ethnic minority are the Circassians – descendants of 
Sunni Muslims who fled the Caucasus after the Russian conquest in the 19th century 
(Harris 1958). Circassians are noted to have more Westernized customs due to their 
historical affiliation with Europe (Harris 1958). Jordan’s Christian minorities also 
have greater assimilation to Western customs given th ir ties to the West by virtue of 
the religion they share; they have also historically been more urbanized, educated and 
wealthy (Harris 1958). 
Contact with the West and the greater assimilation to western practices and 
values also differentiates the West Bankers (i.e. Palestinians) from East Bankers (i.e. 
what is traditionally known as Transjordan). Following 1948, the West Bank was 
annexed and added to the Transjordanian East Bank. The Tranjordanian East Bank is 
largely rural and isolated, while the West Bank terri o y, consisting of Palestinians, is 
mostly urbanized, and by virtue of having been under British mandate rule, was more 
westernized (Harris 1958). The West Bank regions are more secularized compared to 
the historically conservative eastern parts of Jordan (Harris 1958). 
                                                
8 The religious composition of Jordan is as follows: 92 percent Sunni Muslim, 6 
percent Christian, 2 percent Shi’a Muslims and Druze. Source: Jordan Investment 
Board. "Jordan Fact Sheet." Accessed at 
http://www.jordaninvestment.com/JordanataGlance/JordanFactSheet/tabid/2
19/language/en-US/Default.aspx on 03/11/2013.. 
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While tribal affiliation and kinship ties historically have defined the social 
organization of Jordanians, there are profound historical differences in the social 
values, expectations, livelihoods, and dress of the Bedouin nomads/tribes of the 
desert, village dwellers and townspeople. While Bedouin nomads and village dwellers 
share similar kinship patterns that are patrilineal, p trilocal and based on paternal 
authority, town dwellers have been more westernized and in tune with ideals of 
individualism and social and economic progress (Harris 1958). These historical 
differences may partially explain present-day differences gender and family norms.  
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In this dissertation, I empirically test the effects of women’ work and relative 
economic resources on married women’s authority within the household in Jordan net 
of the effects of more culturally relevant sources of power and other background 
individual and household characteristics. Economic resources refer to characteristics 
of women such as their employment status, income and occupational prestige. 
Culturally relevant sources of women’s domestic power refer to attributes of women, 
which based on their gender and position within the family or household, gives them 
respect, prestige and influence (Dixon-Mueller 1978; Dyson and Moore 1983; Mason 
1986). Culturally relevant sources of power reflect the social context (i.e. gender and 
family systems) and include characteristics such as m rital duration, number of 
children, whether the woman is married to the head of household, and whether the 
woman is related to her husband prior to marriage (i.e. endogamy) (Mason 1997).  
Research on the determinants of household decisionmaki g authority has been 
conducted in a broad range of developing countries (Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001; 
Marion 2004; Mason 1997; Mason and Smith 2003; Oppong 1970). Many of these 
studies have focused on the effects of women’s work on authority in decisionmaking 
(Balk 1997; Handapangoda 2012; Heaton, Huntsman, and Flake 2005; Jejeebhoy and 
Sathar 2001; Kabeer, Mahmud, and Tasneem 2011; Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye 
1999; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Rammohan and Johar 2009). However, the 
conditions under which women’s work increases authority within the household 
remain unclear. This dissertation makes several important contributions in this 
respect.  
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First, it explores the effects of women’s work on authority in household 
decisionmaking in a context where women’s work is rare (women’s labor force 
participation in Jordan is less than 15%) and rigid traditional gender norms prevail. 
Second, it tests the importance of women’s work vis-a-vis culturally more relevant 
sources of empowerment, such as women’s family status. Third, it distinguishes 
between different dimensions of household decisionmaking – namely, personal 
decisions and family management decisions. Fourth, it expands our knowledge of the 
conditions through which productive work influences women’s authority within the 
household by looking at the nature of women’s work, relative income and relative 
occupational prestige. Relative income and relative occupational prestige are 
dimensions of women’s work that may influence empowerment within the household 
by conferring both material and non-material resources which can be leverage in 
decisionmaking.  
Finally, most research on women in MENA has focused on women’s low 
labor force participation, the lowest in the world, and structural-level explanations. 
Few studies explore the interrelationship between gder, work and family, and 
quantitative work in this area is limited.  My analytical approach to exploring the 
effects of women’s work and other relative economic advantages rests on several 
theoretical strands pertaining to household decisionmaking as a particular facet of 
women’s empowerment and women’s work. Refer to Figure 3 for a conceptual map 
of the determinants of women’s authority in household decisionmaking.  
In the preceding chapters I discussed theoretical appro ches to, and the 
measurement of, women’s empowerment with a particular focus on women’s 
 62
authority in household decisionmaking. I referred to research on both developed and 
developing countries to summarize how our understanding of the importance, 
meanings, causes and consequences of women’s empowerment and its measurement 
have evolved and where gaps in our knowledge remain. 
Women’s empowerment has been conceptualized both as a condition or state 
and a process. It has also been construed in terms of individual agency and structure. 
While individual characteristics and resources matter, empowerment derives from 
broader institutionalized power relations. The conditions for women’s empowerment 
occur on multiple levels of social organization – the individual, family/household, 
community, market, government and broader society. Additionally, context 
operationalized in terms of gender or family norms, level of socio-economic 
development, or type of economic structure in area of residence, gives social meaning 
to sources of power and conditions the size of effects. The multidimensional nature of 
empowerment implies that the causes and conditions of empowerment differ by 
dimension, and that empowerment in one dimension may not correspond with other 
dimensions. 
My approach to women’s authority in household decisionmaking is based on 
the conceptualization of empowerment as access to and control over material and 
non-material resources that enables one to choose and act free from the control of 
others. Three strands of literature on women’s authority in household decisionmaking 
stand out. Resource theory provides a unitary model f household decisionmaking in 
which authority is based on relative economic resources. Performance theories 
emphasize women’s deference in household decisionmaki g s gender performance 
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rather than a product of individual resources. Theories of institutionalized patriachy 
emphasize institutionalized male dominance while bargaining approaches 
conceptualize household decisionmaking as a bargainin  process shaped by cultural 
norms (i.e. gender and family systems). 
Most empirical research on the determinants of women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking in developing countries hafocused on the effects of 
women’s work. The focus on women’s work rests on two assumptions. First, work 
confers material and nonmaterial resources that women can leverage in household 
bargaining. Second, since women’s labor force participation enhanced women’s 
empowerment in the West, it is theoretically expected o have the same effect in 
developing countries. Evidence from the field indicates mixed effects of work on 
increased authority in household decisionmaking. In more traditional contexts, 
economic advantages may matter less, or not at all, compared to more culturally 
relevant sources of power such as number of living sons and being married to the 
head of the household. Even among seemingly egalitari n couples, or in societies 
transitioning toward greater equality at home and in public, women’s advantages in 
relative economic resources may produce a backlash because of the persistence of 
traditional gender ideology that attributes the largest economic contribution and 
position for men. Under such circumstances, women, men or both may engage in 
gender deviation correction behavior to restore normative roles and behavior – i.e. 
male authority within the household.  
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Research questions and hypotheses 
Based on resource theory in a cultural context, performance theories, theories 
of institutionalized patriarchy and bargaining approaches, and empirical evidence on 
the effects of work on women’s authority within the ousehold, I address the 
following questions: 
1. Does work enhance married women’s decisionmaking authority net of the 
effects of culturally relevant sources of power and other background individual and 
household characteristics? 
 If relative economic resources affect women’s bargaining power within the 
household as resource theory predicts, women who work should have greater 
decisionmaking authority within the household. Moreov r, within the various kinds of 
economic activity women undertake, paid work that confers independent income (in 
contrast to unpaid family work or unpaid work) should confer greater positive 
benefits. On the other hand, if deference in household decisionmaking is more 
performance in service of rigid gender norms as predict d by performance theory, 
than women’s work will not confer greater decisionmaking authority.  
2. Do women’s relative advantages in income and occupational prestige 
enhance women’s authority in household decisionmaking net of the effects of 
individual and household characteristics?  
If relative economic resources affect women’s bargaining power within the 
household as predicted by resource theory, than net of the effects of individual and 
household characteristics, women whose income is about the same or more than their 
husbands are likely to have greater authority in household decisions than women who 
earn less than their spouse or who work but have no arnings. Additionally, women 
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who are in occupations that are equally or more socially prestigious than their 
husbands are likely to have greater authority in household decisions than women 
whose occupational prestige is lower. However, if deference in household 
decisionmaking is more performance in service of rigid gender norms as predicted by 
performance theory, than women’s relative advantages in income and occupational 
prestige will not be associated with greater decisionmaking authority.  
3. Do the effects of women’s work and economic resources (i.e. relative 
income and occupational prestige) on women’s authority within the household vary 
by dimension of domestic power (i.e. type of household decision)?  
If cultural context gives meaning to sources of power as resource theory in a 
cultural context predicts, and if the extent of bargaining and what can be bargained 
over are shaped by social context as predicted by bargaining approaches, than 
women’s work and economic resources are expected to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on women’s authority in personal decisions. On the 
other hand, women’s work and economic resources are exp cted to have a smaller or 
statistically non-significant effect on women’s authority in family management 
decisions which in a patriarchal society may be subject to greater male involvement.  
 4. Do regional characteristics, such as levels of scio-economic development 
and the extent of patriarchal gender norms, condition regional averages of 
women’s household decisionmaking authority and influence the size of the effects 
of women’s work on women’s authority in household decisionmaking? 
 If institutionalized power relations in broader society shape the dynamics of 
intra-household gender dynamics as predicted by theories of institutionalized 
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patriarchy than: (a) women who live in regions marked by above average levels of 
socioeconomic development and less patriarchal norms should experience higher 
levels of household decisionmaking authority regardless of their own characteristics 
and those of their households; and (b) the effects of women’s work on their authority 
in household decisionmaking should be stronger in areas with average or above 
average levels of socio-economic development and less patriarchal norms. Similarly, 
the effects of women’s work on their authority in household decisionmaking should 
be smaller in areas marked by below average levels of socio-economic development 
and more patriarchal gender norms. 
 The hypotheses presented above may be thought of in a complementary rather 
than competing way. For example, if cultural context gives meaning to sources of 
power, what can be bargained over and how much bargainin  can take place, as 
predicted by bargaining approaches and the theory of es urces in a cultural context, 
than economic activity and women’s relative economic resources can still enhance 
women’s decisionmaking authority net of the effects of culturally relevant sources of 
power as predicted by the theory of relative resources. However, cultural gender 
scripts may mediate the extent to which economic resources enhance women’s 
authority within the household – that is, women have leverage to participate in the 
decisionmaking process but not necessarily to exercise exclusive control.  
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CHAPTER 8. DATA AND METHODS 
This research is based on secondary data analysis. In this chapter I describe 
the survey instrument, sampling procedure, measures tilized and the analytical 
sample. I also explain my analytical methodology for approaching my research 
questions. 
The data source for the study is the 2007 Demographic and Health Survey  
(DHS) for Jordan conducted by the Department of Statistics with primary funding 
from the Government of Jordan and USAID and additional funding from UNICEF 
and UNFPA.9 DHS surveys cover a variety of population and healt  issues and have 
been carried out in many developing countries. Jordan has conducted four standard 
DHS surveys in 1990, 1997, 2002 and 2007 and an interim survey in 2009. The 2007 
Jordan DHS is unique in that it offers detailed data on women’s economic activity, 
including employment status, relative income and occupational status. 
The 2007 Jordan DHS is a nationally representative sample of 14,564 
households that covers all 12 governorates and urban and rural areas. The sampling 
frame does not include remote areas and therefore excludes the nomadic population. 
Populations in group housing are also not covered (i. . hospitals, hotels, prisons, and 
work camps. In addition to a household module, a questionnaire was administered to 
10,876 eligible ever-married women aged 15-49 who slept in the selected household 
the night before the survey interview. The eligible women response rate was 97.9 
percent (Department of Statistics Jordan and Macro International Inc. 2008). Due to 
my focus on the effects of women’s relative resources on authority in household 
                                                
9 The survey is entitled the “Jordan Population and Family Health Survey” and is 
part of the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys Programs. 
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decisions, my sample is restricted to currently married women. This leaves us with a 
sample size of 10,360 currently married women, about 96 percent of the original 
sample. Descriptive statistics of my dependent, independent and control variables are 
presented in Appendix Table 1. 
Dependent variables 
The part of the questionnaire that is of most interest for this study has to do 
with questions on various aspects of household decisionmaking. Women were asked 
“who usually decides….” or “who usually makes decision …” on/about the 
following: (1) how husband’s earnings are used; (2) health care for yourself; (3) 
making major purchases; (4) making purchases for daily household needs; and (5) 
visits to your family and relatives. Response categori s include respondent only, 
respondent and husband, husband only and other.  The frequency distributions of 
these decisionmaking variables are presented in Appendix Table 2.  
In many developing countries, household decisionmaking is not confined to 
the conjugal pair and may include other co-residing relatives such as parents and in-
laws. However, the majority of households in Jordan are nuclear (88 percent of 
analytic sample).10 Thus, about one percent or fewer women reported someone else as 
the person who usually decides. I recode my dependent variable in terms of decisions 
for which women are the sole deciders (sole authority). I also construct a secondary 
measure of women’s authority in household decisionmaking that accounts for 
women’s participation in decisionmaking (shared authori y) that includes women who 
                                                
10 I define a nuclear household as one in which there is only one married female and 
one married male.  
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decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone. While it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the respondent is the junior or equal partner in shared decisionmaking (Desai 
and Johnson 2005), distinguishing between women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking in terms of exclusive control versus participation may reveal the 
effects of women’s work on enhancing women’s participation in household 
decisionmaking that would otherwise be masked if we focused exclusively on 
women’s sole authority.  
In addition to distinguishing between different levels of authority (sole versus 
shared), I use principal components factor analysis to distinguish between different 
dimensions of household decisionmaking. I first model household decisionmaking 
authority with all five items described above. Each of the five decisionmaking 
variables are reverse coded so that the highest score is assigned to the response 
category “Respondent alone”, followed by “Respondent a d Husband”, “Husband 
alone” and “Someone Else/Other.” Items that do not load well on a factor (less than 
0.40) are deleted. The extracted components are labled to best describe the 
dimension of decisionmaking within the household that each factor appears to 
represent based on variables with the highest loadings (0.40 or more) after rotation on 
that factor, and in keeping with theory and practical utility.   
Results of the principal component factor analysis are presented in Table 1 
and indicate that household decisionmaking is underlined by two dimensions which I 
refer to as family management decisions (factor 1) and personal decisions (factor 2) 
based on the items with the highest loadings. Decisions relating to daily needs, large 
purchases, social visits, and husband’s earnings all load on factor 1 with loadings of 
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0.6 or greater after rotation. The decision relating o personal health loads on factor 2 
with a loading of 0.9 after rotation.  
Rather than utilizing predicted scores, I construct a summative index for 
family management decisionmaking ranging from 0-4 reflecting the number of 
decisions (i.e. decisions relating to daily needs, large purchases, social visits, and 
husband’s earnings) for which women report having sole or shared authority. The use 
of a summative index is justified in this case as its composition is substantiated by the 
results of the factor analysis. Additionally, a summative index provides a more 
intuitive understanding for the reader than a predict  score, and facilitates cross-
country comparisons. Since the summative index for s le authority in family 
management decisionmaking is highly positively skewed with many zero values, I 
recode this measure into a binary outcome variable in which women who have a score 
of 1 or greater on the sole authority in family management index are coded “1” and 
women with a score of 0 on the index are coded “0”.  The frequency distribution on 
the index measuring shared authority in family management decisionmaking is only 
slightly skewed, so no transformation of this variable is necessary. I analyze women’s 
personal decisionmaking as a binary variable. Therefore, all subsequent analyses are 
conducted on four dependent variables: 
1. Sole authority in at least one family management related decision 
(binary)  
2. Shared authority in family management decisionmaking i dex 
(continuous) 
3. Sole authority in personal decisionmaking (binary) 
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4. Shared authority in personal decisionmaking (binary) 
About 66 percent of women in the analytical sample report being the sole 
decision maker on at least one family management related matter. On average, 
women in my analytical sample reported participating in 2.6 of 4 family 
management-related decisions. Almost one-half of the sample (47 percent) reported 
exclusive authority in personal decisionmaking while 89 percent reported shared 
authority in personal matters. 
Independent variables 
Because this study focuses on whether economic resources adequately explain 
women’s empowerment within the household, I use four measures of economic 
activity– current labor force participation, employment status, relative income and 
relative occupational prestige.  
Labor force participation 
The DHS asked women “have you done any work in the last seven days, even 
for one hour. By “work” I mean any paid work, any work in a business completely or 
partially owned by yourself, any work in a business owned by the household without 
payment or work in any other business.” The survey uses an expanded definition of 
work that captures both paid and unpaid work and home-based work or work in 
family business. The measure of work I use includes women who reported working in 
last seven days or had a job but were absent from it in last seven days. Approximately 
13 percent of the analytical sample is currently working. 
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Employment status 
The second measure is employment status. Work, even unpaid, can enhance 
women’s authority in household decisionmaking but the effect may vary by the nature 
of work (paid versus unpaid or self-employed versus employee). The DHS asked 
currently working women “what is your employment status?” The variable is 
categorical and can take on the following values: employee, employer, self employed, 
unpaid family worker and unpaid worker.  Over 90 percent of women in the sample 
are employees. Unpaid family workers (n= 20) and unpaid workers (n=3) constitute a 
very small category so I group them when running my odels. However, there are 
some differences between the two – unpaid family workers tend to be less educated 
and belong to less affluent households compared to unpaid workers who tend to be 
more educated and come from wealthier families. Additionally, unpaid family 
workers tend to be clustered in occupations typical of family-run businesses and 
farms. Among the three unpaid workers in our sample, one reported herself as a 
modern health professional, and two reported themselve  as clerical workers. 
Relative income 
The third measure is relative income. The DHS asked women “would you say 
that the money you earn is more than what your husband earns, less than what he 
earns, or about the same?”  This variable is ordinal a d has the following response 
categories: more than him; less than him; about the same; husband doesn’t bring in 
any money; and don’t know. About 87 percent of women in the analytical sample 
report having no income; this reflects mostly women who do not work (n= 8,987) and 
a very small number of women who work but are unpaid (n=23). Seven percent of 
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women report having less income than their spouses. Five percent of women report 
making about the same or more than their husbands. A negligible proportion of the 
sample reported husbands with no earnings (n=42) and women in this group are all 
paid workers, so effectively can be considered to have more relative income. 
However, I analyze them as a separate group to explore the possibility of gender 
compensation behavior under different circumstances. 
Occupational prestige 
The fourth measure is relative occupational status. Women who are currently 
working or worked in the last 12 months were asked about their current occupation. 
Wives also reported on their husbands’ occupations. DHS coded occupations 
according to 1988 International Standard of Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). 
I construct a measure of relative occupational prestig  by mapping Treiman’s 
occupational prestige scores to the occupational data of wives and husbands. See 
Appendix Table 3 for the occupation distribution of women and men and respective 
Treiman occupational prestige score. I calculate relativ  occupational prestige scores 
as the difference between wives and husbands’ occupational prestige, similar to a 
procedure followed by McCloskey (1996). I classify women in my analytical sample 
into four groups: both do not work; husband has more prestige, wife does not work; 
husband has more prestige, wife works; and wife has same or greater prestige. The 
last category (wife has same or greater occupational prestige) includes women whose 
husbands do not work (n= 141).  About three-quarters of women in the sample are 
married to men who have greater occupational prestig , but the majority of these 
cases are attributable to the fact that most women do not work. About 4 percent 
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consists of women who work but whose husbands have greater occupational prestige 
and about 10 percent comprises women whose occupational prestige is equal to or 
greater than that of their husbands. Less than 1% of this category includes working 
wives whose husbands are without work (n=141). 
Control variables 
Because I explore the effects of work on women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking in a context where women’s work is rare and traditional gender 
norms prevail, I control for culturally relevant sources of power. These include the 
following four measures of women’s status within the ousehold: martial duration, 
whether the respondent has at least one living son, whether the respondent’s husband 
has co-wives, whether the respondent is related to her husband prior to marriage (e.g. 
cousins) and the respondent’s relation to the head of household.  
Women’s negotiation and communication skills improve over the course of 
marriage. In a society where women are largely seen as mothers and have no source 
of financial security except their male kin, having at least one living son can secure a 
women’s position within her marital home and enhance her bargaining position. Co-
wives may weaken women’s bargaining position if women have to compete with the 
demands of other wives. Endogamy – the practice of marrying within one’s social 
group or family, may enhance women’s status within t e household (reflected in 
whether women reported being related to husband prior to marriage, for example 
being cousins).  Being married to the head of the household or being the head of the 
household also shifts decisionmaking dynamics in favor of women. Because a very 
small number of currently married women report being the head of the household 
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(n=83), I include them along with women who are married to the household head 
(n=9,458).  
About 80 percent of women in the sample have at least one son, 6 percent are 
married to husbands who have co-wives, and 43 percent ar  related to their husbands 
prior to marriage (i.e. an endogamous marriage). The majority of women (91 percent) 
are married to the household head.  
In addition to culturally relevant sources of domestic power, which I refer to 
as family status measures, I control for a number of individual and household 
characteristics. These background variables include women’s age, women’s 
educational attainment, husbands’ educational attainment, husbands’ economic 
activity status, whether the husband is living in the same household as the respondent, 
household wealth index and place of residence (urban/ ural and region). Because the 
household decisionmaking may be influenced both by gender and generational 
hierarchies (Sen, Rastogi, and Vanneman 2006), I also control for the number of 
female and male adults in the household. See Appendix Table one for summary 
statistics. 
Methods 
In the previous section, I described my data. Here, I xplain the analytical 
methodology I select to test my hypotheses and which are best suited to the nature of 
the data.  
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Ordinary least squares regressions 
The testing of my hypotheses requires different methods. I conduct ordinary 
least squares regressions of women’s shared authority in family decisionmaking index 
on my explanatory factors and control variables. I include my variables sequentially 
in my analysis building progressively complex models. I control for a number of 




 is the number of family management decisions for which women report deciding 
in conjunction with their spouses or alone (i.e. shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index);  
is the intercept; 
is the estimated effect of women’s work on the shared authority in family 
management decisionmaking index score of woman i; ad 
 represents the control variables for k number of controls and n number of 
observations. 
I model the effects of women’s employment status , relative income 
and relative occupational prestige on women’s shared uthority in family 
decisionmaking index in a similar fashion. 



















Ordered logistic regressions 
Because the shared authority in family management dcisionmaking index is 
composed of multiple categories (0,1, 2, 3, 4) thathave a meaningful rank order in 
which a value is ‘higher’ than the previous one, I also use an ordered logistical model 
to analyze its correlates. The ordered logistic regression model is composed of a 
number of logits on binary outcomes which calculates the odds of falling in the first 
category versus higher categories, the second category versus higher categories and 
so on. Although each equation can have different intercepts, the effect of a variable is 
held to be equal in all equations (parallel regression assumption), which is not 
necessarily realistic but can be tested (Long 2012).   
Logistic regressions  
The remaining three outcome variables, women’s sole authority in at least one 
family management decision, women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking, 
and women’s shared authority in personal decisionmaking are binary so I analyze 
them using a logistic model summarized below: 
 
where 
Y is one of the binary outcome variables  
(1) sole authority in family decisionmaking  
(2) sole authority in personal decisionmaking 
(3) shared authority in personal decisionmaking 
is the intercept; 









is the estimated effect of women’s work on the decisionmaking authority of 
woman i; and 
 represents the control variables for k number of controls and n number of 
observations. 
I model the effects of women’s employment status , relative income 
and relative occupational prestige on women’s sole authority in family 
decisionmaking and sole and shared authority in personal decisionmaking in a similar 
fashion. 
Propensity score matching 
Results from the OLS, ordinal logistical and logistical regressions of women’s 
authority in family management and personal decisionmaking on women’s work may 
indicate correlation but not necessarily causation.  The correlation between women’s 
participation in work and authority in household decisionmaking could be due to the 
fact that women who are empowered within the household are those who are likely to 
overcome cultural barriers to their participation in paid work (Kabeer, Mahmud, and 
Tasneem 2011)   
There are several ways to address endogeniety between omen’s work and 
women’s empowerment within the household. Qualitative data provide rich detail on 
causal pathways to empowerment within the household (Kabeer, Mahmud, and 
Tasneem 2011). Longitudinal data can also help rule o t issues of endogeniety 
through life course analysis (Kabeer, Mahmud, and Tasneem 2011). Instrumental 











credit schemes on women’s bargaining power (Osmani 2007) , women’s health 
(Nanda 1999), and to explore the effects of women’s work on a variety of dimensions 
of women’s empowerment (Rammohan and Johar 2009).  
In my analysis, I adopt two techniques to address the issue of endogeniety – 
propensity score matching and within-household fixed effects. The propensity to 
engage in productive work is likely to be correlated with factors that influence the 
propensity for women’s decisionmaking authority. To address the potential bias due 
to unobserved heterogeneity, I use propensity matching estimation. This technique 
was first developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Propensity score matching 
methods have been increasingly employed in studies of medicine and epidemiology, 
as well as in education and other social science res arch. Unlike traditional matching 
estimators which condition on X (a set of covariates), propensity score matching 
techniques condition on the propensity score since observations with the same 
propensity score share similar distributions of the vector of covariates (Dehejia and 
Wahba 1999; Mocan and Tekin 2006). 
The first step in propensity score matching is estima ng the propensity score 
using a logistical regression where the propensity score is defined as a function of a 
vector of covariates X such that  - namely, that conditional on the 
propensity score, the covariates are independent of the assignment to treatment (Di) – 
in this case work participation (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The choice of the 
covariates are determined by satisfying the balancing property – that is, that the 
average propensity score of treatment (women who work) and control units (women 
who do not work) do not differ within each group (Becker and Ichino 2002; Dehejia 
Xi ⊥ Di | p(Xi )
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and Wahba 1999; Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Imposing the common support 
condition ensures that each treated unit (women who ork) is matched with a 
corresponding control unit (women who do not work). This condition may or may not 
improve the quality of matches, so may not be necessary (Becker and Ichino 2002; 
Mocan and Tekin 2006). The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the 
average difference in the outcome variable (in this ca e the extent of women’s 
authority in household decisionmaking) between the treated and untreated cases, after 
the sample of untreated cases is reweighted on the propensity score of treated cases, 
and it is estimated as a nonparametric regression (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005; 
Mocan and Tekin 2006).  
I generate the propensity scores using the STATA’s pscore command and 
then estimate the average treatment effect on the treated using the generated 
propensity scores (Becker and Ichino 2002). According to Becker and Ichin (2002), a 
range of matching methods are available all of which imply a “…tradeoff between 
quality and quantity of matches, and none of them is apriori superior to the others” 
(p.361).  
The stratified method divides the propensity score into intervals so that
treatment and control cases within the strata share about the same propensity score 
and ATT is calculated as the average ATT of the block. This approach, however, 
risks excluding treatment cases for which there are no control cases within the same 
strata.  The nearest neighbor method matches each treatment case to a control case 
with the nearest propensity score. However this can be a poor match if the nearest 
control case has a very different propensity score. Radius methods match treatment 
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cases to control cases within a pre-specified radius. The selection of small radius may 
result with better matches, but also the loss of treatment cases for which there are no 
control cases. Kernel matching adopts weighted averages of all control cases so that 
better matches have a bigger influence on the estimation of ATT (Rendall 2013), in 
contrast to radius matching in which all control units are equally weighted regardless 
of the quality of the match (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). 
For greater confidence in results, I calculate the ATT for each of my four 
dependent variables using all four methods described a ove and compare results. I 
calculate the propensity score using the following covariates which are expected to 
influence women’s propensity to engage in productive work: woman’s age, woman’s 
educational level, husband’s educational level, husband’s presence in the household, 
household wealth index, whether the woman has at leas one child under the age of 5; 
whether two or more adult males or two or more adult females live in the household, 
urban/rural residence and governorate. Conditioning on variables that are not strictly 
exogenous (i.e. correlated with both women’s work participation and authority in 
household decisionmaking) may introduce bias (Mocan and Tekin 2006).  
With the exception of the stratification method for which this command is not 
available, ATT standard of errors are computed using a bootstrap with 50 
replications. Bootstrapping is one way to address the problem with standard of errors 
– namely, “the problem is that the estimated variance of the treatment effect should 
also include the variance due to the estimation of the propensity score, the imputation 
of the common support, and possibly also the order in which treated individuals are 
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matched. These estimation steps add variation beyond the normal sampling 
variation.”11 
Propensity score matching assumes that given a set of observable 
characteristics, women differ in their choice to work for reasons uncorrelated to the 
outcome of interest – authority in household decisionmaking. Results are robust in so 
far as the unobservable characteristics that make women more likely to engage in 
work do not directly affect their authority in household decisionmaking. Otherwise, 
results are biased if unobservable characteristics that influence the propensity to work 
also affect household decisionmaking. Estimates of the average treatment effect on 
the treated assume that individuals’ assignment to treatment is independent of each 
other (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). However, women livi g in household in which 
other women engage in productive work may be more likely to work themselves. 
Within-household fixed effects analysis can partially ddress these shortcomings.  
Within-household fixed effects analysis 
Household characteristics can influence both women’s chances of 
participating in paid work and women’s authority in household decisionmaking. 
Controlling for unobserved household characteristics can partially isolate the effect of 
work on women’s authority thereby addressing the limitations of propensity score 
matching discussed above. The only variables that enter the within-household fixed 
effects model are those that pertain to the woman herself – namely, women’s work, 
women’s age, women’s education, husbands’ characteristics (presence in same 
                                                





household as wife, educational level and current labor force participation), marital 
duration, whether the respondent has at least one living son, whether respondent’s 
husband has co-wives, respondent’s relationship to the head of the household, and 
whether the respondent is related to her husband prior to marriage (endogamy).  
The dependent variable women’s shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking is continuous and near normal, so it is analyzed using the xtreg 
command in STATA. Since the dependent variables women’s sole authority in at 
least one family management related decision, women’s sole authority in personal 
decisionmaking, and women’s shared authority in personal decisionmaking are 
binary, they are estimated with STATA’s xtlogit command so only households in 
which there are at least two women enter the model. 
Multi-level analysis of the effects of work on women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking 
Women’s empowerment within the household is shaped by individual and 
household characteristics. Yet, contextual factors may influence the distribution of 
these resources within the population. For example, opportunities to go to school and 
employment will influence chances of being educated an  engaging in productive 
work, in addition to conditioning the size of the effects of these variables on 
outcomes of interest. Although I control for place of residence (urban/rural and 
governorate) in the preceding analyses, multi-level analysis controls for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, which would otherwise lead to smaller standard of errors 
and spurious results.  
I conduct a hierarchal linear modeling (HLM) analysis to explore whether 
contextual factors influence regional averages of wmen’s household decisionmaking 
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authority, and if they conditions the effects of women’s work on authority within the 
household – namely whether the positive effects of w men’s work on household 
decisionmaking are stronger in regions marked by average or above average levels of 
socio-economic development and less patriarchal gender norms. Analysis is 
conducted on 24 regions which reflect the governorate in which women reside and 
whether or not their locality is urban or rural.   
The use of multi-level modeling can be justified onthree principles – 
theoretical, empirical and statistical (Luke 2004). In Chapter 3 I summarized key 
theoretical perspectives on the determinants of women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking. Theories of institutionalized male power posit that women’s status 
within the household is not only a function of their individual characteristics and 
those of their households, but also structural factors. The pervasiveness of patriarchy 
within our cultural, social, economic, political and ideological frameworks shapes 
women’s comparative resources and influences what can be bargained over and how 
much bargaining can take place (Agarwal 1997; Collins et al. 1993; Gillespie 1971; 
Sen and Batliwala 2000). Empirical evidence reinforces the multilevel nature of 
women’s empowerment with the household. Cross-country studies illustrate that the 
size and statistical significance of the effects of w men’s resources vary from one 
context to the other (Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001; Dharmalingam and Morgan 
1996; Heaton 1996; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; Mason 1997). Statistically, the case 
for multilevel analysis is strong when the data are multilevel in nature. Of the three 
justifications described above, the third is the weakest for the data I use since they are 
collected on the individual level. The DHS did not c llect governorate level or other 
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regional level statistics. To test my hypotheses on the effects of contextual factors I 
had to aggregate up from the individual level, a limitation in itself. 
The contextual factors in which I am interested are regional levels of socio-
economic development and extent of patriarchal norms.  I operationalize level of 
socio-economic development in terms of average women’s literacy rate in a given 
region. I operationalize gender norms in terms of two measures: women’s work 
participation and attitudes toward wife beating.  Low levels of women’s labor force 
participation rate may reflect traditional gender norms and the notion that women 
belong at home. They could also reflect poor work opportunities. Women’s attitudes 
toward wife beating may reflect one aspect of patriarchal norms. Research on gender-
based violence in the Arab region suggest that the justification of wife beating by 
both women and men may be partially related to patriarchal attitudes (Haj-Yahia 
2002; Haj-Yahia and Uysal 2011; Khawaja, Linos, and El-Roueiheb 2008; Obeid, 
Chang, and Ginges 2010) in so far as patriarchal ideology condones male dominance 
and control over women, emphasizes women’s obedience a d loyalty to men, and 
justifies women’s punishment for violating these norms (Smith 1990; Straus 1977).   
Summary statistics of regional-level indicators of s cioeconomic development 
and gender norms are presented in Appendix Tables 4a and 4b. The data are initially 
available on the woman-level, but because they reflect the regional context, they can 
be aggregated to the regional level. The rejection of wife beating rate reflects the 
percent of women who believe that wife beating is not justified under any of the 
seven conditions specified in the interview – namely, going out without telling the 
husband, neglecting the children, arguing or insulting the husband, disobeying the 
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husband or having relations with another man. On average, about 93 percent of 
women in my analytical sample are literate; about 6 percent of women reject 
domestic violence under any circumstance, and about 13 percent of women 
participate in productive work. However, there is considerable spread across regions 
(see Appendix Tables 4a and 4b).  
Given the multidimensional nature of women’s empowerment (and 
patriarchy), women’s labor force participation rates and women’s disapproval of wife 
beating may not go hand-in-hand and this is reflected in the data on Jordan. Appendix 
Table 4b indicates that while women’s literacy rates and rejection of wife beating are 
highest in the Central region, women’s labor force participation is the lowest in this 
part of the country. By contrast, women’s participation in the labor force is highest in 
the Southern region, yet this is a pocket of the country where women’s literacy and 
rejection of wife beating are low. 
Results from ANOVA analysis (not shown here) illustrate statistically 
significant differences in the variance in women’s decisionmaking authority between 
regions for all four measures except sole authority in personal decisionmaking. 
However, these results should be taken with caution as the ANOVA approach to 
modeling between-group differences treats group parameters as fixed effects, 
overlooking random variability in group-level characteristics, and it is less capable of 
handling severely unbalanced designs (Luke 2004).    
I use a two-level model to explore the effects of level of socio-economic 
development and gender norms on women’s authority in household decisionmaking. 
For each of my four dependent variables, I estimate two equations  - one at the 
 87
individual level and one at the regional. In each instance I model both the intercept  
(average level of women’s authority) and the work participation gradient (effect of 
women’s work on household decisionmaking authority).  
Typically, HLM analysis involves three steps, the first partitions the variance 
in the outcome into its within and between regions components. The fully 
unconditional model partitions variance in women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking within-regions as a factor of women’s i dividual and household level 
characteristics, and between-regions as a factor of regional-level variables – namely, 
level of socio-economic development and gender norms. The between-region 
component of the variance is measured by the interclass correlation (ICC) and is 
modeled as a function of regional factors. However, this step is not appropriate for 
dichotomous outcome variables (Lee and Burkam 2003), so it is only carried out for 
the dependent variable shared authority in family management decisionmaking index.  
The second step (within-model or Level 1) involves estimating, within each 
region, the effects of women’s work and other background characteristics on 
women’s authority in household decisionmaking. All independent variables at Level 
1 are estimated as fixed effects with the exception of women’s work; that is, their 
slopes are kept constant across regions and the between-region variances of their 
relationship to the outcome are fixed.  
The third step (between-regions model or Level 2) involves exploring the 
relationship between measures of regional socio-economic development and gender 
norms described earlier, and the regional level estimate of women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking. The results of the HLM models, which tested the 
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hypotheses put forth in Research Question 4, are presented in the both log odds and 
odds metric.  
At level 1, I model shared authority in family management decisionmaking of 
woman i in region j as a function of woman’s work and a number of individual and 
household characteristics as follows:  
 
where 
Y ij is the authority in household decisionmaking of woman i in region j; 
β0j is the average level of authority in household decisionmaking in region j; 
Xqij is a series of woman-level q=1, …, q characteristics; 
βqj are the level-1 coefficients measuring the effect of individual woman-level 
characteristics on their authority within the household; 
rij is the random error associated with woman i in region j on her authority within the 
household. 
I model women’s sole authority in family management decisionmaking, 
women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking, and women’s shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking of woman i in region j as a function of woman’s work and a 
number of individual and household characteristics using a logistic model. I control 
for the same variables as in preceding statistical an yses – namely, woman’s age, and 
education, husband’s characteristics (currently working, educational level and 
presence in the household), household wealth index, whether there are one or more 
adult males and one or more adult females in the household and whether the 
household is nuclear. I also control for family status variables– namely, marital 
Yij = β0 j + βqj
q=1
Q
∑ Xqij + rij
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duration, living sons, co-wives, relationship to household head and relationship to 
husband prior to marriage. 
At level 2 (between-regions), I model the intercept and one coefficient ( ) 
of the level-1 equation – namely, the work participation slope as follows:   
 
where 
βqj  is a level-1 coefficient;  
γqs (q=0, 1, …, Sq) are level-2 coefficients;  
Wsj is set of s region level variables for region j;  
uqj is the random effect of region j. 
I model the intercept β0j (average level of women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking in region j) as a function of women’s work participation rate Wj (γ01), 
women’s literacy rate Wj (γ02), women’s rejection of wife beating rate Wj (γ03), and 
the random effect of region j on mean authority in household decisionmaking (u0j). 
This is based on the theoretical notion that women in regions marked by higher levels 
of development and less patriarchal norms will experience greater authority in 
household decisionmaking over and above their own characteristics. 
I model the work participation slope in region j (β1) as a function of regional-
level measures of women’s work participation, women’s literacy, and rejection of 
wife beating given that I hypothesize that the effect of women’s work participation on 
authority in household decisionmaking is mitigated by regional levels of development 
and the extent to which gender norms are patriarchal. I allow my intercept to vary 
βqj





randomly. All level-1 variables, with the exception f my main explanatory variable, 
women’s work participation, are grand mean centered and their error terms are fixed. 
I group-mean center women’s work participation and llow its error term to vary to 
explore whether regional characteristics influence th relationship between this 
variable and women’s level of authority in household decisionmaking.12  
  
                                                
12 I include weights in the weight-region model but no in this portion of the statistical 
analysis (between-regions) due to the fact that I am aggregating up from the 
individual level and do not have weights on the regional level. 
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CHAPTER 9. RESULTS 
In this section, I present the results of bivariate nd multivariate analyses 
linking the latter to the research questions and hypotheses presented in Chapter 7. 
Bivariate analysis 
Cross-tabulations of women’s decisionmaking authoriy in personal and 
family management by labor force participation status, employment status, relative 
income and relative occupational prestige are illustrated in Tables 2-3. Bivariate 
statistics support our contention that patterns of decisionmaking authority differ by 
type of decision and our conceptualization of women’s authority, i.e. whether we 
operationalize authority in terms of women deciding on their own versus deciding in 
conjunction with their spouses.   
Table 3 shows that the majority of women in my sample exercise considerable 
input in family management decisionmaking. In each type of family management 
decision (Columns VII-X), except for control over husband’s earnings, over two-
thirds of women share decisionmaking power with their usbands or decide on their 
own. Jordanian women have greater and more exclusive control over personal 
matters. About 90 percent decide alone or with their usbands on personal matters 
such as health. 
When exclusive control of household decisions is considered, the proportion 
of women who have significant power is lower, especially for family management 
decisions. Table 2 illustrates that about one-third of women in the sample report 
having sole authority in at least one family management decision. With the exception 
of decisions relating to the daily needs of the household, for each type of family 
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management decision (Columns II-V), 10 percent or less of women report having 
exclusive control. The sample is almost equally divided between women who report 
exclusive control over personal matters and those who do not. 
With regards to my main explanatory variables, the cross-tabulations reveal a 
mixed picture. Women who are currently engaged in productive work are more likely 
to exercise authority in both family management andpersonal decisionmaking across 
both operationalizations of decisionmaking (i.e. whether defined as sole or shared).  
Work participation and women’s authority in household decisionmaking 
Among married women in our analytical sample, about 38 percent of women 
who work have exclusive decisionmaking authority over at least one family 
management issue, compared to 33 percent of women who do not work . 
On average women who work are likely to decide with their husbands or on their own 
on about 2.85 of 4 family-related decisions compared to 2.57 among women who do 
not work . About 51 percent of women who work report exclusive control 
when it comes to personal health matters compared to 47 percent of women who do 
not work . About 93 percent of women who work decid on personal 
health issues in conjunction with their spouses or al ne compared to 89 percent of 
those who do not work .  
Employment status and women’s authority in household decisionmaking 
Based on the cross-tabulations presented in Tables 2 and 3, it is difficult to 
identify a clear pattern of association between the nature of women’s economic 






workers are less likely to participate in any type of family management 
decisionmaking and even less likely to exercise solauthority in this arena. Unpaid 
workers (n=3) stands out as exceptionally empowered within the household when 
both dimensions of household decisionmaking (personal a d family) and both 
operationalizations of authority (sole and shared) are considered – this may reflect 
women from more affluent classes who take on volunteer work in chartable 
organizations or non-profits. Within the category of paid workers, which includes 
employees, employers and the self employed, self-employed women are more likely 
to exercise exclusive control in family management decisionmaking and personal 
decisionmaking. Results from ANOVA model (not shown here) indicate that 
differences in women’s authority in household decisionmaking by employment status 
are statistically significant. However, small sample sizes in many categories reduce 
our ability to make generalizations based on these ob rvations. 
Relative income, relative occupational prestige and women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking 
When it comes to relative income, women who make about the same or more 
than their spouses, and women who are paid workers but whose husbands do not 
bring in money, exercise greater (sole and shared) authority in personal 
decisionmaking compared to women who make less money than their spouses, or 
women who have no earnings. However, the advantages conferred by making the 
same or more income than one’s spouse compared to women who earn less is not 
reflected in family management decisionmaking. Women who have the same or 
greater occupational prestige than their spouses are mo e likely to have input in both 
personal and family management decisionmaking compared to women who do not 
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work and women who work but are in less prestigious ccupations.  Results from 
ANOVA model (not shown here) indicate between-group differences in mean 
outcomes for personal and family management decisionmaking are statistically 
significant. Substantively, however, the differences discussed above are very small. 
Culturally relevant sources of domestic power and women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking 
Tables 4a and 4b illustrate the association between culturally relevant sources 
of domestic power and women’s sole and shared authority in household 
decisionmaking, respectively. Culturally relevant sources of domestic power refer to 
characteristics of women that in their social context confer prestige and respect given 
their gender and place within the household or family. 
Marital duration, having at least one living son, ad being married to the head 
of the household (or being the household head) are associated with higher levels of 
women’s exclusive decisionmaking power in both dimensions. Women in 
endogamous marriages (i.e. related to husband prior to marriage as a cousin, for 
example) also appear more likely to exercise sole authority in decisionmaking than 
women who are unrelated to their spouses prior to marriage. Women whose husbands 
have co-wives experience reduced decisionmaking authority in family management 
compared to women whose husbands have no other wives. 
The relationships between women’s work and other relativ  economic 
resources and women’s household decisionmaking authority are explored in 
multivariate analysis that control for a number of background characteristics and 




 I estimated multivariate models using methodologies for continuous and 
binary dependent variables; including ordinary least squares, logistic regressions and 
ordered logistic models. For both financial management and personal 
decisionmaking, I initially tested my models for wife having the major input (sole 
authority) in household decisionmaking and re-ran the models for wife having some 
input, which includes all women who reported deciding n conjunction with their 
spouses or on their own. This differentiation between sole versus shared decision 
making authority provided very different results for family management 
decisionmaking, and less so for personal decisionmaking. This finding indicates that 
women’s relative economic resources are not keys issues in their control of family 
management matters. For each set of decisions, I present the baseline model with my 
main explanatory variable and the full model with all f mily status variables and 
other background individual and household characteristics.  
The results indicate that while women’s labor force participation enhances 
women’s authority in family management and personal decisionmaking, the effect 
varies depending on how I operationalize women’s empowerment within the 
household. The statistical significance of the effects of women’s work differs when I 
define women’s empowerment within the household as decisionmaking in 
conjunction with spouse or alone as opposed to exclusive control. For matters related 
to family management, women’s work has no statistical significance for women’s 
exclusive control, but its statistical significance is evident when I define authority in 
the household in terms of shared decisionmaking. On the other hand, the positive and 
statistically significant effects of work participation are evident for both measures of 
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authority in personal decisionmaking (sole and exclusive) even after controlling for 
background factors. The associations between other sources of economic power and 
women’s decisionmaking authority are mixed. I discuss these results in detail below. 
Family management decisionmaking: effects of work and economic resources 
 In the following sections, I discuss the results of my multivariate analysis as 
they pertain to the dimension of household decisionmaking that has to do with family 
management. 
Does work participation enhance women’s family management decisionmaking 
authority? 
 Table 5 illustrates that women’s participation in productive work is not 
associated with women’s exclusive control over family management matters. 
However, as Table 6 illustrates, when authority is expanded to include shared 
decisionmaking, in the baseline model, women’s work participation is associated with 
a 0.235 increase in women’s family management decisionmaking score . 
Even after controlling for background characteristics and culturally relevant sources 
of power, work participation continues to confer positive benefits for women’s 
participation in family management decisionmaking and is associated with a 0.119 
increase on the index .  
Does paid economic activity confer additional benefits for women’s authority in 
family management decisionmaking? 
 Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the association between women’s employment status 
and decisionmaking authority in family management net of the effects of our control 
variables. Consistent with the results from Table 5, women’s economic activity, 




association with women’s likelihood of exercising sole authority in at least one family 
management related decision. When authority in family anagement is considered on 
the basis of shared decisionmaking, every type of ec nomic activity, whether paid or 
unpaid, is associated with a statistically significant increase on thefamily management 
index compared to women who do not work, except for the category of self-
employment, even after controlling for all background characteristics and traditional 
sources of domestic power (see Table 8). 
 To test whether paid economic activity confers greater benefits than unpaid 
economic activity, I re-run my models with unpaid family workers and unpaid 
workers as the reference category (see Table 8a and 8b). Unexpectedly, paid work 
that confers an independent income seems to confer fewer benefits for women’s 
authority in family management decisionmaking (both sole and shared) compared to 
unpaid work. These results are statistically non-significant except in one instance; 
self- employed women score lower on the shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index compared to unpaid workers  (see Table 8b). These 
results are counter-intuitive and run counter to prevailing theoretical perspectives on 
the determinants of women’s empowerment. The way data were collected may not 
have adequately captured unpaid work. The small sample sizes for the various 
categories of employment status do not permit us to draw conclusive remarks on the 
effects of different types of work on women’s authority within the household. 
Comparisons among different types of paid economic activity are presented in 
Tables 8c and 8d. Compared to employees (N=1,258), wives who are self-employed 
(N=71) are more likely to be the sole deciders on at le st one family management 
(α = 0.1)
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related decision while employers are less likely, however the results are statistically 
non-significant. When women’s input in decisionmaking is considered, being an 
employer (N=21) is associated with an increase in the decisionmaking index score 
compared to employees, but again the finding is statistically non-significant. That 
these results do not indicate any statistically meaningful differences within different 
types of paid economic activity does not imply that none exist, but possibly that lack 
of statistical power of these sub-categories of women’s work. 
Do women’s advantages in relative income enhance their family management 
decisionmaking authority? 
 The association between women’s relative income and f mily management 
decisionmaking authority net of the effects of all control variables are presented in 
Tables 9 and Table 10. Women’s relative income has no tatistically significant effect 
on women’s sole authority in family management decisionmaking (Table 9). 
However, when authority is considered in terms of decisionmaking conducted in 
conjunction with the spouse or alone, earning the same or more is associated with a 
0.173 increase on the decisionmaking index  compared to women who do 
not work or women who are in unpaid work, holding all other variables constant. 
Similarly engaging in paid work but earning less than one’s husband is associated 
with a 0.0790 increase on the index  compared to women who do not work 
or are unpaid workers. On the other hand, women who are in paid work but whose 
husbands do not work (effectively, women who have greater relative income) suffer a 
penalty; their score on the index decreases by 0.0672  However, this association is 




To test whether advantages in relative income confer additional benefits for 
women’s authority in family management decisionmaking compared to women who 
earn less than their spouses, I re-run the same modl with “women who earn less” as 
the reference category (see Tables 10a and 10b). There is no statistically significant 
difference in the odds of being the sole decision maker on at least one family 
management decision between women who earn the sameor more compared to 
women who earn less than their spouses. However, women who earn about the same 
or more than their husbands participate in a greate number of family management 
decisions than women who earn less even after we control for family status and other 
background variables  (see Table 10b). Unexpectedly, women who work for 
pay but whose husbands have no earnings - effectively women who have an 
advantage in relative income, participate in a smaller number of family management 
decisions compared to women who earn less than their husbands but the difference is 
not statistically significant.  
Additionally, women whose husbands do not work but who are personally 
engaged in paid work participate in fewer family relat d decisions compared to 
women who earn more than their working spouses (see Table 10c). This suggests that 
being a working women with a dependent husband carries a penalty with it, or is not 
as rewarding as making about the same or more than a no -dependent spouse. 
Do women’s advantages in relative occupational prestig  enhance their family 
management decisionmaking authority? 
 The effects of women’s relative occupational prestige on sole and shared 
authority in family management decisionmaking are presented in Table 11 and Table 
12, respectively. Consistent with measures of economic status, women’s relative 
(α = 0.1)
 100
occupational prestige is not associated with women’s exclusive control in family 
management decisionmaking in any statistically significant way. When family 
management decisionmaking is considered on the basis of providing input with one’s 
spouse or alone, women’s relative advantages in occupational prestige is associated 
with a 0.230 increase in their index score compared to women who do not 
work, but whose husbands work. Even after controlling for culturally relevant sources 
of domestic power and other background characteristics, women’s relative advantages 
in occupational prestige enhance their participation in decisionmaking on family 
management-related issues; being in an equally or more prestigious occupation than 
one’s husband is associated with a 0.139 increase in the index score compared to 
women who do not work, but whose husbands work .  
 Results of multivariate models comparing women who are in an equally or 
more prestigious occupations than their husbands to those who are in less prestigious 
occupations are presented in Table 12a and Table 12b. Holding background factors 
constant, women who are in equally or more prestigious occupations than their 
spouses experience lower decisionmaking authority in family management related 
issues on both measures of authority (i.e. sole and shared) compared to women who 
are in less prestigious occupations. However, these r ults are statistically non-
significant.  
 Results from the ordered logistic regressions of wmen’s sole and shared 
authority in household decisionmaking on women’s work, employment status, 
relative income and relative occupational prestige ar  consistent with the findings 




Personal decisionmaking: Effects of women’s work and economic resources  
 Two dimensions, family management and personal decisionmaking, or 
decisions that relate to a woman’s personal health underline household 
decisionmaking. In this section I repeat the analysis above for the dependent variables 
sole authority in personal decisionmaking and shared authority in personal 
decisionmaking. Results indicate that personal decisionmaking differs from family 
management in that women’s work and other relative economic resources can 
influence women’s exclusive control in this arena, albeit with mixed results. 
Does work participation enhance women’s personal decisionmaking authority? 
 The results of the logistic regressions of women’s sole and shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking on women’s participation in productive work are presented 
in Table 13 and Table 14, respectively. Women who are in paid work are 1.3 times 
more likely to exercise exclusive control on matters relating to their personal health 
compared to women who do not work . The positive effcts of women’s 
work participation on their odds of exercising exclusive power over decisions that 
relate to their own health remain relatively unchanged both in magnitude and 
statistical significance even after we control for a number of family status and 
background variables. The effects of women’s work on authority in personal 
decisionmaking are even larger when we consider joint decisionmaking. Holding all 
control variables constant, women who work are about 1.5 times more likely to 
decide with their husbands, or on their own, on matters relating to their own health 




Does paid economic activity confer additional benefits for women’s authority in 
personal decisionmaking? 
 Controlling for background variables, the positive effects of paid forms of 
economic activity on exclusive power in personal matters compared to not working, 
is statistically significant for employees only (see Table 15). There is no statistically 
significant difference between unpaid work and not w rking when it comes to sole 
authority in personal decisionmaking. The lack of stati tical significance may be due 
to the small size of these groups; only 21 of women in the sample are employers, 71 
are self-employed, and 23 are unpaid workers compared to 8,987 who do not work. 
When the possibility of providing input in personal decisions is considered, 
the positive effects of paid economic activity relative to not working are more evident 
(see Table 16). Employees are about 1.6 times more likely to decide with their 
husbands  on matters of their own health, and self-employed women are 
about 6.7 times more likely to partake in shared decisionmaking than women who do 
not work  even after we control for cultural sources of power and other 
background factors. Additionally, there is no statistical difference in the chances of 
joint decisionmaking on personal matters between women who work and women who 
are in unpaid work. 
 To test whether paid forms of economic activity confer greater benefits than 
unpaid work, I re-run the regressions with “unpaid family workers and unpaid 
workers” as the omitted category.  The greater benefits conferred by paid forms of 
economic activity compared to unpaid workers is evid nt in Table 16a, however they 
are statistically non-significant when exclusive contr l is considered. When personal 




benefits of paid work compared to unpaid work are lrge and statistically significant 
net of the effects of controls. Compared to unpaid f mily workers and unpaid 
workers, employees and self employed women are about 5.9  and 24 
times more likely to decide with their husbands, or on their own, on 
matters related to their personal health, respectivly. Women employers are about 1.6 
times more likely to experience shared personal decisionmaking authority compared 
to women who are in unpaid work but this association is statistically non-significant. 
 To test differences within different kinds of paid economic activity, I re-run 
the models using “employee” as my reference category (see Table 16b). Net of the 
effects of control variables, there is no statistically significant difference in the 
association between different kinds of paid economic activity and women’s sole 
personal decisionmaking authority. When shared authority is considered, self-
employed women are about 4 times more likely to decide on personal matters in 
conjunction with their spouses or on their own compared to employees .  
Do women’s advantages in relative income enhance their personal decisionmaking 
authority? 
 The effects of women’s relative income on sole and shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking are presented in Table 17 and Table 18, respectively. 
Consistent with the results of the analyses on the association between different types 
of economic activity and women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking, net of 
the effects of controls, women who are in paid work, are more likely to decide alone 
compared to women who do not work or those who are in unpaid forms of economic 
activity irrespective of the relative magnitude of their earnings. Women who are paid 





 to be the sole decision makers on issues pertaining to their own health 
even after we control for family status and other background variables (see Table 17). 
Results are statistically non-significant for women whose income is the same or 
greater. 
The benefits of advantages in relative income for wmen who earn about the 
same or more than their spouses and for women who work but whose spouses do not 
bring in any money are larger and statistically signif cant when shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking is considered (see Table 18). The odds of providing input in 
personal matters, or deciding alone, compared to women who do not work or are 
unpaid workers, rise to 2.6 and 5.6 respectively. However, this does not tell us 
whether women who earn about the same or more than their spouses are more likely 
to exercise sole or shared authority in personal decisionmaking compared to women 
who earn less.  
The results of the logistic regression of women’s sole and shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking on women’s relative income wh re the reference category is 
“women who earn less” are presented in Table 18a. There is no statistical significance 
between women who earn about the same or more and women who earn less when 
exclusive control is considered. However, when authority is defined in terms of 
shared decisionmaking, women who earn as much as their husbands or more, as well 
as women who are in paid work but whose husbands do not bring in money are about 
2.2 and 4.6 times more likely to be involved in decisionmaking relating to their own 
wellbeing than women who earn less than their husbands, even after we control for all 




Do women’s advantages in relative occupational prestig  enhance their personal 
decisionmaking authority? 
 The association between women’s relative occupation l prestige and women’s 
sole and shared authority in personal decisionmaking net of the effects of family 
status and other characteristics are presented in Table 19 and Table 20, respectively. 
Consistent with previous analyses on the effects of w rk on women’s personal 
decisionmaking authority, any type of work, regardless of its relative prestige, 
enhances women’s exclusive authority in personal het  matters net of background 
factors. However, this association is statistically significant only for women who are 
in less prestigious occupations. Additionally, women who do not work and whose 
husbands do not work are less likely to exert exclusive control on personal health 
issues than women who do not work but whose husbands do work . Similar 
results are evident when we consider the association between women’s relative 
occupational prestige and joint decisionmaking on personal matters (Table 20). 
However, these results do not indicate whether women in about the same or more 
prestigious occupations fare better than women in less prestigious occupations.  
To explore whether women’s advantages in relative occupational prestige 
confer greater benefits on their authority in personal decisionmaking compared to 
women in less prestigious occupations, I re-run my odel with “women in less 
prestigious occupations than their husband’ as my oitted category (see Table 20a.). 
Results indicate that net of the effects of women’s family status and other background 
characteristics, being in an occupation that is equally or more prestigious than one’s 
spouse does not confer greater benefits in personal decisionmaking (sole or shared) 
compared to being in a less prestigious occupation – rather the association is negative 
(α = 0.05)
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and statistically non-significant. These results do not permit us to draw conclusive 
remarks about the association between women’s occupational prestige and the extent 
of women’s authority in household decisionmaking. I discuss the limitations of these 
findings in the Discussion chapter. 
Do the effects of work and relative economic resources vary by dimension of 
household decisionmaking?   
 Household decisionmaking among Jordanian couples is underlined by two 
distinct dimensions – decisions that have to do with the daily management of the 
household and those that have to do with women’s per onal health. In the previous 
sections I reviewed the results of my models estimating the association between 
women’s work and other economic resources and these dimensions separately. 
Results suggest that women’s work and advantages in other relative economic 
resources may confer additional benefits in both aspects of household 
decisionmaking. A comparison between models is not possible, however it is possible 
to draw some conclusions as to whether the effects of women’s work and economic 
resources on their authority within the household vary by dimension of domestic 
power. 
 Women’s control over family management issues is not shaped by women’s 
labor force participation, in contrast to women’s control over personal decisions 
(comparison of Tables 5 and 13). Even after controlling for a host of family status and 
other background variables, women’s labor force participation is statistically 
significant in explaining variation in women’s authority in personal decisionmaking. 
While engaging in productive work enhances women’s exclusive control over 
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personal matters, when it comes to family management, it increases their ability to 
participate in the decisionmaking process with their spouses. 
 Participating in paid forms of economic activity confers addition benefits 
compared to unpaid types of work for shared authority in personal decisionmaking, 
but has no statistically significant effect on family management matters (comparison 
of Tables 8b and 16a). Advantages in relative income confer additional benefits for 
women’s participation in both personal and family management decisions 
(comparison of Tables 10b ad 18a). Differences in women’s control over or 
participation in family management matters and personal issues are not explained by 
advantages in relative occupational prestige (comparisons of Tables 12a-12b and 
20a).  
Nuclear versus extended household: does it matter for women’s decisionmaking 
authority? 
 The analysis of women’s decisionmaking authority thus far has made no 
distinction between nuclear and extended households. Although about 88 percent of 
married women in the analytic sample live in nuclear households, empirical evidence 
indicates both gender and generational hierarchies w thin households (Malhotra and 
Mather 1997; Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). To explore these effects, I re-
run the regressions of women’s authority in household decisionmaking on women’s 
work and relative economic resources separately for women in nuclear households 
and those living in extended households and compare the stimated coefficients. The 
results of these analyses are summarized in Appendix Tables 10-17. 
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Family management decisionmaking in nuclear versus extended households 
 The positive effect of women’s work on women’s shared authority in family 
management decisionmaking is statistically significant for women who live in nuclear 
households but not those who reside in extended households (see Appendix Table 
10). Employment status is statistically unrelated to women’s authority in family 
management decisionmaking for both women in nuclear and extended households 
(see Appendix Table 11). Advantages in relative income enhance women’s 
bargaining power in family management decisionmaking o ly for women who live in 
nuclear households (see Appendix Table 12). Among women who live in nuclear 
households, making about the same or more money than one’s husband is associated 
with a 0.110 increase in women’s score on the shared uthority in family management 
index (α = 0.05). On the other hand, this association is negative and statistically non-
significant for women in extended households. Women’s advantages in relative 
occupational prestige are statistically unrelated to women’s authority in family 
management decisionmaking in both nuclear and extended households (see Appendix 
Table 13). 
Personal decisionmaking in nuclear versus extended households 
 Work enhances women’s personal decisionmaking authority, net of the effects 
of culturally relevant sources of domestic power and other background factors only 
for women residing in nuclear households (see Appendix Table 14). Among nuclear 
households, women who work are 1.265 times (α = 0.05) more likely to exercise 
exclusive control over personal matters and 1.476 times (α = 0.1) more likely to 
participate in such decisions compared to women whodo not work, after controlling 
for individual and household factors. Although women’s employment status is 
 109
statistically unrelated to women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking across 
both types of households, paid forms of work confer additional benefits for shared 
authority in personal matters for women who live in nuclear households but not those 
in extended households (see Appendix Table 15). Net of the effects of background 
individual and household characteristics, women employees in nuclear households are 
7.635 times(α = 0.05) more likely to decide in conjunction with their spouses or 
alone on matters related to their own wellbeing compared to women in unpaid forms 
of work. Self-employed women in nuclear households are 92.56 times (α = 0.01) 
more likely to share authority in personal decisionmaking compared to women in 
unpaid forms of work even after we control for indivi ual and household factors.  
The benefits of women’s advantages in relative income in terms of enhancing 
their position to participate in decisions that have to do with their own wellbeing 
accrue for women in both nuclear and extended households (see Appendix Table 16). 
Net of control variables, women in nuclear households who earn about the same or 
more than their spouses are 2.084 times (α = 0.1)more likely to participate or decide 
alone on personal matters compared to women who earn l ss. Among extended 
households, the positive benefits of advantages in relative income are even higher; 
compared to women who earn less then their spouses, women who make about the 
same or more are 7.380 times (α = 0.1)more likely to exercise shared authority in 
personal decisionmaking than women who earn less than t eir husbands. Advantages 
in relative occupational prestige are statistically unrelated to women’s personal 
decisionmaking in both nuclear and extended households (see Appendix Table 17). 
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To summarize, the positive benefits of women’s work are statistically 
significant for women’s authority in both dimensions of household decisionmaking in 
nuclear but not extended households. While employment status is statistically 
unrelated to family management decisionmaking regardless of household structure, 
when it comes to shared authority in personal decisionmaking, the additional benefits 
of participating in forms of employment that confer independent income (employees 
and more so self employment) is evident only for women in nuclear households. 
Whereas advantages in relative income are experiencd only by women who live in 
nuclear households when it comes to shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking, women’s participation in personal decisionmaking is enhanced by 
advantages in relative income in both nuclear and extended households. Moreover, 
the effects of advantages in relative income for women’s shared authority in personal 
decisionmaking are bigger for women in extended households. Advantages in 
occupational prestige are statistically unrelated across both dimensions of 
decisionmaking for women in both nuclear and extended households. These results 
suggest that women’s decisionmaking authority in extended households is associated 
with factors other than their economic status and differ substantially from intra-
household power dynamics in nuclear households. The larg , positive and statistically 
significant effect of women’s advantages in relative income on women’s shared 
authority in personal decisionmaking in extended households may have more to do 
with access to income than work itself.  
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Does work empower women within the household? Addressing the issue of 
causality 
 The results of the multivariate models indicate correlation between work and 
relative economic resources, but they do not imply correlation. To test whether 
women’s work leads to greater decisionmaking power ithin in the household, I 
conduct a propensity matching technique on all fouroutcome measures.  
Results of propensity score matching 
 I estimate the propensity score for my analytical sample by including all the 
covariates linearly, and recoding husband’s education l level and household wealth 
index into fewer categories in order to satisfy thebalancing property.13 Appendix 
Table 18 reports the results from the logistic regression that predicts the propensity 
scores. The overwhelming majority of the covariates are statistically significant 
predictors of women’s participation in productive work. 
 The propensity score matching procedure starts by diving the analytical 
sample into equally spaced intervals of the propensity score and testing the equality 
of this score for the treatment group (women who work) and the control group 
(women who do not work). If the propensity score of the two groups differ, the 
interval is split and the test is repeated.  This procedure also tests for the equality in 
the means of the covariates between the treatment cases and control cases within each 
propensity score block. I impose the common support restriction in the calculation of 
the propensity score to ensure that each treatment case has a corresponding match in 
                                                
13 Husband’s educational level is originally four categories – none, primary, 
secondary and higher but the variable was recoded so that the latter two groups – 
secondary and higher were combined into one. Similarly, the household wealth index 
consisted of five groups – poorest, poorer, middle, richer, and richest and was 
recoded so that the latter two categories of richer and richest are combined into one.  
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the control group. The final number of blocks that s isfies the balancing property is 
9. Table 21 presents the distribution of the number of working women (treatment 
cases) and non-working women (control cases) across the propensity score blocks.  
T-statistics of the equality of the means of the covariates between treatment 
and control cases within each block are presented i Table 22. The great majority of 
women who do not work and women who do work are ident cal in their observed 
characteristics within each block. Differences between women who work and women 
who do not work are statistically significant at the 0.05 level for only 19 of 306 
combinations. The mean propensity score is 0.209 and the standard deviation is 0.108 
for women who work, while the mean propensity score f  women who do not work 
is 0.120 and the standard deviation is 0.084.  
 Table 23 presents the estimated average treatment eff c on the treated (ATT) 
that resulted from the various methods of matching I discussed in the Methods 
section. I include weights in the calculation of the propensity score and in the 
matching routine I calculate standard of errors using bootstrapping with 50 
replications.14 I also impose the common support restriction to remove all cases of 
non-working women who do not match to a working woman. 
The results are consistent across different matching methods. For example, 
women’s labor force participation tends to increase women’s propensity to decide 
alone on family related matters by about 2-4 percentage points. It increases the 
propensity to decide exclusively on personal matters by 2-4 percentage points as well. 
                                                
14 Bootstrapping of standard of errors is conducted for all matching methods except 
STATA’s “stratification” method as this command is not available. Additionally, the 
STATA commands for estimating average treatment effects do not allow for the 
inclusion of weights in this step. 
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In contrast to multivariate regression analysis, ATT estimates can be compared to 
simple differences in means or proportions (Rendall 2011). Thus, the estimated ATT 
is the difference in decisionmaking authority between women who work and women 
who do not work after the sample of non-working women (control cases) is 
reweighted on the propensity scores of working women (treatment group) – namely, 
the probability that a woman with a given set of characteristics will engage in 
productive work (treatment) (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005; Rendall 2011).  
Among the possible matching techniques reported in Table 23, I use the 
results of kernel matching to compare against the bivariate association of engaging in 
productive work and women’s authority in household decisionmaking, presented in 
Table 24. I selected this method over the rest since there are many comparable 
untreated cases, and using more than one nearest neighbor and giving greater weight 
to better matches improves precision (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005).  
Overall, 37.7 percent of married women who work repo ted having the sole 
say in at least one family management related decision compared to 33.1 percent of 
women who do not work. After controlling for socio-economic factors that influence 
the propensity to work, we can say that an additional 2.72% of women would 
experience exclusive control in at least one family anagement decision if they were 
to engage in productive work. This is smaller than the difference between women 
who work and who do not work (33.7 – 33.1=4.6), implying a greater propensity for 
sole authority in family management decisionmaking among women who work. After 
accounting for this higher propensity by matching, the incidence of exclusive control 
in family management matters is 1.09 times higher (33.1 /[33.1-2.72]=1.09) among 
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women who work. Similarly, the propensity score estima e of women’s labor force 
participation on women’s sole and shared authority in personal decisionmaking is 
smaller than the observed difference in decisionmaking between women who work 
and those who do not, implying a greater propensity for authority in personal 
decisionmaking among women who work. Even after controlling for this propensity 
by matching, the incidence of exclusive control and shared authority in personal 
matters is 1.07 (46.8.1 /[46.8-3]=1.07) and 1.04 times higher (88.6/[88.6-3.75]=1.04) 
among women who work, respectively.15  
We would interpret the propensity score estimates of the “work effect” on the 
other three measures of household decisionmaking in a similar fashion. If women 
were to engage in productive work, the number of family management decisions in 
which women decide in conjunction with their husbands or alone would increase by 
0.204. The additional percent of women who would exercise exclusive control in 
personal matters would increase by about 3 percent if they were to engage in 
productive work and the percent that exercise shared authority in personal 
decisionmaking would increase by 3.75%. To the extent hat my estimates are not 
affected by the endogeniety of the choice to work, they suggest that women’s labor 
force participation increases the propensity that women will decide either exclusively 
or jointly in household decisionmaking. 
Results of within-household fixed effects 
 The results from the propensity score matching technique are robust in so far 
as the variables on which we match are strictly exog n us and that non-observable 
                                                
15 In explaining the results of the propensity score matching, I adopt the same 
analysis style as Rendall (2011).  
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characteristics, for which this type of analysis does not control, do not simultaneously 
influence the propensity to engage in productive work and women’s authority in 
household decisionmaking. Additionally, estimates of the average treatment effect on 
the treated assume that individuals’ assignment to treatment is independent of each 
other(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). However, women living in household in which 
other women engage in productive work may be more likely to work themselves.  
To address this issue and that of unobservable chara teristics I conduct a fixed effects 
model. Since this is a within-household fixed effects analysis, only variables that 
reflect women’s individual characteristics enter the model. In the case of the three 
binary outcome variables (sole authority in at least one family management decision, 
sole authority in personal decisionmaking and shared authority personal 
decisionmaking), only households where there are at least two women enter the 
model. 
The results of within-household fixed effect regressions are presented in 
Tables 25-27. Women who work are 3.3 times more likly to experience exclusive 
control in at least one family management decision c mpared to women who do not 
work, however, this model is statistically non-significant (see Table 25). Engaging in 
productive work is associated with a 0.447 increase   0.05 in the index score 
when shared authority in family management is considered (see Table 26). Women 
who work are about 6 times more likely to exercise sole authority in personal 
decisionmaking compared to women who do not work   0.05 (see Table 27). 
The comparable statistic for the within-household fixed effect model of shared 
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authority in personal decisionmaking is 0.803 but neither this statistic or the model 
are statistically significant.  
Contextual effects on women’s authority in family management and personal 
decisionmaking 
 Empirical evidence from developed and developing countries indicate that 
contextual (i.e. structural) factors, located at the level of community, market, and 
state influence women’s empowerment in a number of ways. Conceptually, structural 
factors may matter more for the marital balance of p wer than individual 
characteristics since men dominate not as individuals only but as a class due to 
institutionalized male privilege (Gillespie 1971). First, context shapes the causes and 
correlates of a given dimension of women’s empowerment (Dharmalingam and 
Morgan 1996; Jejeebhoy 2000; Kulik 2011; Mason 1997). For example, in traditional 
societies, economic resources may be less important for women’s power compared to 
culturally relevant social capital, such as the number of sons.  Second, contextual 
factors may condition the magnitude of the effects of the correlates of women’s 
empowerment (Heaton, Huntsman, and Flake 2005; Malhotr  and Mather 1997; 
Rodman 1967; Rodman 1972).  
To test whether women’s household decisionmaking authority is shaped by 
contextual factors, I undertake a hierarchical linear modeling analysis of my four 
dependent variables.16 I operationalize context in terms of three regional-level 
                                                
16 I use Bartlett's test (Snedecor and Cochran Snedecor, George W. and William G.  
Cochran. 1989. Statistical Methods, Eighth Edition: Iowa State University Press.) to 
test whether variances are equal between groups (i.e. regions). Results of analysis of 
between-group variance (not shown here) indicate that at least one region’s variance 
is different from the others for all four outcome variables except sole authority in 
personal decisionmaking. Similar results are obtained when using Levene’s test of the 
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measures – women’s literacy rate, women’s labor force participation rate, and 
women’s rejection of wife beating rate. These measure are expected to capture some 
aspects of regional-level socio-economic development and the extent of patriarchal 
gender norms, which can foster opportunities or obstacles for women’s increased 
authority in household decisionmaking.   
If contextual factors matter as suggested by theoretical frameworks and 
empirical evidence, than women who live in regions with average or above average 
rates of women’s literacy, labor force participation and rejection of wife beating, will 
on average experience higher levels of authority in household decisionmaking than 
women in regions were rates are low(er). To explore the effect of regional levels of 
socio-economic development and gender norms on the regional average of women’s 
household decisionmaking authority I model the intercept. To explore whether the 
effect of women’s work is stronger in regions marked by average or above average 
rates of women’s literacy, labor force participation and rejection of wife beating (i.e. 
high levels of socioeconomic development and less patriarchal gender norms) I 
attempted to model the work participation slope. However, I found that this 
relationship did not vary systematically between regions so I could not successfully 
model it as a random Level 2 outcome.  Thus, I fixed this effect and only modeled the 
intercept. The results of HLM analyses of women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking are presented in Tables 28-36. 
                                                                                                                                 
assumption of equal variance, which is an alternative to the Bartlett test in that it is 
less sensitive to departures from normality. 
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HLM analysis of sole authority in family management decisionmaking 
The within-regions model of women’s sole authority in family management 
decisionmaking (Table 28) indicates that women’s labor force participation is 
positively correlated with women’s sole authority in at least one family management 
decision but the association is statistically non-significant.17 This is consistent with 
our earlier findings from the logistic regression of sole authority in family 
management decisionmaking on women’s work.  
The results of the fully conditional model are displayed in Table 29. The 
analysis includes variables that describe regions in terms of their socioeconomic 
development and gender norms and tests our hypothesis about the effects of context 
on women’s sole authority in family management decisionmaking. The estimated 
average of regional averages of the odds that a woman will be the sole decision maker 
for at least one family management decision  in regions with average women’s 
literacy rates, average women’s labor force participation rates, and average rates of 
women’s rejection of wife beating is 0.51 (α = 0.001), controlling for women’s 
economic status, family status and other background characteristics.18 As average 
women’s literacy rate  increases so do women’s odds f being the sole decision 
maker on at least one family management issue. In other words, a 1-SD increase in 
the regional average literacy rate for women results wi h a 1.51 increase in the odds 
of being the sole decider on at least one family management decision (α = 0.01). 
                                                
17 Based on population average model with robust standard of errors. The association 
between women’s work and sole authority in at least one family management 
decision is statistically non-significant even without controlling for other individual 
and household characteristics. 
18 Based on population average model. Odds ratio is calculated from the coefficient b 




Average women’s labor force participation rate and the average rate of women’s 
rejection of wife beating  are statistically unrelat d to women’s sole authority in 
family management decisionmaking. The lack of statiical significance of the effects 
of regional women’s labor force participation rates and rejection of wife beating rates 
may be partially related to high multicollinearity. However, even after entering them 
separately, these measures remained non-significant. Thus, I conclude that women are 
more likely to have sole authority in family management issues in regions with higher 
women’s literacy rates, over and beyond their own behavior and regardless of their 
characteristics or those of their households.  
Comparing the variance components across models illustrates a progressive 
decrease. Without any explanatory variables, the variance component of the intercept 
(average of regional averages) is 0.171. The variance of the intercept remains 
unchanged when only women’s work participation is included. After controlling for 
women’s individual and other background characteristics the variance in the intercept 
decreases to 0.167 (see chi-square table at the bottom of Table 28). This modest 
decline implies that individual explanations are incomplete. Controlling for 
contextual factors reduces the variance component of the intercept to 0.115 (see chi-
square table at the bottom of Table 29). Our model explains about 31 percent of 
between-region variance in women’s exclusive control over family management 
related decisionmaking.19 Explaining away all regional level variance is not 
                                                
19 The percent of explained between-region variance is calculated by subtracting the 
residual variance in the intercept listed in the chi-squared table at the end of table 29 
(0.115) from the initial variance in the intercept lis ed in the chi-squared table at the 
end of table 28 (0.167) and dividing by the estimated initial variance: [(0.167-




necessarily the goal. However, that the biggest decline in the variance component 
occurs when contextual measures are entered into the model provides empirical 
evidence that social context can exert important effects on women’s empowerment 
within the household over and above their own characte istics. 
HLM analysis of shared authority in family management decisionmaking 
Running a fully unconditional model with no explanatory variables for 
women’s shared authority in family management decisionmaking shows that less than 
one percent of the variance in women’s shared authority in family decisionmaking 
occurs between regions.20 See Table 32 for variance components. A summary of the 
within-model for women’s shared authority in family management decisionmaking is 
presented in Table 30. Within regions, my model indicates that women’s labor force 
participation is associated with a 0.121 increase  in women’s index score 
net of the effects of women’s family status measure and other background 
characteristics. The reliability for the intercept (λintercept1 =.890) is adequate (over 
0.100) therefore I proceeded with modeling it. 
The results of the fully conditional model are summarized in Table 31. The 
reported reliability for this model was λintercept1= 0.841 indicating the precision with 
which we can estimate the random effects for the int rcept. The estimated average of 
regional averages of women’s score on the shared authority in family management 
index  in regions with average rates of women’s literacy, average rates of 
women’s labor force participation, and average rates of women’s rejection of wife 
beating is 2.591  controlling for women’s economic status, family status 
                                                





and other background characteristics. Average women’s literacy rates  and 
average women’s labor force participation rates  are statistically unrelated to the 
average of regional averages of women’s shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index score. To test whether the lack of statistical significance of 
regional rates of women’s literacy and labor force participation is not due to 
multicollinearity, I enter each one of these measure  into my model separately, but 
they remain non-significant. The relationship is positive and statistically significant 
for women’s rejection of wife beating . Every 1-SD increase in the rate of 
women’s rejection of wife beating is associated with a 0.043 increase   0.001 in 
the shared authority in family management index score. These results suggest that 
living in regions with high rates of women’s rejection of wife beating is associated 
with greater shared authority in family management issues over and above women’s 
individual and household characteristics.  
As shown in Table 32, my fully conditional model explains 100 percent of the 
variance in the average of regional averages of women’s shared authority in family 
management decisionmaking.21 In addition, the variance in the intercept is no longer 
statistically significant, indicating that the model was able to explain enough of the 
variance in the intercept that it was no longer variable between regions. 
HLM analysis of women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking 
The within-regions model of women’s sole authority in personal 
decisionmaking is displayed in Table 33. 22  Within-regions, the model indicates that 
                                                
21 The percent of variance in the intercept explained = within – 
between/within=(0.004-0.000)/0.004=1=100% 





women’s labor force participation is associated with a 0.301 increase (α = 0.01) in 
the log odds that women will exercise exclusive authori y in personal health matters, 
net of the effects of women’s family status and other background characteristics. 
Stated differently, women who work are about 1.35 times more likely to decide on 
alone on matters of personal health compared to women who do not work. 23  
The results of the fully conditional model are summarized in Table 34.24 The 
estimated average of regional averages of the odds that a woman will have exclusive 
control over her own health  in regions with averag women’s literacy rates, 
average women’s labor force participation rates, and verage rates of women’s 
rejection of wife beating is 0.903 (α = 0.05), controlling for women’s economic 
status, family status and other background characteristics.25 Average women’s 
literacy , average women’s rejection of wife beating , and average women’s 
labor force participation  are statistically unrelat d to women’s sole authority in 
personal decisionmaking even when they are entered separately into the model. Other 
characteristics of social context may be better suited for explaining regional variation 
in this dimension of household decisionmaking.  
Comparing the variance components across models illustrates that my models 
contribute little to explaining variance in women’s sole authority in personal 
decisionmaking between regions. Without any explanatory variables, the variance 
component of the intercept is 0.0177. The variance of the intercept barely changes to 
0.017 when only women’s work participation is included, and declines to 0.015 when 
                                                
23 Odds ratio is calculated from coefficient b as follows: odds ratio= eb. 
24 Based on the population-average model with robust standard of errors. 





individual and household characteristics are controlled (see chi-squared table at the 
bottom of Table 33). Controlling for contextual factors reduces the variance 
component in the intercept to 0.013 (see chi-squared table at the bottom of Table 34). 
The variance of the intercept remains statistically significant. The multivariate, 
multilevel model presented in Table 34 accounts for approximately 13 percent of 
between-region variance in women’s sole authority in personal decisionmaking, 
indicating that many other regional factors affect this dimension of women’s 
empowerment. 
HLM analysis of women’s shared authority in personal decisionmaking 
Table 35 presents a summary of the within-model of w men’s shared 
authority in personal decisionmaking.26 Within-regions, the model indicates that 
women’s labor force participation is associated with a 2.247 increase  in 
the odds that women will participate in decisions related to personal health matters, 
net of the effects of women’s family status and other background characteristics. 
Stated differently, women who work are about 9.459 times more likely to decide 
either jointly with their spouse or alone on matters of personal health compared to 
women who do not work.  
The results of the fully conditional model are summarized in Table 36.27 The 
estimated average of regional averages of the odds that a woman will decide in 
conjunction with her husband or alone on matters of personal health  in regions 
with average women’s literacy rates, average women’s labor force participation rates, 
and average rates of women’s rejection of wife beating is 8.434  
                                                
26 Based on the population average model with robust standard of errors.  





controlling for women’s economic status, family status and other background 
characteristics. Average women’s literacy  and averg  women’s rejection of 
wife beating  are positively associated with the regional average of women’s 
shared authority in personal decisionmaking. Every 1-SD increase in average 
women’s literacy rates is associated with a 1.091 increase in women’s odds of 
participating in decisions that related to their own ellbeing(α = 0.1). Women living 
in regions that are 1 SD above the mean in the rate of women’s rejection of wife 
beating experience a 1.115 increase in the odds of eciding alone or jointly with their 
spouses on personal matters (α = 0.01). Women’s labor force participation  does 
not have a statistically significant contextual effect even when it is entered separately 
into the model to avoid issues of multicollinearity with other regional measures. Thus, 
I conclude that women are more likely to have some say in matters of personal 
wellbeing when living in regions with above average rates of women’s literacy and 
above average rates of women’s rejection of wife beating regardless of their 
individual or household characteristics. This confirms the hypothesis about the effects 
of regional characteristics on shared authority in personal decisionmaking. 
The model presented in Table 36 explains about 68 percent of between-region 
variance in women’s shared authority in personal decisionmaking (see the chi-
squared table at the bottom of Table 36).28 Additionally, controlling for contextual 
factors renders the residual variance in the intercept no longer statistically significant 
indicating that the model was able to explain enough of the variance that it was no 
                                                






longer variable between regions. These results provide empirical support that 
individual-level explanations alone do not suffice and that social context exerts 
significant effects on women’s empowerment within the household. 
CHAPTER 10. DISCUSSION  
At the beginning of this dissertation, I posed the qu stion “do economics 
trump culture?”, and using several multivariate methods of analysis, I test whether 
women’s labor force participation and relative economic resources empower them 
when it comes to decisionmaking within the household even after we control for 
culturally relevant sources of domestic power and other background characteristics. 
The results of this dissertation are consistent with multidimensional 
conceptualizations of women’s empowerment, but theyalso expand our theoretical 
model by providing empirical support for the conditions under which economic 
resources might trump cultural factors, and when cultural factors matter more, or 
when the two interact.  
Economic and cultural explanations are better thougt of as complementary 
rather than competing accounts of women’s decisionmaking authority within the 
household. This research demonstrates that while women’s work participation may 
have a causal effect on improving women’s bargaining position within the household, 
relying solely on women’s own characteristics and those of their households to 
explain power dynamics within the household provides incomplete explanations. 
Below I expand on these points and highlight some iportant non-findings, 
limitations and future directions for research. 
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Economic and cultural factors are complementary rather then 
competing explanations 
For currently married Jordanian women, participation in productive work is 
associated with greater control and participation in household decisionmaking even 
after controlling for women’s family status, other individual characteristics and 
household factors. However, the effects of women’s work differ by dimension of 
household decisionmaking and whether we define authority as exclusive control or 
the ability to decide in conjunction with one’s spouse. The effects of women’s work 
and relative economic resources on women’s household decisionmaking authority 
also differ markedly between women in nuclear and extended households. 
Engaging in productive work enhances women’s ability to participate in 
family management decisions while it confers greater chances of exercising exclusive 
control over personal decisions. Advantages in relative income do not confer 
additional benefits in terms of exclusive control over either dimension of household 
decisions. However, making about the same or more than one’s spouse is associated 
with higher levels of women’s participation in both family management and personal 
matters, over and above the effects of women’s family status, individual 
characteristics and household factors, compared to not working or working and 
making less than one’s spouse.  
The benefits of participation in productive work and advantages in relative 
income on women’s chances of exercising shared authority in family management 
and personal decisionmaking are only experienced by women in nuclear households. 
The differential impact of women’s work and relative economic resources on 
women’s household decisionmaking authority by household structure suggests that 
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patterns of marital power in extended households differ substantially from nuclear 
ones. In extended households, both gender and age hierarchies matter, and adherence 
to traditional gender norms may also matter more. In contrast to nuclear households, 
the extent of women’s decisionmaking authority in extended households is far more 
likely to be negatively influenced by the presence and number of adult women and 
men. There may be a selectivity bias in the types of women who select into marriages 
that result with extended households; such women may be more likely to subscribe to 
traditional gender scripts in which men are expected to play the dominant role as 
providers and guardians.   
I interpret the differential impact of women’s productive work and relative 
income by dimension of household decisionmaking, level of authority and household 
structure to imply that cultural gender scripts andsocial context shape whether or not 
economic resources impact household decisionmaking dy amics, which aspects of 
these dynamics, and the extent of their influence. Th  results of this dissertation 
demonstrate empirically that theories of relative economic resources, gender 
performance, institutionalized patriarchy and bargaining approaches are 
complementary rather then competing explanations for women’s authority within the 
household. In this respect, the findings presented here are consistent with existing 
research which has dispelled black-and-white conceptualizations of women’s 
empowerment that emphasize comparative advantage in economic resources, or those 
that focus exclusively on cultural gender scripts. For example, approaches to 
household decisionmaking based on relative economic resources cannot explain why 
women who make more than their spouses, or contribute more to household expenses, 
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spend more time in housework or experience declines in their husbands’ participation 
(Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994). Similarly, a focus on cultural gender scripts 
cannot account for high levels of women’s labor force participation in some Muslim 
countries, such as Indonesia (40 percent) and Malaysi  (32 percent), compared to 
very low levels of participation in other countries (World Bank 2013a).  
A growing body of research has documented the multidimensionality of 
women’s empowerment and demonstrated that different dimensions are correlated 
with different factors (Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; 
Malhotra 1997; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Mason 1986). For example, in traditional 
societies, women’s schooling and participation in productive work matter less than 
culturally relevant sources of domestic power such as duration of marriage, number 
of sons, and being married to the head of the household (Jejeebhoy 2000; Kulik 2011; 
Mason 1997).  
The results presented in this dissertation expand our theorizations of the 
multidimensionality of women’s empowerment, and particularly the conditions for 
women’s authority in household decisionmaking, by empirically demonstrating under 
what circumstances economic factors matter more than cultural ones and vice versa, 
as well as how much these factors matter. Even in large y traditional societies with 
low levels of women’s labor force participation, adv ntages in economic resources 
may trump cultural gender scripts if women live in nuclear households in which they 
do not have to contend with generational hierarchies. Living apart from in-laws may 
not only facilitate women’s ability to leverage their advantages in relative economic 
resources to gain a greater say in household decisionmaking, but it may also free men 
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from the burden of doing their own gender to save face in front of their parents or in-
laws. The differentiated impact of women’s work by type of decision even within 
nuclear households suggests that economic considerations nd cultural norms may 
interact and shape the extent to which women’s gains in spheres considered to be 
“masculine” such as employment, translate into a greater stake in the management of 
the household. 
Multidimensionality of household decisionmaking  
The nature of household decisionmaking in Jordanian society is underlined by 
a distinction between decisions that have to do with the daily management of the 
household and those that pertain to women’s own wellbeing. Jordanian women are far 
more likely to exercise exclusive control over personal matters. The daily 
management of the household is one arena in which women can have influence as co-
participants, yet this is one aspect of the household in which men are also more likely 
to decide on their own.  
Additionally, these two dimensions of household decisionmaking differ in 
their nature and correlates. While participation in productive work enhances women’s 
chances of exercising exclusive control over personal decisionmaking, it improves 
women’s chances of partaking in decisions that have to do with the management of 
the household. The differential impact of women’s work by household decision and 
level of authority may partially have to do with the fact that family management 
decisions by nature differ fundamentally from personal decisionmaking in that they 
have to do with the wellbeing of others so spouses ar  likely to participate. The 
differentiation in household decisionmaking and its correlates in Jordanian society 
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may also have to do with cultural gender scripts.  In so far as men are expected to act 
as the guardians and protectors, we would expect thm o decide on matters that have 
to do with the wellbeing of others 
Individual level explanations are incomplete: social context matters 
My research demonstrates that women’s economic resou ces, net of other 
background characteristics and those of their households, are under some conditions 
positively associated with their household decisionmaking power. However, the story 
does not end here. My results expand research on women’s household 
decisionmaking authority by providing further empirical evidence that characteristics 
of regions in which women reside can exert important effects on the extent of 
women’s control over, or participation in, decisions that have to do with the daily 
management of their families and their personal welbeing.  
There are important regional effects on women’s authority in household 
decisionmaking, even after controlling for women’s relative economic resources, 
husbands’ characteristics, women’s family status such as whether their husbands have 
co-wives, whether they are related to their spouses prior to marriage, number of living 
sons and being married to the household head or being the head, as well as household 
factors such as whether their husbands live with them and whether they live in 
nuclear households. Individual models tend to overlok the pervasiveness of cultural 
norms which shape day-to-day behavior and activities, and structural level factors that 
can facilitate or complicate women’s abilities to decide on their own, free from the 
control of others, on issues that have to do with the management of their families and 
their own wellbeing. For example, the availability of well-paying female suited jobs 
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may encourage women and their families to overlook traditional gender norms, 
especially in the context of high living costs.  
Regional characteristics were associated with between-r gion differences in 
average levels of women’s authority in household decisionmaking. Regardless of 
women’s characteristics, regions with high levels of w men’s literacy and/or 
women’s rejection of wife beating are associated with h gher levels women’s of 
household decisionmaking power. This implies that in such regions, even women 
who do not work are more likely to have exclusive control over, or participate in, 
household decisions. On the other hand, regional levels of women’s labor force 
participation do not seem to influence the extent of w men’s household 
decisionmaking. I discuss this important non-finding and its implication for our 
theorizations of women’s empowerment in the latter section. 
Some important non-findings  
There are several important non-findings that are rel vant to our theorizations 
of women’s empowerment and the conditions under which we expect women’s labor 
force participation to enhance the extent of women’s authority within the household. 
These non-findings include the following: distinctions in level of decisionmaking 
authority by type of economic activity (i.e. paid versus unpaid), effects of 
occupational prestige, lack of a systematic difference in the effects of work by 
regional characteristics, and the association of family status variables with the extent 
of women’s household decisionmaking authority. Below I describe these non-findings 
in detail. 
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Is there a difference between paid and unpaid work? 
In this research, I could not detect any statistically meaningful difference 
between participating in different forms of paid work versus unpaid work for the 
extent of women’s authority in family management decisionmaking. In only one 
circumstance, paid work (self-employment) confers additional benefits for shared 
authority in personal decisionmaking The lack of stati ical association between 
employment status and women’s authority in household decisionmaking may have 
more to do with underreporting and undercounting. It maybe that women who 
participate in unpaid family work or unpaid forms of work do not consider such 
activities to be work and accordingly did not report it.29 Investigators may have not 
consistently probed for accurate responses that capture women’s unpaid work, which 
has a long history of been undercounted. In our analytic l sample, only 23 women are 
unpaid workers. The lack of statistically significant difference between unpaid versus 
paid work may be a result of small sample size. These r sults do not permit us to 
conclude that partaking in paid forms of economic activity do not confer additional 
benefits for women’s household decisionmaking compared to unpaid work. First, 
differences between paid and unpaid work have been documented in other research. 
Second, the results of this research indicate that advantages in relative income are 
positively and statistically associated with enhanced shared authority in both 
dimensions of household decisionmaking.  
                                                
29 For some details on differences in the characteristics of unpaid family workers and 
unpaid workers, including types of occupations, refer back to Chapter 8, Section on 
Independent Variables.  
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(How) does occupational prestige matter? 
The results on the association between occupational prestige and married 
women’s authority in household decisionmaking are mixed. The results do not 
support the contention that women in equally or more prestigious occupations than 
their husbands exercise greater authority (whether exclusive or shared) in household 
decisionmaking compared to women in less prestigious occupations.  Based on my 
results, I cannot identify a consistent pattern about the association between women’s 
relative occupational prestige and the extent of their authority in household 
decisionmaking in which women in more or less prestigious occupations exercise 
greater authority than women who do not work, but women who are in more 
prestigious occupations have greater authority thanwomen in less prestigious 
occupations. It may be that women in managerial and professional occupations are 
more likely to participate in or exercise exclusive control over household decisions 
compared to women in less skilled occupations (and women who do not work), 
independent of their husbands’ occupations. Research that includes absolute measures 
of women’s occupational status might be more effectiv  in shedding light on the 
association between occupational status and household decisionmaking authority. 
Do regional levels of women’s labor force participation matter for women’s 
authority in household decisionmaking? 
I was interested in modeling the work participation slope to test whether the 
positive benefits of women’s work are even larger in regions marked by high levels of 
socioeconomic development and less traditional gender orms. However, I failed to 
detect a systematic difference in the work participation slope between regions. This 
non-finding is important but may be a problem of stati ical power related to modest 
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within-region sample sizes that include a sufficient number of women who work. 
Additionally, my model failed to detect a contextual effect for women’s labor force 
participation. Regional rates of women’s labor force participation were statistically 
unrelated to regional averages in women’s household decisionmaking authority, and 
this may be partially explained by the lack of variation in women’s labor force 
participation rates between regions. Women’s labor force participation rate ranges 
from a high of about 25 percent in urban Karak to al w of 5.5 percent in rural Zarqa. 
This is a wider spread than that of women’s rejection of wife beating rate but lower 
than that of women’s literacy rate.  
Another possible explanation for the lack of statisical association between 
regional rates of women’s labor force participation and the extent of women’s 
authority in household decisionmaking may have to do with the multidimensional 
nature of women’s empowerment discussed above and in Chapter 2. Regions with the 
highest levels of women’s literacy and rejection of wife beating also have the lowest 
levels of women’s labor force participation (refer to Appendix Table 4b). Regions 
with the lowest levels of women’s literacy and lowest levels of disapproval of wife 
beating are regions in which women’s labor force participation rates are highest.  
(When) does family status matter? 
In this dissertation I was interested in testing whether women’s participation 
in productive work could increase the extent of their authority within the household 
after controlling for factors that would hypothetically influence women’s domestic 
power in a traditional context such as Jordan. Among the culturally relevant factors 
that may enhance women’s influence or prestige within the household are the number 
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of living sons, co-wives, being related to the spouse prior to marriage (e.g. first 
cousin) and martial duration (Mason 1997). The importance of family status variables 
for the extent of women’s authority in household decisionmaking varies by type of 
decision and household structure. When it comes to participating in decisions that 
have to do with the daily management of the household, marital duration is 
statistically important for women in both nuclear and extended households, but it has 
a bigger positive effect in extended households. While having co-wives has a 
negative effect on women’s shared authority over family management decisions, this 
association is statistically significant only for women in nuclear households. 
Women’s authority in personal decisionmaking, whether shared or exclusive, does 
not seem to be influenced by women’s family status. Women’s family status may 
impact the extent of their authority within the household and additional research may 
address this set of factors to further explore these associations. The data at hand 
permit us to conclude, that for decisions which are culturally construed to be part of 
men’s decisionmaking prerogative in their capacity as protectors and providers, some 
family status variable may be influential over and above the advantages conferred by 
participation in productive work, and these effects may be more pronounced for 
women who live in traditional households. 
Implications for research on women’s work in MENA region 
 Research on women’s labor force participation in MENA region and efforts to 
expand women’s access to paid employment have been partially motivated by the 
underlying assumption that participation in productive work may potentially confer 
both material and non-material resources which can improve women’s lives and the 
 136
wellbeing of others in their household. The research t hand aims to empirically 
explore whether these assumptions, which we observe in d veloped countries and 
other developing regions with sizable proportions of w men in the labor force, can 
also hold true in a context where women’s labor force participation rates are low and 
traditional gender norms prevail.  
On the micro-level, the results of this dissertation support the contention that 
women’s participation in productive work may enhance the extent of women’s 
participation in decisions that have to do with the daily management of their 
households, as well as improve their chance of exercising exclusive control on issues 
that have to do with their own wellbeing, net of other factors. However, on the macro-
level, women’s labor force participation rates do not seem to be related to the extent 
of women’s authority in household decisionmaking. This could have to do with lack 
of variation and/or the multidimensional nature of w men’s empowerment as 
discussed above. Nonetheless, the results of this resea ch have two implications for 
literature on women’s work in the MENA region and efforts to promote women’s 
access to paid work opportunities First, enhancing women’s labor force participation 
may not, on the macro-level be positively correlated with other dimensions of 
women’s empowerment. Traditional gender norms may partially explain low levels of 
labor force participation, but cultural scripts adapt to economic realties as more 
women engage in remunerative work. Second, continuig to invest in women’s 
education, training, and job placement may on the micro-level improve women’s 
sense of empowerment within their households and possibly on the macro-level shift 
cultural gender scripts.  
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Limitations and future directions 
This analysis relies on women’s reporting, so when it comes to distinctions 
between exclusive control and shared decisionmaking authority, social desirability 
effects may influence women’s responses. Cultural gender scripts may also influence 
women’s own perceptions of the extent of their contr l over household decisions. 
This research sheds light on the pathways through which work improves 
women’s control over, or participation in, household decisions. However, this 
research did not detect meaningful differences betwe n paid and unpaid work. This 
may very well have to do with reporting and data colle tion, yet, these results 
underscore the contention that conventional measures of women’s work are 
insufficient for explicating household power dynamics. Some aspects of household 
decisionmaking require the life-long development of negotiation and communication 
skills (Malhotra and Mather 1997). Collecting information on quasi work (e.g. 
volunteer work and training) and whether the respondent has ever worked could shed 
more light on the pathways through which work empowers women within the 
household. Women’s labor force participation rates in MENA region are low, but 
there is a marked difference by marital status - when Arab women work most do so 
prior to marriage (World Bank 2013b). The positive effects of improved 
communication and negotiation skills and confidence may persist long after dropping 
out of the labor force. Including prior work experience may help us get a better 
handle on how work impacts women’s empowerment within t e household.  
Qualitative research in the form of focus groups with both women and men 
can shed more light on the pathways through which work empowers women within 
the household, as well as the strategies that women adopt within the constraints they 
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face to make decisions. Why is women’s decisionmaking authority marked by a sharp 
delineation between exclusive control over personal matters and shared authority in 
family management? Is this part and parcel of the concessions women make in one 
domain to gain in others? How and when do women use their economic and social 
resources to get what they want? 
In this dissertation I make a distinction between two levels of women’s 
authority – exclusive control versus shared authoriy in two distinct dimensions of 
household decisionmaking. But is there a substantive difference between being able 
to decide alone versus having to negotiate with one’s spouse when it comes to other 
demographic outcomes of interest?  For example, future research can explore the 
difference between child health and schooling outcomes depending on the level of 
their mother’s decisionmaking authority. Differences in level of empowerment may 
have a substantive impact on women’s own wellbeing. Women’s depression rates are 
in MENA region are the highest in the world, and the gender gap is also the widest 
(Freund 2013). A number of factors, including ongoing armed conflict and civil strife, 
may partially explain the extraordinarily high levels of depression rates among 
women in MENA and that fact that the gap is the widest. However, these rates may 
be related to levels of women’s agency and empowerment in the region (Freund 
2013). Being able to participate in family management decisions is better than being 
shut out of this process altogether. Yet there may be a cost associated to having to 
negotiate with husbands on issues that have to do with the wellbeing of others that 
eventually takes a toll on women’s own wellbeing.  




Table 1. Factors for different dimensions of women's authority in household decision making with the variables that are 
most correlated (factor loadings of 0.40 or more) 
Factor 
number 
Assigned factor label Variables most correlated (loading 
0.40 or more post rotation) 
Factor loading after 
rotation 
1 Family management decisions Large purchases 0.754 
Daily needs 0.706 
Social visits to family 0.635 
Husband's earnings 0.641 
2 Personal decisions Personal health 0.926 
 
 

















in +1 family 
decisions (VI) 
Current work status(1) 
       
   Currently working (N=1,373) 0.51 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.38 
    Currently not working (N=8,987) 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.33 
Nature of current work(2) 
   Employee (N=1,258) 0.50 0.14 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.37 
   Employer (N=21) 0.43 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.43 
   Self employed (N=71) 0.55 0.25 0.44 0.16 0.11 0.52 
   Unpaid family worker (N=20) 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.35 
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in +1 family 
decisions (VI) 
   Unpaid worker (N=3) 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Relative income(3) 
   Wife earns more or same as husband (N=540) 0.51 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.05 0.37 
   Wife earns less income than husband (N=766) 0.49 0.12 0.29 0.11 0.04 0.38 
   Husband doesn't earn any income (N=42) 0.67 0.26 0.41 0.21 n/a 0.48 
   Wife has no earnings (N=9,010) 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.33 
Relative occupational prestige  
   Husband works, wife does not work (N=7,521) 0.46 0.09 0.27 0.10 0.04 0.34 
   Husband more prestige, wife works (N=384) 0.50 0.15 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.38 
   Wife same or more prestige (N=989)(4) 0.51 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.38 
   Both do not work (N=1,466) 0.52 0.13 0.22 0.12 0.05 0.31 
All Married Women (N=10,360) 0.47 
 
0.11 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.34 
Notes: Values are unweighted. 
(1) Includes both paid and unpaid work.  
(2) Pertains to currently working women.  
(3) Category "wife has no earnings" mostly pertains to women who do not work (n=8,987) and women in unpaid work (n=23).( 
4) Includes working women whose husbands do not work (n=141).  
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Current work status(1) 
       
   Currently working (N=1,373) 0.93 0.85 0.80 0.92 0.30 2.85 
    Currently not working (N=8,987) 0.89 0.66 0.68 0.83 0.42 2.57 
Nature of current work(2) 
   Employee (N=1,258) 0.94 0.85 0.80 0.92 0.29 2.86 
   Employer (N=21) 0.76 0.95 0.76 0.95 0.29 2.95 
   Self employed (N=71) 0.97 0.86 0.79 0.89 0.24 2.75 
   Unpaid family worker (N=20) 0.75 0.55 0.55 0.80 0.65 2.55 
   Unpaid worker (N=3) 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.67 
Relative income(3) 
   Wife earns more or same as husband (N=540) 0.94 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.27 2.86 
   Wife earns less income than husband (N=766) 0.93 0.84 0.80 0.92 0.31 2.86 
   Husband doesn't earn any income (N=42) 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.81 n/a 2.60 
   Wife has no earnings (N=9,010) 0.89 0.66 0.68 0.83 0.42 2.57 
Relative occupational prestige 
   Husband works, wife does not work (N=7,521) 0.89 0.66 0.70 0.84 0.41 2.60 
   Husband more prestige, wife works (N=384) 0.92 0.84 0.76 0.92 0.33 2.84 
   Wife same or more prestige (N=989)(4) 0.94 0.85 0.81 0.91 0.28 2.85 
   Both do not work (N=1,466) 0.87 0.61 0.60 0.79 0.51 2.40 
All Married Women (N=10,360) 0.89 0.68 0.70 0.84 0.40 2.60 
Notes: Values are unweighted. 
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Sole authority  
Marital duration 
   0-4 years (N=2,158) 0.40 0.07 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.27 
   5-9 years (N=2,042) 0.47 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.04 0.31 
   10-14 years (N=1,924) 0.48 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.04 0.36 
   15-19 years (N=1,783) 0.50 0.12 0.30 0.12 0.04 0.38 
   20-24 years (N=1,288) 0.52 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.37 
   25-29 years (N=805) 0.52 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.05 0.35 
   30+ years (N=360) 0.53 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.05 0.40 
Number of living sons 
   No sons (N=1,949) 0.41 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.29 
   At least one son (N=8,411) 0.49 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.04 0.35 
Co-wives 
   Husband does not have other wives (N=9,721) 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.34 
   Husband has other wives (N=627) 0.55 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.03 0.32 
Respondent's relation to head of household 
    Not married to head/not head (N=819) 0.39 0.08 0.23 0.09 0.03 0.31 
   Respondent is household head or married to 
household head (N=9,541) 0.48 0.11 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.34 
Relationship to husband prior to marriage (endogamy) 
   Not related to husband prior to marriage (N=5,887) 0.47 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.33 
   Related to husband prior to marriage (N=4,472) 0.48 0.10 0.27 0.10 0.04 0.34 
All Married Women (N=10,360) 0.47 0.11 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.34 




















family mgmt.  
Marital duration 
   0-4 years (N=2,158) 0.87 0.68 0.69 0.83 0.38 2.57 
   5-9 years (N=2,042) 0.89 0.67 0.69 0.83 0.40 2.58 
   10-14 years (N=1,924) 0.90 0.70 0.73 0.85 0.38 2.64 
   15-19 years (N=1,783) 0.91 0.69 0.72 0.85 0.39 2.63 
   20-24 years (N=1,288) 0.91 0.68 0.68 0.86 0.44 2.63 
   25-29 years (N=805) 0.90 0.67 0.66 0.84 0.48 2.62 
   30+ years (N=360) 0.85 0.63 0.63 0.83 0.48 2.54 
Number of living sons 
   No sons (N=1,949) 0.87 0.68 0.69 0.82 0.39 2.56 
   At least one son (N=8,411) 0.90 0.68 0.70 0.85 0.41 2.62 
Co-wives 
   Husband does not have other wives (N=9,721) 0.90 0.69 0.71 0.85 0.38 2.63 
   Husband has other wives (N=627) 0.81 0.47 0.49 0.67 0.73 2.29 
Respondent's relation to head of household 
    Not married to head/not head (N=819) 0.86 0.64 0.64 0.76 0.39 2.40 
   Respondent is household head or married to 
household head (N=9,541) 0.90 0.68 0.70 0.85 0.40 2.62 
Relationship to husband prior to marriage 
   Not related to husband prior to marriage (N=5,887) 0.89 0.69 0.70 0.84 0.40 2.62 
   Related to husband prior to marriage (N=4,472) 0.89 0.67 0.69 0.84 0.41 2.59 




Table 5. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Respondent currently working 1.038 1.048 1.005 1.01E+00 1.03E+00 
Respondent’s educational attainment (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.244 1.232 1.245 1.184 
   Secondary 1.371** 1.375* 1.404** 1.323* 
   Higher 1.317* 1.247 1.323 1.255 
Respondent’s age (years) 1.110*** 1.078** 1.081** 
Respondent age squared  0.999** 0.999* 0.999* 
Husband's educational attainment (ref: none) 
   Primary 1.012 1.015 1.008 
   Secondary 1.071 1.076 1.095 
   Higher 0.957 0.958 0.946 
Husband currently working 1.226** 1.221** 1.187* 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.099 1.108 1.109 
   Middle 1.121 1.129 1.131 
   Richer 1.259** 1.280** 1.249* 
   Richest 1.300** 1.328** 1.226 
Husband in the household 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.02 1.029 
Respondent's husband has other wives 1.112 1.182 
Respondent is married to household head or is the head 1.026 1.014 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.977 0.984 
Duration of marriage (years) 1.018* 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.949 0.948 
Number of adult females 0.965 0.945 
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Table 5. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.484*** 
   Zarqa 0.493*** 
   Madaba 0.608*** 
   Irbid 1.214** 
   Mafraq 1.18 
   Jarash 0.684*** 
   Ajlun 0.872 
   Karak 1.148 
   Tafiela 0.683*** 
  Ma'an 0.9 
   Aqaba 0.439*** 
Urban 1.424*** 
Constant 0.623*** 0.467*** 0.128*** 0.224** 0.184** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 0.142 (1) 5.037 (4) 80.48 (15) 90.8 (22) 305.2 (34) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Work includes paid and unpaid work. Weights included.  




Table 6. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Respondent currently working 0.235*** 0.134*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 
Respondent’s educational attainment (ref: no 
education) 
   Primary 0.057 0.026 0.014 0.011 
   Secondary 0.257*** 0.197*** 0.177*** 0.175*** 
   Higher 0.417*** 0.278*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 
Respondent's age (years) 0.0265*** 0.007 0.007 
Respondent's age squared  -0.000286** 0.000 0.000 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.015 -0.008 -0.010 
   Secondary 0.044 0.016 0.016 
   Higher 0.141** 0.110* 0.115* 
Husband currently working 0.0799*** 0.0660** 0.0637** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.040 0.044 0.033 
   Middle 0.0586** 0.0708** 0.0530* 
   Richer 0.157*** 0.178*** 0.156*** 
   Richest 0.155*** 0.178*** 0.147*** 
Husband in the household 0.046 -0.048 -0.052 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.000 0.000 
Respondent's husband has other wives -0.149*** -0.148*** 
Respondent is married to HH head or is the head 0.111*** 0.112*** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.004 -0.001 
Duration of marriage (years) 0.00835*** 0.00849*** 
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Table 6. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males -0.0221* -0.0209* 
Number of adult females -0.0482*** -0.0433*** 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa -0.0676* 
   Zarqa 0.0538** 
   Madaba 0.111* 
   Irbid -0.0820*** 
   Mafraq -0.128*** 
   Jarash -0.090 
   Ajlun -0.109* 
   Karak -0.0975* 
   Tafiela -0.060 
  Ma'an -0.032 
   Aqaba -0.050 
Urban -0.033 
Constant 2.629*** 2.360*** 1.626*** 2.102*** 2.156*** 
      
R-squared 0.007 0.022 0.038 0.047 0.051 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of family management decisions in which women 
decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone. W ights included. 





Table 7. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's employment status 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's employment status (ref.: does not work) 
   Employee 1.015 1.02 0.98 0.993 1.013 
   Employer 0.662 0.652 0.581 0.568 0.548 
   Self employed 1.442 1.469 1.388 1.347 1.332 
   Unpaid family worker/unpaid worker 2.031 2.144 2.153 2.07 1.818 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.242 1.23 1.243 1.182 
   Secondary 1.383** 1.387** 1.414** 1.332* 
   Higher 1.338* 1.262 1.333 1.262 
Women's age (continuous) 1.112*** 1.081** 1.083** 
Age squared 0.999** 0.999* 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.01 1.015 1.009 
   Secondary 1.067 1.073 1.093 
   Higher 0.958 0.959 0.948 
Husband currently working 1.220** 1.215* 1.182 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.103 1.11E+00 1.11E+00 
   Middle 1.123 1.13E+00 1.13E+00 
   Richer 1.265** 1.287** 1.253* 
   Richest 1.308** 1.337** 1.23E+00 
Husband in household 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.019 1.028 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.107 1.181 
Respondent is HH head/married to head 1.027 1.014 
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Table 7. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's employment status 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.974 0.982 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.017* 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.949 0.948 
Number of adult females 0.964 0.945 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.483*** 
   Zarqa 0.492*** 
   Madaba 0.608*** 
   Irbid 1.208* 
   Mafraq 1.179 
   Jarash 0.684*** 
   Ajlun 0.871 
   Karak 1.148 
   Tafiela 0.684*** 
  Ma'an 0.901 
   Aqaba 0.439*** 
Urban 1.428*** 
Constant 0.623*** 0.463*** 0.123*** 0.217** 0.178** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 2.961 (4) 8.192 (7) 83.82 (18) 93.94 (25) 308.2 (37) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Unpaid workers (n=3) are included with unpaid family workers (n=23) because they are a very 
small group. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 8. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's employment status 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's employment status (ref.: does not work)           
   Employee 0.238*** 0.123*** 0.0998*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 
   Employer 0.476*** 0.429*** 0.313** 0.319** 0.316** 
   Self employed 0.0399 0.0616 0.0353 0.0233 0.0338 
   Unpaid family worker/unpaid worker 0.311* 0.353* 0.351* 0.372** 0.403** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0587 0.0278 0.0154 0.0132 
   Secondary 0.257*** 0.198*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 
   Higher 0.420*** 0.281*** 0.279*** 0.281*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0266*** 0.0072 0.0077 
Age squared -0.000288** -0.000105 -0.000114 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.0145 -0.00967 -0.0111 
   Secondary 0.0437 0.0147 0.0148 
   Higher 0.139** 0.107 0.112* 
Husband currently working 0.0792*** 0.0651** 0.0628** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0399 0.0439 0.0338 
   Middle 0.0595** 0.0717** 0.0540* 
   Richer 0.158*** 0.179*** 0.157*** 
   Richest 0.155*** 0.178*** 0.148*** 
Husband in household 0.0448 -0.0492 -0.0537 
Respondent has at least one living son -4.42E-05 0.000357 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.154*** -0.153*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.111*** 0.112*** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.00411 -0.000661 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00831*** 0.00844*** 
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Table 8. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's employment status 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males -0.0217* -0.0205* 
Number of adult females -0.0484*** -0.0435*** 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa -0.0666* 
   Zarqa 0.0544** 
   Madaba 0.113** 
   Irbid -0.0820*** 
   Mafraq -0.128*** 
   Jarash -0.089 
   Ajlun -0.108* 
   Karak -0.0970* 
   Tafiela -0.0593 
  Ma'an -0.0307 
   Aqaba -0.0491 
Urban -0.0327 
Constant 2.629*** 2.359*** 1.626*** 2.102*** 2.154*** 
      
R-squared 0.008 0.022 0.038 0.047 0.051 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of family management decisions in which women 
decide in conjunction with their spouses. Weights included. 




Table 8a. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family 
management decision on women's employment status 
Variable Odds ratio 
Women's employment status (ref.: unpaid family workers/unpaid 
workers) 
   Employee 0.557 
   Employer 0.301 
   Self employed 0.733 
   Women who do not work 0.55 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.182 
   Secondary 1.332* 
   Higher 1.262 
Women's age (continuous) 1.083** 
Age squared 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.01E+00 
   Secondary 1.09E+00 
   Higher 0.948 
Husband currently working 1.182 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.112 
   Middle 1.132 
   Richer 1.253* 
   Richest 1.232 
Husband in household 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.028 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.181 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.014 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.982 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.948 




Wald Chi2 (df) 308(37) 
N 10344 
Notes: Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8b. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index on women's employment status 
Variable Coefficient 
Women's employment status (ref.: unpaid family workers/unpaid 
workers)   
   Employee -0.291 
   Employer -0.0871 
   Self employed -0.369* 
   Women who do not work -0.403** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0132 
   Secondary 0.176*** 
   Higher 0.281*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0077 
Age squared -0.000114 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.0111 
   Secondary 0.0148 
   Higher 0.112* 
Husband currently working 0.0628** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0338 
   Middle 0.0540* 
   Richer 0.157*** 
   Richest 0.148*** 
Husband in household -0.0537 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.000357 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.153*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.112*** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.000661 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00844*** 
Number of adult males -0.0205* 






Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of 
family management decisions in which women decide in conjunction with spouses or 
alone. Region dummies included but not shown here Weights included.  





Table 8c. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family 
management decision on women's employment status 
Variable Odds ratio 
Women's employment status (ref.: Employee) 
   Employer 0.54 
   Self-employed 1.315 
   Unpaid family worker/unpaid worker 1.794 
   Women who do not work 0.987 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.182 
   Secondary 1.332* 
   Higher 1.262 
Women's age (continuous) 1.083** 
Age squared 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.009 
   Secondary 1.093 
   Higher 0.948 
Husband currently working 1.182 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.112 
   Middle 1.132 
   Richer 1.253* 
   Richest 1.232 
Husband in household 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.028 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.181 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.014 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.982 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.948 




Wald Chi2 (df) 308.2 (37) 
N 10344 
Notes: Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8d. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index on women's employment status 
Variable Coefficient 
Women's employment status (ref.: Employee)   
   Employer 0.204 
   Self-employed -0.078 
   Unpaid family worker/unpaid worker 0.291 
   Women who do not work -0.112*** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0132 
   Secondary 0.176*** 
   Higher 0.281*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0077 
Age squared -0.000114 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.0111 
   Secondary 0.0148 
   Higher 0.112* 
Husband currently working 0.0628** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0338 
   Middle 0.0540* 
   Richer 0.157*** 
   Richest 0.148*** 
Husband in household -0.0537 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.000357 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.153*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.112*** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.000661 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00844*** 
Number of adult males -0.0205* 





Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of 
family management decisions in which women decide in conjunction with their 
spouses or on their own. Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights 
included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Full 
model 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who don't work r women with 
no earnings) 
   Earns about the same or more than husband  0.994 0.999 0.974 0.988 1.001 
   Earns less than husband 1.042 1.045 0.988 0.992 1.014 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) 0.997 1.03 1.007 1.031 1.002 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.25 1.235 1.248 1.186 
   Secondary 1.375** 1.377* 1.405** 1.322* 
   Higher 1.330* 1.257 1.331 1.26 
Women's age (continuous) 1.111*** 1.079** 1.081** 
Age squared 0.999** 0.999* 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.02 1.02E+00 1.02E+00 
   Secondary 1.08 1.085 1.108 
   Higher 0.965 0.967 0.957 
Husband currently working 1.226** 1.222* 1.186 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.098 1.108 1.108 
   Middle 1.119 1.128 1.129 
   Richer 1.258** 1.280** 1.249* 
   Richest 1.300** 1.330** 1.227 
Husband present in the household 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.02 1.029 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.113 1.184 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.024 1.012 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.978 0.985 
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Table 9. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on wmen's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Full 
model 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.018* 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.948 0.947 
Number of adult females 0.964 0.945 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.482*** 
   Zarqa 0.493*** 
   Madaba 0.608*** 
   Irbid 1.214** 
   Mafraq 1.178 
   Jarash 0.683*** 
   Ajlun 0.872 
   Karak 1.149 
   Tafiela 0.683*** 
  Ma'an 0.901 
   Aqaba 0.439*** 
Urban 1.422*** 
Constant 0.624*** 0.466*** 0.125*** 0.221** 0.182** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 0.101(3) 5.038 (6) 80.47(17) 90.78 (24) 305.2 (36) 
N 10358 10358 10355 10342 10342 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Weights included. 




Table 10. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's relative income 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who don't work r women 
with no earnings)           
   Earns about the same or more than husband  0.280***  .175*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.174*** 
   Earns less than husband 0.223*** 0.114*** 0.0656* 0.0662* 0.0787** 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) -0.159 -0.154 -0.100 -0.066 -0.072 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.056 0.026 0.014 0.011 
   Secondary 0.254*** 0.196*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 
   Higher 0.414*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 0.277*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0265*** 0.007 0.007 
Age squared -0.000286** 0.000 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.016 -0.007 -0.009 
   Secondary 0.045 0.018 0.018 
   Higher 0.145** 0.115* 0.119* 
Husband currently working 0.0746*** 0.0617** 0.0589** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.040 0.044 0.034 
   Middle 0.0589** 0.0712** 0.0535* 
   Richer 0.157*** 0.178*** 0.156*** 
   Richest 0.155*** 0.179*** 0.148*** 
Husband present in the household 0.041 -0.051 -0.055 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.000 0.000 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.145*** -0.144*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.109** 0.109** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.003 0.000 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00841*** 0.00854*** 
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Table 10. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's relative income 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males -0.0223* -0.0212* 
Number of adult females -0.0487*** -0.0438*** 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa -0.0676* 
   Zarqa 0.0546** 
   Madaba 0.111* 
   Irbid -0.0798*** 
   Mafraq -0.128*** 
   Jarash -0.089 
   Ajlun -0.109* 
   Karak -0.0963* 
   Tafiela -0.059 
  Ma'an -0.031 
   Aqaba -0.048 
Urban -0.033 
Constant 2.630*** 2.363*** 1.636*** 2.111*** 2.165*** 
 
R-squared 0.008 0.022 0.038 0.047 0.051 
N 10358 10358 10355 10342 10342 
Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of family management decisions in which women 
decide in conjunction with spouses or alone Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10a. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family 
management decision on women's relative income 
Variables Odds ratio 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn less)   
   Women who do not work or women with no earnings  0.987 
   Earns about the same or more than husband 0.987 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) 0.989 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.186 
   Secondary 1.322* 
   Higher 1.26 
Women's age (continuous) 1.081** 
Age squared 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.021 
   Secondary 1.108 
   Higher 0.957 
Husband currently working 1.186 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.108 
   Middle 1.129 
   Richer 1.249* 
   Richest 1.227 
Husband present in the household 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.029 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.184 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.012 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.985 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.947 
Number of adult females 0.945 
Urban 1.422*** 
Constant 0.184** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 305.2 (36) 
N 10342 
Notes: Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 




Table 10b. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index on women's relative income 
Variables Coefficient 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn less) 
   Women who do not work or women with no earnings  -0.0787** 
   Earns about the same or more than husband 0.0954*  
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) -0.151 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0114 
   Secondary 0.174*** 
   Higher 0.277*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.00739 
Age squared -0.00011 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.00869 
   Secondary 0.018 
   Higher 0.119* 
Husband currently working 0.0589** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0341 
   Middle 0.0535* 
   Richer 0.156*** 
   Richest 0.148*** 
Husband present in the household -0.0549 
Respondent has at least one living son -1.12E-05 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.144*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.109** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -1.49E-06 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00854*** 
Number of adult males -0.0212* 





Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of 
family management decisions in which women decide in conjunction with spouses or 
alone. Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10c. Effect of women’s relative income on women's family management authority 
  
Sole say in at least one 
family management 
decision (1) 
Shared authority in family 
management decisionmaking 
index (2) 
Variables Odds ratio Coefficient 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn same or more) 
   Women who do not work or women with no earnings  0.999 -0.174*** 
   Women who earn less 1.013 -0.0954* 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) 1.002 -0.246* 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.186 0.0114 
   Secondary 1.322* 0.174*** 
   Higher 1.26 0.277*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.081** 0.00739 
Age squared 0.999* -0.00011 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.021 -0.00869 
   Secondary 1.108 0.018 
   Higher 0.957 0.119* 
Husband currently working 1.186 0.0589** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.108 0.0341 
   Middle 1.129 0.0535* 
   Richer 1.249* 0.156*** 
   Richest 1.227 0.148*** 
Husband present in the household 0.335*** -0.0549 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.029 -1.12E-05 
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Table 10c. Effect of women’s relative income on women's family management authority 
  
Sole say in at least one 
family management 
decision (1) 
Shared authority in family 
management decisionmaking 
index (2) 
Variables Odds ratio Coefficient 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.184 -0.144*** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.012 0.109** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.985 -1.49E-06 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021** 0.00854*** 
Number of adult males 0.947 -0.0212* 
Number of adult females 0.945 -0.0438*** 
Urban 1.422*** -0.0332 
Constant 0.182** 2.339*** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 305.2 (36) 
R-squared 0.051 
N 10342 10342 
Notes:       
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole say in at least one family management decision. 
(2) Results of ordinary least squares regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index. Index ranges 
from 0-4. Shared authority includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone. 
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 




Table 11. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on w men's relative occupational 
prestige  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: women don't work, husband works) 
     
   Both don't work 0.849 0.875 0.728 0.735 0.76 
   Wife less prestige, husband more prestige 0.942 0.954 0.883 0.886 0.885 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes men who don't work) 1.05 1.074 1.013 1.025 1.05 
Women's education (ref.no education)      
   Primary  
1.219 1.23 1.243 1.182 
   Secondary  
1.319* 1.367* 1.397** 1.317 
   Higher  
1.258 1.235 1.312 1.243 
Women's age (continuous)   
1.111*** 1.080** 1.082** 
Age squared   
0.999** 0.999* 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education)      
   Primary   
1.01 1.013 1.008 
   Secondary   
1.067 1.072 1.092 
   Higher   
0.96 0.961 0.951 
Husband currently working    
0.925 0.931 0.933 
Household wealth (ref: poorest)      
   Poorer   
1.1 1.108 1.109 
   Middle   
1.121 1.128 1.13 
   Richer   
1.261** 1.281** 1.250* 
   Richest   
1.306** 1.333** 1.231 
Husband present in the household   
0.307*** 0.302*** 0.336*** 
Respondent has at least one living son    
1.021 1.03 
Respondent's husband has co-wives    
1.111 1.182 
Respondent is the household head or married to head    
1.03 1.018 
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Table 11. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision on w men's relative occupational 
prestige  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage    
0.976 0.983 
Marital duration (continuous)    
1.018* 1.021** 
Number of adult males    
0.949 0.948 
Number of adult females    
0.966 0.947 
Region (ref.: Amman)      
   Balqa     
0.484*** 
   Zarqa     
0.492*** 
   Madaba     
0.610*** 
   Irbid     
1.214** 
   Mafraq     
1.183 
   Jarash     
0.685*** 
   Ajlun     
0.875 
   Karak     
1.156 
   Tafiela     
0.685*** 
  Ma'an     
0.903 
   Aqaba     
0.439*** 
Urban 
    
1.428*** 
Constant 0.635*** 0.493*** 0.167** 0.289 0.229* 
Wald Chi2 (df) 3.103 (3) 7.138 (6) 82.02 (17) 92.38 (24) 306.5 (36) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Weights included. 




Table 12. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's relative occupational 
prestige  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: women who don't work, 
husband works) 
          
   Both don't work -0.115*** -0.0507* 0.0149 0.0155 0.0155 
   Wife less prestige, husband more prestige 0.198*** 0.124*** 0.0597 0.0661 0.0768 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband 0.230*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.140*** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0488 0.0261 0.0137 0.0114 
   Secondary 0.241*** 0.197*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 
   Higher 0.400*** 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.276*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0267*** 0.0071 0.00757 
Age squared -0.000288** -0.000104 -0.000113 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.0161 -0.00764 -0.00918 
   Secondary 0.0448 0.0165 0.0167 
   Higher 0.144** 0.113* 0.118* 
Husband currently working (y/n) 0.0958 0.0822 0.0798 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0395 0.0435 0.0333 
   Middle 0.0581** 0.0703** 0.0525* 
   Richer 0.157*** 0.178*** 0.155*** 
   Richest 0.155*** 0.179*** 0.147*** 
Husband present in the household 0.0453 -0.0476 -0.0519 
Respondent has at least one living son -0.000248 0.000162 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.148*** -0.147*** 
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Table 12. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking on women's relative occupational 
prestige  
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.111*** 0.111*** 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.00401 -0.000485 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00841*** 0.00855*** 
Number of adult males -0.0222* -0.0210* 
Number of adult females -0.0481*** -0.0432*** 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa -0.0672* 
   Zarqa 0.0536** 
   Madaba 0.112* 
   Irbid -0.0820*** 
   Mafraq -0.128*** 
   Jarash -0.0904* 
   Ajlun -0.109* 
   Karak -0.0963* 
   Tafiela -0.0599 
  Ma'an -0.0316 
   Aqaba -0.0504 
Urban -0.0324 
Constant 2.644*** 2.381*** 1.608*** 2.084*** 2.137*** 
      
R-squared 0.009 0.022 0.038 0.047 0.051 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of family management decisions in which women 
decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone. W ights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12a. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family 
management decision on women's relative occupational prestige  
Variables Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: wife less prestige, 
husband more prestige) 
 
   Women who don't work, husband works 0.832* 1.13 
   Both don't work 0.730*** 0.858 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes men 
who don't work) 0.998 1.186 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.182 
   Secondary 1.317 
   Higher 1.243 
Women's age (continuous) 1.082** 
Age squared 0.999* 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.008 
   Secondary 1.092 
   Higher 0.951 
Husband currently working 0.933 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.109 
   Middle 1.13 
   Richer 1.250* 
   Richest 1.231 
Husband present in the household 0.336*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.03 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.182 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.018 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.983 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021** 
Number of adult males 0.948 





Wald Chi2 (df) 306.5 (36) 
N 10344 
Notes: Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 




Table 12b. OLS regression of women's shared authority in family management 
decisionmaking index on women's relative occupationl prestige 
Variables Coef Coef 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: wife less 
prestige, husband more prestige) 
 
   Women who don't work, husband works -0.242*** -0.0768 
   Both don't work -0.439*** -0.0613 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes 
men who don't work) 0.0102 0.0632 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.0114 
   Secondary 0.176*** 
   Higher 0.276*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.00757 
Age squared -0.000113 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.00918 
   Secondary 0.0167 
   Higher 0.118* 
Husband currently working 0.0798 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0333 
   Middle 0.0525* 
   Richer 0.155*** 
   Richest -0.147*** 
Husband present in the household -0.0519 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.000162 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.147*** 
Respondent is the household head /married to head 0.111***  
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.000485 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.00855*** 
Number of adult males -0.0210* 





   
R-squared  0.051 
N  10344 
Notes: Household decisionmaking index ranges from 0 - 4 reflecting the number of 
family management decisions in which women decide in conjunction with their 
spouses or alone. Region dummies included but not show here. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Respondent currently working 1.306*** 1.295** 1.310** 1.318*** 1.294** 
Respondent’s educational attainment (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.054 1.275 1.283 1.276 
   Secondary 0.861 1.245 1.255 1.234 
   Higher 0.894 1.433** 1.477** 1.449** 
Respondent's age (years) 1.070** 1.046 1.044 
Respondent's age squared  0.999 1 1 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.811 0.81 0.81 
   Secondary 0.833 0.833 0.825 
   Higher 0.671* 0.667** 0.652** 
Husband currently working 0.938 0.929 0.937 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.977 0.994 1.012 
   Middle 0.723*** 0.739*** 0.765*** 
   Richer 0.793** 0.824* 0.869 
   Richest 0.708*** 0.744** 0.815 
Husband in the household 0.370*** 0.340*** 0.333*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.133 1.127 
Respondent's husband has other wives 1.173 1.177 
Respondent is married to household head or is the head 1.247 1.248 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.062 1.06 
Duration of marriage (years) 1.003 1.003 
Number of adult males 0.998 0.993 
Number of adult females 0.97 0.965 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
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Table 13. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's work 
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
   Balqa 1.398*** 
   Zarqa 1.102 
   Madaba 1.345*** 
   Irbid 1.313*** 
   Mafraq 1.317*** 
   Jarash 1.029 
   Ajlun 1.225** 
   Karak 1.098 
   Tafiela 1.257** 
  Ma'an 0.929 
   Aqaba 0.984 
Urban 1.074 
Constant 0.833*** 0.939 0.573 0.718 0.636 
Wald Chi2 (df) 7.672 (1) 11.43 (4) 96.33 (15) 107.6 (22) 146.4 (34) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Work includes paid and unpaid work. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to 
make decisions related to their own health. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's work  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Respondent currently working 1.713*** 1.452* 1.386 1.413* 1.476* 
Respondent’s educational attainment (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.178 1.257 1.218 1.138 
   Secondary 1.822*** 2.081*** 2.017*** 1.847*** 
   Higher 2.319*** 2.501*** 2.570*** 2.416*** 
Respondent's age (years) 1.038 1.015 1.023 
Respondent's age squared  1 1 1 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.698 0.622* 0.620** 
   Secondary 0.867 0.766 0.762 
   Higher 0.841 0.749 0.752 
Husband currently working 1.066 1.04 1.029 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.962 0.945 0.912 
   Middle 1.11 1.093 1.032 
   Richer 0.945 0.939 0.876 
   Richest 1.199 1.185 1.094 
Husband in the household 1.492 1.309 1.291 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.057 1.06 
Respondent's husband has other wives 0.621** 0.639** 
Respondent is married to household head or is the head 0.939 0.951 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.059 1.08 
Duration of marriage (years) 1.021 1.021 
Number of adult males 0.988 0.997 
Number of adult females 0.934 0.949 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.838 
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Table 14. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's work  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
   Zarqa 1.636*** 
   Madaba 1.126 
   Irbid 0.85 
   Mafraq 0.865 
   Jarash 0.963 
   Ajlun 0.974 
   Karak 0.858 
   Tafiela 0.731* 
  Ma'an 0.676** 
   Aqaba 0.675** 
Urban 1.107 
Constant 9.180*** 5.123*** 1.231 2.803 2.519 
Wald Chi2 (df) 7.774 (1) 31.37 (4) 54.98 (15)  74.45 (22) 131.1 (34) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Work includes paid and unpaid work. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to 
make decisions related to their own health. Includes women who decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's employment status  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's employment status (ref.: does not work)           
   Employee 1.286** 1.274** 1.293** 1.305** 1.283** 
   Employer 0.945 0.959 0.997 0.978 1 
   Self employed 2.015** 1.956* 1.894* 1.848* 1.79 
   Unpaid family worker and unpaid workers 1.164 1.113 1.081 1.034 0.979 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.048 1.268 1.277 1.27 
   Secondary 0.862 1.243 1.254 1.233 
   Higher 0.899 1.435** 1.476** 1.448** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.071** 1.047 1.045 
Age squared 0.999 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.809 0.81 0.81 
   Secondary 0.832 0.834 0.826 
   Higher 0.673* 0.670* 0.655** 
Husband currently working 0.938 0.93 0.938 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.977 0.994 1.012 
   Middle 0.722*** 0.738*** 0.764*** 
   Richer 0.793** 0.823* 0.868 
   Richest 0.708*** 0.743** 0.814 
Husband in household 0.370*** 0.340*** 0.333*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.132 1.126 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.177 1.181 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.249 1.25 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.061 1.059 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.003 
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Table 15. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's employment status  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males 0.999 0.994 
Number of adult females 0.97 0.965 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 1.396*** 
   Zarqa 1.101 
   Madaba 1.343*** 
   Irbid 1.311*** 
   Mafraq 1.318*** 
   Jarash 1.026 
   Ajlun 1.223** 
   Karak 1.098 
   Tafiela 1.259** 
  Ma'an 0.931 
   Aqaba 0.984 
Urban 1.073 
Constant 0.833*** 0.937 0.569 0.707 0.628 
 
Wald Chi2 (df) 10.08 (4) 13.24 (7) 97.63 (18) 108.8 (25) 147.2 (37) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions related to their own 
health. Unpaid workers are a very small group (n=3) so they are included with unpaid family workers (n=23). Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's employment status  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's employment status (ref.: does not work)           
   Employee 1.907*** 1.588** 1.534* 1.565** 1.639** 
   Employer 0.556 0.503 0.417 0.454 0.446 
   Self employed 6.976** 7.499*** 6.700** 6.522** 6.677** 
   Unpaid family worker/unpaid worker 0.232** 0.257* 0.237* 0.249 0.278 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.16 1.238 1.199 1.122 
   Secondary 1.802*** 2.061*** 1.998*** 1.831*** 
   Higher 2.260*** 2.424*** 2.496*** 2.348*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.036 1.013 1.022 
Age squared 1 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.7 0.626* 0.624* 
   Secondary 0.873 0.775 0.772 
   Higher 0.858 0.766 0.769 
Husband currently working 1.077 1.054 1.042 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.957 0.94 0.906 
   Middle 1.099 1.082 1.021 
   Richer 0.934 0.929 0.866 
   Richest 1.192 1.182 1.091 
Husband in household 1.498 1.324 1.306 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.053 1.055 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.643** 0.662** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.943 0.955 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.064 1.084 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.022 1.021 
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Table 16. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's employment status  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males 
Number of adult females 0.832 
Region (ref.: Amman) 1.629*** 
   Balqa 1.11 
   Zarqa 0.851 
   Madaba 0.862 
   Irbid 0.952 
   Mafraq 0.965 
   Jarash 0.856 
   Ajlun 0.726** 
   Karak 0.669** 
   Tafiela 0.670*** 
  Ma'an 1.102 
   Aqaba 0.989 0.999 
Urban 0.935 0.95 
Constant 9.180*** 5.194*** 1.266 2.811 2.539 
      Wald Chi2 (df) 20.72  (4) 44.17 (7) 69.05 (18) 89.69 (25) 147 (37) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions on their own health. 
Includes women who decide in conjunction with spouses or alone. Unpaid workers are a very small group (N=3) so are they included 
with unpaid family workers. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 16a. Logistic regression of women's personal decisionmaking on women's 






Women's employment status (unpaid family workers 
and unpaid workers)       
   Employee 1.319 5.870* 
   Employer 1.02 1.582 
   Self employed 1.833 23.80*** 
   Women who do not work 1.027 3.588 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.271 1.12 
   Secondary 1.233 1.824*** 
   Higher 1.448** 2.338*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.041 1.018 
Age squared 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.809 0.625* 
   Secondary 0.823 0.771 
   Higher 0.653** 0.767 
Husband currently working 0.936 1.039 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.013 0.91 
   Middle 0.764*** 1.027 
   Richer 0.87 0.872 
   Richest 0.815 1.105 
Husband in household 0.337*** 1.319 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.127 1.053 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.178 0.664** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.241 0.907 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.058 1.084 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.021 
Number of adult males 0.971 0.979 
Number of adult females 0.975 0.932 
Urban 1.072 1.101 
Constant 0.657 0.816 
Wald Chi2 (df) 147.1 (37) 148.1 (37) 
N 10344  10344 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's 
authority to make decisions related to their own healt . Includes women who decide 
in conjunction with spouses or alone. Unpaid workers are a very small group (n=3) so 
they are included with unpaid family workers (n=23). Region dummies included but 
not shown here. Weights included.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 16b. Logistic regression of women's personal decisionmaking on women's 






Women's employment status (ref.: employee) 
   Employer 0.774 0.270 
   Self employed 1.39 4.054* 
   Unpaid family workers and unpaid workers 0.758 0.170* 
   Women who do not work 0.779** 0.611** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.271 1.120 
   Secondary 1.233 1.824*** 
   Higher 1.448** 2.338*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.041 1.018 
Age squared 1 1.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.809 0.625* 
   Secondary 0.823 0.771 
   Higher 0.653** 0.767 
Husband currently working 0.936 1.039 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.013 0.910 
   Middle 0.764*** 1.027 
   Richer 0.87 0.872 
   Richest 0.815 1.105 
Husband in household 0.337*** 1.319 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.127 1.053 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.178 0.664** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.241 0.907 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.058 1.084 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.021 
Number of adult males 0.971 0.979 
Number of adult females 0.975 0.932 
Urban 1.072 1.101 
Constant 0.866 4.788 
Wald Chi2 (df) 147.1 (37) 148.1 (37) 
N 10344  10344 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's 
authority to make decisions related to their own healt . Includes women who decide 
in conjunction with spouses or alone. Unpaid workers are a very small group (n=3) so 
they are included with unpaid family workers (n=23). Region dummies included but 
not shown here. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who don't work r women with 
no earnings) 
   Earns about the same or more than husband  1.271 .255 1.232 1.246 1.239 
   Earns less than husband 1.253* 1.242 1.315** 1.318** 1.281* 
   Husband has no earnings 3.935*** 3.811*** 2.850** 2.942** 3.008** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
     
   Primary  
1.053 1.265 1.273 1.266 
   Secondary  
0.864 1.233 1.243 1.223 
   Higher  
0.904 1.424** 1.468** 1.440** 
Women's age (continuous) 
  
1.071** 1.046 1.045 
Age squared 
  
0.999 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
     
   Primary   
0.818 0.816 0.816 
   Secondary   
0.84 0.84 0.83 
   Higher   
0.677* 0.672* 0.657** 
Husband currently working   
0.959 0.95 0.96 
Household wealth (ref: poorest)      
   Poorer   
0.976 0.993 1.012 
   Middle   
0.722*** 0.738*** 0.765*** 
   Richer   
0.795** 0.826* 0.872 
   Richest   
0.709*** 0.745** 0.818 
Husband present in the household   
0.374*** 0.343*** 0.337*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 
   
1.134 1.128 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 
   
1.168 1.171 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 
   
1.252 1.254 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 
   
1.064 1.062 
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Table 17. Logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Marital duration (continuous) 
   
1.003 1.003 
Number of adult males 
   
0.998 0.993 
Number of adult females 
   
0.97 0.966 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
     
   Balqa     
1.399*** 
   Zarqa     
1.101 
   Madaba     
1.350*** 
   Irbid     
1.315*** 
   Mafraq     
1.327*** 
   Jarash     
1.03 
   Ajlun     
1.233** 
   Karak     
1.104 
   Tafiela     
1.262** 
  Ma'an     
0.932 
   Aqaba     
0.984 
Urban 
    
1.074 
Constant 0.833*** 0.934 0.55 0.689 0.609 
N 10358 10358 10355 10342 10342 
Wald Chi2 (df) 13.76 (3) 16.91 (6) 98.53 (17) 109.5 (24) 147.9 (36) 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions related to their own 
health. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who don't work r women with no 
earnings) 
          
   Earns about the same or more than husband  3.076***  2.606*** 2.496*** 2.540*** 2.630*** 
   Earns less than husband 1.405 1.173 1.12 1.136 1.194 
   Husband has no earnings 5.010* 5.333* 5.067* 5.592* 5.630* 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.177 1.249 1.21 1.131 
   Secondary 1.834*** 2.066*** 2.004*** 1.835*** 
   Higher 2.301*** 2.424*** 2.502*** 2.351*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.038 1.015 1.024 
Age squared 1 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.699 0.620* 0.618** 
   Secondary 0.869 0.765 0.761 
   Higher 0.858 0.76 0.763 
Husband currently working 1.093 1.07 1.058 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.968 0.95 0.916 
   Middle 1.115 1.097 1.036 
   Richer 0.951 0.945 0.882 
   Richest 1.205 1.188 1.099 
Husband present in the household 1.5 1.317 1.293 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.06 1.061 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.625** 0.643** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.945 0.958 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.063 1.084 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.022 1.022 
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Table 18. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative income  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Number of adult males 0.99 1 
Number of adult females 0.935 0.95 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.842 
   Zarqa 1.643*** 
   Madaba 1.132 
   Irbid 0.856 
   Mafraq 0.87 
   Jarash 0.972 
   Ajlun 0.984 
   Karak 0.862 
   Tafiela 0.739* 
  Ma'an 0.676** 
   Aqaba 0.681** 
Urban 1.11 
Constant 9.125*** 5.081*** 1.198 2.694 2.416 
      Wald Chi2 (df) 16.55 (3) 40.97 (6) 63.5 (17) 84.12 (24) 142.8 (36) 
N 10358 10358 10355 10342 10342 
Notes: Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions related to their own health. Includes women who report 
deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 184
Table 18a. Logistic regression of women's personal decisionmaking on women's 
relative income  
Variables Sole authority 
Shared 
authority 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn 
less than their husbands)   
   Women who don't work or women with no 
earnings 0.781* 0.839 
   Women who earn about the same or more than 
husbands 0.967 2.204* 
   Women who work but whose husbands do not have 
earnings 2.343 4.648* 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.268 1.128 
   Secondary 1.224 1.827*** 
   Higher 1.440** 2.340*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.041 1.021 
Age squared 1 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.815 0.618** 
   Secondary 0.828 0.76 
   Higher 0.656** 0.761 
Husband currently working 0.959 1.055 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.013 0.919 
   Middle 0.766*** 1.042 
   Richer 0.875 0.888 
   Richest 0.818 1.112 
Husband present in the household 0.341*** 1.304 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.129 1.06 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.168 0.645** 
Respondent is the household head or married to 
head 1.248 0.913 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.061 1.084 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.021 
Number of adult males 0.97 0.984 
Number of adult females 0.976 0.932 
Urban 1.073 1.108 
Constant 0.833 3.27 
    
Wald Chi2 (df) 147.6 (36) 143.5 (36) 
N 10342 10342 
Notes: Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's 
authority to make decisions related to their own healt . Includes women who decide 
in conjunction with spouses or alone. Region dummies included but not shown here. 
Weights included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 19. Logistic regression of women's sole authority personal decisionmaking on women's relative occupational prestige  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: women who don't work, husband 
works) 
          
   Both don't work 1.199* 1.173* 0.535** 0.539** 0.545** 
   Wife less prestige, husband more prestige 1.464**  1.446** 1.516** 1.525** 1.493** 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes men who don't work) 1.286** 1.261* 1.127 1.134 1.117 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.081 1.271 1.278 1.272 
   Secondary 0.902 1.234 1.243 1.223 
   Higher 0.946 1.442** 1.485** 1.458** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.071** 1.047 1.045 
Age squared 0.999 1.000 1.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.804 0.803 0.803 
   Secondary 0.825 0.825 0.816 
   Higher 0.660** 0.655** 0.641** 
Husband currently working  0.526** 0.524** 0.535** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.978 0.995 1.013 
   Middle 0.725*** 0.741*** 0.767*** 
   Richer 0.798** 0.829* 0.874 
   Richest 0.710*** 0.745** 0.817 
Husband present in the household 0.372*** 0.341*** 0.335*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.134 1.127 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.162 1.166 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.253 1.254 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.060 1.058 
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Table 19. Logistic regression of women's sole authority personal decisionmaking on women's relative occupational prestige  
Variables Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.003 
Number of adult males 0.999 0.994 
Number of adult females 0.970 0.966 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 1.395*** 
   Zarqa 1.102 
   Madaba 1.346*** 
   Irbid 1.311*** 
   Mafraq 1.317*** 
   Jarash 1.033 
   Ajlun 1.229** 
   Karak 1.099 
   Tafiela 1.262** 
  Ma'an 0.931 
   Aqaba 0.986 
Urban 1.071 
Constant 0.814*** 0.879 1.028 1.272 1.119 
Wald Chi2 (df) 11.44 (3) 14.27 (6) 102.3 (17) 113.3 (24) 151 (36) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions related to their own 
health. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative occupational prestige  
Variable Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: women who don't work, husband 
works)      
   Both don't work 0.870 1.011 0.279** 0.271** 0.272** 
   Wife less prestige, husband more prestige 2.136**  1.888** 1.747* 1.798* 1.881* 
   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes men who don't work) 1.544* 1.316 1.111 1.124 1.174 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.178 1.252 1.210 1.132 
   Secondary 1.823*** 2.063*** 1.996*** 1.831*** 
   Higher 2.334*** 2.532*** 2.597*** 2.445*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.039 1.017 1.025 
Age squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.693 0.614** 0.611** 
   Secondary 0.859 0.755 0.751 
   Higher 0.828 0.732 0.735 
Husband currently working  0.313** 0.296** 0.295** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.963 0.946 0.912 
   Middle 1.115 1.098 1.036 
   Richer 0.952 0.946 0.882 
   Richest 1.202 1.186 1.095 
Husband present in the household 1.503 1.312 1.293 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.057 1.059 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.612** 0.630** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.946 0.959 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.057 1.078 
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Table 20. Logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking on women's relative occupational prestige  
Variable Baseline Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Full model 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.021 1.020 
Number of adult males 0.990 1.000 
Number of adult females 0.935 0.950 
Region (ref.: Amman) 
   Balqa 0.835 
   Zarqa 1.636*** 
   Madaba 1.128 
   Irbid 0.847 
   Mafraq 0.863 
   Jarash 0.968 
   Ajlun 0.978 
   Karak 0.860 
   Tafiela 0.734* 
   Ma'an 0.677** 
   Aqaba 0.677** 
Urban 1.105 
Constant 9.347*** 5.108*** 4.201 9.736** 8.694* 
      
Wald Chi2 (df) 10.82 (3) 33.42 (6) 68.9 (17) 87.37 (24) 146.7 (36) 
N 10360 10360 10357 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios. Personal decisionmaking reflects women's authority to make decisions on their own health. 
Includes women who decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone. Weights included.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 20a. Logistic regression of women's personal decisionmaking on women's 






Relative occupational prestige (ref.: wife less 
prestige than husband)   
   Husband works, wife does not work 0.670** 0.533* 
   Both do not work 0.367*** 0.147*** 
   Wife has about the same or more prestige 
(includes small portion of men who don't work) 0.749 0.625 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.273 1.129 
   Secondary 1.225 1.824*** 
   Higher 1.459** 2.434*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.041 1.023 
Age squared 1.000 1.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.802 0.611** 
   Secondary 0.814 0.751 
   Higher 0.639** 0.734 
Husband currently working (y/n) 0.537** 0.297** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.014 0.916 
   Middle 0.768*** 1.041 
   Richer 0.877 0.887 
   Richest 0.817 1.107 
Husband present in the household 0.338*** 1.302 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.128 1.058 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.163 0.632** 
Respondent is the household head or married to 
head 1.250 0.917 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.058 1.078 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 1.020 
Number of adult males 0.973 0.985 
Number of adult females 0.977 0.932 
Urban 1.070 1.103 
Constant 1.760 18.12** 
    
Wald Chi2 (df) 150.8 (36)  147.3 (36) 
N 10344 10344 
Notes:  Results reported as odds ratios Personal decisionmaking reflects women's 
authority to make decisions related to their own healt . Includes women who decide 
in conjunction with spouses or alone. Region dummies included but not shown here 
Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1 1,611 66 1,677 
2 2,621 172 2,793 
3 832 83 915 
4 1,006 145 1,151 
5 1,129 208 1337 
6 854 249 1103 
7 281 153 434 
8 329 228 557 
9 60 69 129 
Total 8,723 1,373 10,096 
Notes: The distributions do not include 264 observations since these observations are outside the common support region which 




Table 22. T-statistics for the equality of the means of covariates between treated and controls cases within estimated propensity score 
blocks 
Variable Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 
Block 
9 
Respondent's age  
15-19 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20-24 0.330 0.179 0.074 0.0269** 0.037 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.000 
25-29 0.101 0.202** 0.213 0.262 0.230 0.230 0.138 0.187 0.116 
30-34 0.0894 0.185 0.220** 0.263 0.292 0.268 0.274 0.278 0.287 
35-39 0.105 0.166 0.172 0.191 0.248 0.209 0.385 0.343 0.395 
40-44 0.191** 0.163 0.190 0.151 0.114 0.200 0.120 0.172 0.155 
45-49 0.183** 0.105 0.131 0.106 0.078 0.083 0.081 0.020 0.047 
Respondent's education 
   No education 0.217 0.078 0.037 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 
   Primary 0.225 0.126** 0.081 0.041 0.0284** 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.000 
   Secondary/higher 0.558 0.796** 0.882** 0.946** 0.966** 0.992 0.988 0.998 1.000 
Husband's education 
   No education 0.0948 0.048 0.044 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
   Primary 0.432 0.156 0.063 0.031 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.000 
   Secondary/higher 0.473 0.796** 0.893 0.959 0.983** 0.991 0.993 1.000 1.000 
Household wealth  
   Poorest 0.557 0.381 0.198 0.342 0.119 0.024 0.012 0.000 0.000 
   Poorer 0.315 0.326 0.330 0.099 0.384 0.111 0.023 0.014 0.000 
   Middle 0.104 0.188 0.198 0.285 0.233 0.240 0.553 0.183 0.016 
   Richer/Richest 0.0244 0.106 0.274 0.274 0.265 0.626 0.412 0.803 0.984 
 Husband currently 
working 0.730 0.830 0.849 0.850 0.868 0.915 0.917 0.953 0.938 
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Table 22. T-statistics for the equality of the means of covariates between treated and controls cases within estimated propensity score 
blocks 
Variable Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 7 Block 8 
Block 
9 
   At least one child under 
the age of 5 in the 
household 0.0519 0.075 0.085 0.0626** 0.073 0.089 0.106 0.088 0.209 
   At least 2 male adults or 
2 female adults 0.609 0.421 0.405 0.368 0.197 0.307 0.207 0.063 0.008 
Urban 0.660 0.697 0.687 0.725 0.683 0.739 0.657 0.666 0.488 
Rural 0.340 0.303 0.313 0.275 0.317 0.261 0.343 0.334 0.512 
Governorates 
   Amman 0.160 0.128 0.203 0.150 0.057 0.141 0.028 0.014 0.000 
   Balqa 0.0525 0.059 0.033 0.086** 0.097 0.119 0.018 0.206 0.039 
   Zarqa 0.187** 0.151 0.087 0.0313** 0.084 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   Madaba 0.0346 0.066 0.042 0.088 0.117 0.097 0.180 0.199 0.054 
   Irbid 0.0912 0.100 0.091 0.087 0.078 0.064 0.101 0.005 0.000 
   Mafraq 0.0847** 0.086 0.084 0.117 0.070 0.080 0.014 0.074 0.008 
   Jarash 0.106 0.097 0.157 0.037 0.074 0.014 0.074 0.000 0.000 
   Ajlun 0.0417 0.070 0.026 0.129 0.108 0.095 0.127** 0.104 0.000 
   Karak 0.0239 0.037 0.073 0.036 0.087 0.100 0.138 0.201 0.659 
   Tafiela 0.0555 0.071 0.047 0.095 0.107 0.101 0.071 0.113 0.008 
  Ma'an 0.0453 0.056 0.093 0.040 0.102 0.054 0.247 0.077 0.233 
   Aqaba 0.117 0.082 0.063 0.104 0.019 0.134 0.002 0.005 0.000 
Notes: T-statistics pertain to the differences betwe n the covariates of treatment and control groups within a given propensity score 



















Sole authority in at least one family management 
decision (a) 0.0198 0.0192 0.0371** 0.0316* 0.0218 0.0272* 
(0.0158) (0.0179) (0.0148) (0.0163) (0.0181) (0.0150) 
    
Shared authority in family management (b) 0.180*** 0.147*** 0.242*** 0.226*** 0.164*** 0.204*** 
(0.0264) (0.0322) (0.0257) (0.0270) (0.0265) (0.0251) 
      
Sole authority in personal decision making(c) 0.0271* 0.0200 0.0307** 0.0318** 0.0429** 0.0299** 
(0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0151) 
 
Shared authority in personal decision making (d) 0.0358*** 0.0356*** 0.0388*** 0.0369*** 0.0264*** 0.0375*** 
(0.0085) (0.0106) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0095) (0.00812) 
Notes: Standard of errors are computed using a bootstrap with 50 replications and are reported in parentheses. Weights are included in 
the computation of the propensity matching scores.  
(a) The estimate is interpreted as the additional proportion of women who would experience sole authority in at least one family 
management decision if they were to engage in productive work.  
(b) The estimate is interpreted as the additional number of family management decisions in which women would either decide in 
conjunction with their spouses or alone if they were to engage in productive work.  
(c) The estimate is interpreted as the additional proportion of women who would experience sole authority in deciding on personal 
health matters if they were to engage in productive work.  
(d) The estimate is interpreted as the additional proportion of women who either decide in conjunction with their spouses or alone if 
they were to engage in productive work. 





Table 24. Comparison of PSM estimates of the effects of work on women's household decisionmaking authority and the observed 
difference in decisionmaking authority by women's labor force participation  
  
Observed difference in decisionmaking 
PSM estimate of the 











Difference P-value Estimate 
Sole say in at least one family management decision (a) 0.377 0.331 0.046 <0.0001 0.027* 
Shared authority in family management(b) 2.849 2.567 0.282 <0.0001 0.204*** 
Sole authority in personal decisions(c) 0.505 0.468 0.037 <0.01 0.030** 
Shared authority in personal decisions(d) 0.932 0.886 0.046 <0.0001 0.038*** 
Notes: P-value pertains to t-test with equal variance.  
(1) Based on kernel method of calculating the average treatment effect on the treated with bootstrapping with 50 repetitions. Includes 
weights in the generation of propensity scores and imposes the common support restriction.  
(a) The estimate is interpreted as the additional proportion of women who would experience having the sole authority on at least one 
family management decision if they were to engage in productive work. (b) The estimate is interpreted as the additional number of 
family related decisions in which women would either d cide in conjunction with their spouses or on their own if they were to engage 
in productive work. (c) The estimate is interpreted as the additional proportion of women who would experience having the sole 
authority in deciding on personal health matters if they were to engage in productive work. (d) The estimate is interpreted as the 
additional proportion of women who either decide in co junction with their spouses or alone if they were to engage in productive 
work.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 25. Within-household fixed effect model of the effects of women's sole 
authority in family management decisionmaking 
Variables Odds ratio 
Women's work 3.312** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.777 
   Secondary 0.891 
   Higher 0.821 
Women's age (continuous) 1.059 
Age squared 1 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.682 
   Secondary 0.457 
   Higher 0.316 
Husband currently works 0.715 
Husband present in the household 0.924 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.44 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.501 
Respondent is the household head/married to head 0.778 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.621 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.981 
N 254 
Number of groups 118 
Wald Chi2 (df) 16.83 (16) 
Notes: Weights not included.  





Table 26. Within-household fixed effect model of the women's shared authority in 
family management decisionmaking index 
Variables Coefficient 
Women's work 0.447** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary -0.273 
   Secondary -0.0104 
   Higher -0.173 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0715* 
Age squared -0.000517 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.407 
   Secondary -0.524 
   Higher -0.575* 
Husband currently works 0.914*** 
Husband present in the household 0.634*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.115 
Respondent's husband has co-wives -0.0605 
Respondent is the household head or married to head -0.0173 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.288***  





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Odds ratio Odds ratio 
Women's work 6.166** 0.803 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 4.804** 0.733 
   Secondary 2.36 0.688 
   Higher 1.42 0.363 
Women's age (continuous) 0.91 1.203 
Age squared 1.00 0.997 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.11 3.17E-08 
   Secondary 0.21 3.20E-08 
   Higher 0.25 2.67E-08 
Husband currently works 0.88 0.704 
Husband present in the household 0.0790*** 6.187 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.83 1.181 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.78 0.170* 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.44 1.217 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.14 1.089 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.97 1.016 
N 256 162 
Number of groups 118 74 
Wald Chi2 (df) 32.95 (16) 21.03 (16) 
Notes: Weights not included.  




Table 28. Within-region model of women's sole authori y in at least one family management decision 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
Intercept, γ00  -0.58 *** 0.12 0.56 
Woman's work, γ1 0.03  0.06 1.03 
Women's age (z score) γ2 0.06 * 0.03 1.06 
Woman's Education (z score), γ3 0.05  0.04 1.05 
Woman's SES (ref.: poorest) 
  
   Poorer, γ4 0.03  0.06 1.03 
   Middle, γ5 0.04  0.06 1.04 
   Richer/Richest, γ6 0.13 ** 0.04 1.14 
Husband currently works, γ7 0.21 ** 0.07 1.23 
Husband's education level (ref.: none) 
  
   Primary, γ8 0.06  0.14 1.06 
   Secondary, γ9 0.16  0.22 1.17 
   Higher, γ10 0.03  0.20 1.03 
Family status measures 
  
   Respondent has at least one living son γ11 0.07  0.10 1.08 
   Respondent's husband has co-wives γ12 0.13  0.23 1.14 
   Respondent is the household head or married to headγ13  0.25 ~ 0.15 1.28 
   Respondent related to husband prior to marriage γ14  -0.02  0.03 0.98 
   Marital duration (z score) γ15 0.14 ~ 0.07 1.15 
Household structure measures   
   Husband lives in same household as wife, γ16 -0.81 *** 0.16 0.45 
   Household has one or more adult females, γ17 0.90  0.64 2.47 
   Household has one or more adult males, γ18 -1.54 *** 0.20 0.22 
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Table 28. Within-region model of women's sole authori y in at least one family management decision 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
   Nuclear household, γ19 -0.08  0.08 0.93 
Chi-square table: 
   
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.409 0.167 23 319.17*** 
Notes: Weighted n=10,322 married women, unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~p<.10 
 
 
Table 29. Fully conditional model: effects of regional characteristics on women's sole authority in at le st one family management 
decision  
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
Intercept, β0           
      Intercept, γ00  -0.673 *** 0.082 0.51 
     Ave. Women's literacy  γ01  0.414 ** 0.131 1.51 
     Ave. Women's rejection of wife beating, γ02  -0.116  0.081 0.89 
     Ave. Women's work participation, γ03  0.116  0.093 1.12 
Chi-square table:           
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.339 0.115 20 212.9*** 
Notes: Weighted n=10,322 married women, unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. Fully 
conditional model controls for same variable as within-region model but are not shown here. 




Table 30. Within-region model of women's shared authori y in family management (index 0-4) 
Fixed effects Coefficient 
 
SE 
Intercept, γ00  2.622 *** 0.023 
Woman's work, γ1 0.121 *** 0.019 
Women's age (z score) γ2 -0.003 0.025 
Woman's education (z score), γ3 0.113 *** 0.015 
Woman's SES (ref.: poorest) 
   Poorer, γ4 -0.026  0.035 
   Middle, γ5 -0.014  -0.896 
   Richer/Richest, γ6 0.077 *** 0.022 
Husband currently works, γ7 0.073 0.050 
Husband's education level (ref.: none) 
   Primary, γ8 -0.029 0.117 
   Secondary, γ9 0.000  0.068 
   Higher, γ10 0.111 * 0.057 
Family status measures 
  
   Respondent has at least one living son γ11 0.009  0.023 
   Respondent's husband has co-wives γ12 -0.151 ** 0.051 
   Respondent is the household head or married to headγ13  0.206 ** 0.076 
   Respondent related to husband prior to marriage γ14  -0.004  0.014 
   Marital duration (z score) γ15 0.072 ~ 
Household structure measures   
   Husband lives in same household as wife, γ16 -0.004  0.113 
   Household has one or more adult females, γ17 -0.194 * 0.088 
   Household has one or more adult males, γ18 -0.227  
0.225 
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Table 30. Within-region model of women's shared authori y in family management (index 0-4) 
Fixed effects Coefficient 
 
SE 
   Nuclear household, γ19 0.006  0.057 
Notes: Weighted n=10,322 married women, unweighted N=24 regions. Model with robust standard of errors. 




Table 31. Fully conditional model: effects of regional characteristics on women's shared authority family anagement 
decision (index 0-4) 




      Intercept, γ00  2.591 *** 0.013 
     Ave. Women's literacy  γ01  0.002  0.016 
     Ave. Women's rejection of wife beating, γ02  0.043 *** 0.008 
     Ave. Women's work participation, γ03  0.002  0.015 
Notes: Unweighted N=24 regions. Model with robust standard of errors. Fully conditional model controls f r same variable as 
within-region model but are not shown here.  




Table 32. Variance components for HLM analysis of shared authority in family management decisionmaking index  
Random effect Standard deviation 
Variance 
component 
df Χ2 p-value 
Fully unconditional model     
          Intercept, µ0 0.089 0.008 23 111.466 0.000 
          level-1 error, r 0.883 0.779 
   
   Within-region model 
   
          Intercept, µ0 0.062 0.004 23 65.204 0.000 
          level-1 error, r 0.866 0.750 
   
   Fully conditional model 
   
          Intercept, µ0 0.019 0.000 20 25.219 0.193 
          level-1 error, r 0.866 0.750 




Table 33. Within-region model of women's sole authori y in personal decisionmaking 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
Intercept, γ00  -0.125 * 0.050 0.883 
Woman's work, γ1 0.301 ** 0.093 1.352 
Women's age (z score) γ2 0.170 ** 0.065 1.185 
Woman's Education (z score), γ3 0.013  0.058 1.013 
Woman's SES (ref.: poorest) 
   Poorer, γ4 0.105 0.097 1.110 
   Middle, γ5 -0.172 * 0.082 0.842 
   Richer/Richest, γ6 -0.026  0.044 0.974 
Husband currently works, γ7 -0.060 0.098 0.941 
Husband's education level (ref.: none) 
   Primary, γ8 -0.175 * 0.086 0.840 
   Secondary, γ9 -0.159  0.130 0.853 
   Higher, γ10 -0.390 ** 0.120 0.677 
Family status measures 
  
   Respondent has at least one living son γ11 0.130 ** 0.042 1.139 
   Respondent's husband has co-wives γ12 0.165  0.134 1.179 
   Respondent is the household head or married to headγ13  0.185 ~ 0.110 1.204 
   Respondent related to husband prior to marriage γ14  0.064 * 0.029 1.066 
   Marital duration (z score) γ15 -0.035  0.051 0.965 
Household structure measures   
   Husband lives in same household as wife, γ16 -1.038 *** 0.117 0.354 
   Household has one or more adult females, γ17 2.347 *** 0.598 10.455 
   Household has one or more adult males, γ18 -0.432  
0.414 0.649 
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Table 33. Within-region model of women's sole authori y in personal decisionmaking 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
   Nuclear household, γ19 0.193 ~ 0.107 1.213 
Chi-square table:       
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.123 0.015 23 52.033** 
Notes: Weighted n=10,322 married women, unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~p<.10 
 
 
Table 34. Fully conditional model: effects of regional characteristics on women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking  





Intercept, β0         
      Intercept, γ00  -0.102 * 0.040 0.903 
     Ave. Women's literacy  γ01  0.024  0.058 1.024 
     Ave. Women's rejection of wife beating, γ02  -0.047  0.037 0.954 
     Ave. Women's work participation, γ03  0.012  0.043 1.012 
Chi-square table: 
   
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.112 0.013 20 40.309** 
Notes: Unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. Fully conditional model controls for same 
variable as within-region model but are not shown here.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~p<.10 
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Table 35. Within-region model of women's shared authori y in personal decisionmaking 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
Intercept, γ00  2.247 *** 0.072 9.459 
Woman's work, γ1 0.409 *** 0.077 1.505 
Women's age (z score) γ2 0.059 0.071 1.061 
Woman's education (z score), γ3 0.179 *** 0.031 1.196 
Woman's SES (ref.: poorest) 
   Poorer, γ4 -0.106 0.169 0.899 
   Middle, γ5 0.019  0.176 1.019 
   Richer/Richest, γ6 -0.144  0.146 0.866 
Husband currently works, γ7 0.073 0.105 1.075 
Husband's education level (ref.: none) 
   Primary, γ8 -0.410 ~ 0.237 0.664 
   Secondary, γ9 -0.158  0.320 0.854 
   Higher, γ10 -0.127  0.268 0.880 
Family status measures 
  
   Respondent has at least one living son γ11 0.061  0.068 1.063 
   Respondent's husband has co-wives γ12 -0.487 *** 0.093 0.614 
   Respondent is the household head or married to headγ13  0.002  0.162 1.002 
   Respondent related to husband prior to marriage γ14  0.072 0.114 1.075 
   Marital duration (z score) γ15 0.139  0.095 1.149 
Household structure measures   
   Husband lives in same household as wife, γ16 0.266 * 0.125 1.304 
   Household has one or more adult females, γ17 1.076 ** 0.383 2.933 
   Household has one or more adult males, γ18 -0.273  
0.174 0.761 
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Table 35. Within-region model of women's shared authori y in personal decisionmaking 
Fixed effects Change in log odds 
 
SE Change in odds 
   Nuclear household, γ19 0.108  0.148 1.114 
Chi-square table: 
   
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.216 0.047 23 53.224** 
Notes: Weighted n=10,322 married women, unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~p<.10 
 
 
Table 36. Fully conditional model: effects of regional characteristics on women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking  





Intercept, β0   
      Intercept, γ00  2.132 *** 0.044 8.434 
     Ave. Women's literacy  γ01  0.087 ~ 0.049 1.091 
     Ave. Women's rejection of wife beating, γ02  0.108 ** 0.035 1.115 
     Ave. Women's work participation, γ03  -0.061  0.066 0.940 
Chi-square table: 
   
 
SD Variance df Χ2 
Intercept 0.124 0.015 20 27.535 
Notes: Unweighted N=24 regions. Population-average model with robust standard of errors. Fully conditional model controls for same 
variable as within-region model but are not shown here.   




Appendix Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
  N Mean SD 
Dependent variables       
Who decides on the following … 
Own health care 
   Someone else 10360 0.0034 0.0580 
   Husband alone 10360 0.1042 0.3056 
   Respondent and husband jointly 10360 0.4191 0.4934 
   Respondent alone 10360 0.4733 0.4993 
Making large household purchases 
   Someone else 10360 0.0083 0.0907 
   Husband alone 10360 0.3108 0.4628 
   Respondent and husband jointly 10360 0.5750 0.4944 
   Respondent alone 10360 0.1059 0.3077 
Making household purchases for daily needs 
   Someone else 10360 0.0122 0.1096 
   Husband alone 10360 0.2917 0.4546 
   Respondent and husband jointly 10360 0.4346 0.4957 
   Respondent alone 10360 0.2616 0.4395 
Visits to family or relatives 
   Someone else 10360 0.0036 0.0597 
   Husband alone 10360 0.1557 0.3626 
   Respondent and husband jointly 10360 0.7386 0.4394 
   Respondent alone 10360 0.1021 0.3028 
Husband's earningsa 
   Someone else 9939 0.0008 0.0284 
   Husband alone 9939 0.4021 0.4903 
   Respondent and husband jointly 9939 0.5573 0.4967 
   Respondent alone 9939 0.0398 0.1956 
Family management decisionmaking index - sole 
authority (0-4) 10360 0.5078 0.8505 
Family management decisionmaking index- some 
authority  (0-4) 10360 2.6042 0.9291 
Sole authority in personal decisionmaking 10360 0.4733 0.4993 
Shared authority in personal decisionmaking 10360 0.8924 0.3099 
Independent variables 
A. Economic variables 
Respondent's currently working 10360 0.1325 0.3391 
Respondent's employment statusb 
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Appendix Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
  N Mean SD 
   Employee 1373 0.9162 0.2771 
   Employer 1373 0.0153 0.1228 
   Self-employed 1373 0.0517 0.2215 
   Unpaid family worker 1373 0.0146 0.1199 
   Unpaid worker 1373 0.0022 0.0467 
Respondent's relative income 
   Wife earns more or same as husband 10358 0.0521 0.2223 
   Wife earns less than husband 10358 0.0740 0.2617 
   Husband doesn't not earn income 10358 0.0041 0.0636 
   Wife has no income 10358 0.8699 0.3365 
Respondent's relative occupational prestige 
   Wife does not work, husband more prestige 10360 0.7260 0.4460 
   Both do no work 10360 0.1415 0.3486 
   Husband has more prestige, wife works 10360 0.0371 0.1889 
   Wife has same or more prestigec 10360 0.0955 0.2939 
B. Family Status variables (cultural variables) 
Marital duration in years (0-37) 10360 12.8161 8.5733 
Respondent has at least one son 10360 0.8119 0.3908 
Husband has other wives 10348 0.0606 0.2386 
Head of household or married to head of household 10360 0.9209 0.2698 
Related to husband prior to marriage (endogamy) 10359 0.4317 0.4953 
Control variables 
Respondent's age in years (15-45) 10360 33.7517 7.9144 
Respondents' educational level 
   No education 10360 0.0635 0.2439 
   Primary 10360 0.0898 0.2859 
   Secondary 10360 0.5671 0.4955 
   Higher 10360 0.2796 0.4488 
Husbands' educational level 
   No education 10360 0.0347 0.1832 
   Primary 10360 0.1295 0.3358 
   Secondary 10360 0.5977 0.4904 
   Higher 10360 0.2378 0.4257 
Husband currently working 10360 0.8449 0.3620 
Husband lives in same household as respondent 10360 0.9845 0.1237 
Number of adult females in household 
   None 10360 0.0034 0.0580 
   One 10360 0.7052 0.4560 
   Two 10360 0.1642 0.3705 
   Three 10360 0.0826 0.2753 
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Appendix Table 1. Summary statistics of variables 
  N Mean SD 
   Four 10360 0.0278 0.1644 
   Five 10360 0.0119 0.1083 
   Six 10360 0.0036 0.0597 
   Seven 10360 0.0011 0.0326 
   Eight 10360 0.0003 0.0170 
Number of adult males in household 
   None 10360 0.0065 0.0802 
   One 10360 0.7255 0.4463 
   Two 10360 0.1264 0.3323 
   Three 10360 0.0813 0.2733 
   Four 10360 0.0369 0.1885 
   Five 10360 0.0182 0.1338 
   Six 10360 0.0041 0.0635 
   Seven 10360 0.0013 0.0354 
Household wealth index 
   Poorest 10360 0.2775 0.4478 
   Poorer 10360 0.2492 0.4326 
   Middle 10360 0.2095 0.4069 
   Richer 10360 0.1596 0.3662 
   Richest 10360 0.1042 0.3056 
Governorates 
   Amman 10360 0.1233 0.3288 
   Balqa 10360 0.0762 0.2653 
   Zarqa 10360 0.0980 0.2973 
   Madaba 10360 0.0819 0.2742 
   Irbid 10360 0.0821 0.2746 
   Mafraq 10360 0.0819 0.2743 
   Jarash 10360 0.0789 0.2695 
   Ajlun 10360 0.0785 0.2689 
   Karak 10360 0.0718 0.2582 
   Tafiela 10360 0.0774 0.2673 
  Ma'an 10360 0.0723 0.2590 
   Aqaba 10360 0.0778 0.2679 
Urban 10360 0.6903 0.4624 
Notes: Unweighted. 
aExcludes men who have no earnings or do not work. 
bRefers to women who are currently working 




Appendix Table 2. Women's authority in household decisionmaking 






























































Missing … … … … 
0.01 
(1) 
Husband no earnings … … … … 
3.65 
(378) 
N/A …   … … … 
0.41 
(42) 






Appendix Table 3. Distribution of women and men's occupations 
Treiman's 
Prestige score 





   N % 
 
N % 
64 1110 Legislators … …   1 0.01 
71 1120 Senior national government officials … … 1 0.01 
63 1130 Traditional chiefs and heads of village … … 1 0.01 
63 1140 Senior officials - special interest organiztions … … 1 0.01 
50 1310 General managers … … 2 0.02 
69 2110 Physicists, chemists and related professionals … … 8 0.08 
51 2130 Computing professionals 1 0.01 20 0.19 
63 2140 Architects, engineers and related professionals 12 0.12 160 1.54 
62 2210 Life science professionals 3 0.03 23 0.22 
73 2220 Health professionals (except nursing) 18 0.17 65 0.63 
54 2230 Nursing and midwifery professionals 11 0.11 11 0.11 
78 2310 College, university and higher education teaching 
professionals 11 0.11 48 0.46 
60 2320 Secondary education teaching professionals 196 1.89 160 1.54 
57 2330 Primary and pre-primary education teaching professionals 294 2.84 121 1.17 
62 2340 Special education teaching professionals 1 0.01 … … 
62 2350 Other teaching professionals 5 0.05 27 0.26 
57 2410 Business professionals 81 0.78 461 4.45 
73 2420 Legal professionals 4 0.04 52 0.50 
54 2430 Archivists librarians and related information professionals 1 0.01 4 0.04 
58 2440 Social science and related professionals 11 0.11 8 0.08 
57 2450 Writers and creative or performing artists 1 0.01 4 0.04 
60 2460 Religious professionals 4 0.04 12 0.12 
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Appendix Table 3. Distribution of women and men's occupations 
Treiman's 
Prestige score 





   N % 
 
N % 
48 3100 Physical and engineering science associate prof ssionals 2 0.02 152 1.47 
53 3120 Computer associate professionals 11 0.11 14 0.14 
46 3130 Optical and electronic equipment operators 1 0.01 12 0.12 
54 3140 Ship and aircraft controllers and technicias … … 21 0.20 
52 3150 Safety and quality inspectors … … 24 0.23 
52 3210 Life science technicians and related associate professionals 1 0.01 1 0.01 
51 3220 Modern health associate professionals 17 0.16 37 0.36 
51 3220 Modern health associate professionals (other) 81 0.78 48 … 
50 3230 Nursing and midwifery professionals … … … … 
50 3310 Primary education teaching associate professi nals 176 1.70 49 0.47 
50 3320 Pre-primary education teaching associates 3 0.03 … … 
50 3330 Special education teaching associate professi nals 4 0.04 1 0.01 
49 3410 Finance and sales associate professionals … … 95 0.92 
52 3420 Business services agents and trade brokers … … 17 0.16 
49 3430 Administrative associate professionals 104 1.00 232 2.24 
49 3440 Customs, tax and related government associate professionals … … 17 0.16 
45 3451 Police inspectors and detectives … … 1 0.01 
49 3460 Social work associate professionals 4 0.04 2 0.02 
45 3470 Artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals 1 0.01 19 0.18 
50 3480 Religious associate professionals 3 0.03 59 0.57 
45 4110 Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks 21 0.20 29 0.28 
44 4120 Numerical clerks 11 0.11 163 1.57 
32 4130 Material-recording and transport clerks … … 131 1.26 
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Appendix Table 3. Distribution of women and men's occupations 
Treiman's 
Prestige score 





   N % 
 
N % 
37 4140 Library, mail and related clerks 53 0.51 291 2.81 
37 4190 Other office clerks … … 3 0.03 
37 4210 Cashiers, tellers and related clerks … … 10 0.10 
38 4220 Client information clerks 6 0.06 105 1.01 
32 5110 Travel attendants and related workers 1 0.01 18 0.17 
26 5120 Housekeeping and restaurant services workers 1 0.01 114 1.10 
27 5130 Personal care and related workers 12 0.12 3 0.03 
29 5140 Other personal services workers 25 0.24 72 0.69 
37 5160 Protective services workers … … 106 1.02 
32 5220 Shop salespersons and demonstrators 32 0.31 844 8.15 
24 5230 Stall and market salespersons … … 18 0.17 
40 6110 Market gardeners and crop growers 9 0.09 155 1.50 
38 6130 Market-oriented animal producers and related workers 11 0.11 46 0.44 
24 6140 Forestry and related workers … … 2 0.02 
28 6150 Fishery workers, hunters, and trappers … … 1 0.01 
34 7110 Miners, shotfirers, stone cutters and carvers … … 53 0.51 
31 7120 Building frame and related trades workers … … 264 2.55 
38 7130 Building finishers and related trades workers … … 85 0.82 
37 7140 Painters, building structure cleaners /related trades workers … … 60 0.58 
43 7210 Metal molders, welders, sheet-metal workers, st uctural-
metal preparers, and related trades workers … … 8 0.08 
38 7220 Blacksmiths, tool-makers and related trades … … 139 1.34 
45 7230 Machinery mechanics and fitters … … 208 2.01 
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Appendix Table 3. Distribution of women and men's occupations 
Treiman's 
Prestige score 





   N % 
 
N % 
28 7240 Electrical and electronic equipment mechanics … … 199 1.92 
42 7310 Precision workers in metal and related materials … … 2 0.02 
28 7320 Potters, glass-makers and related trades … … 1 0.01 
29 7340 Printing and related trades workers … … 9 0.09 
28 7410 Food processing and related trades work 5 0.05 78 0.75 
27 7420  Wood treaters, cabinet-makers and related trades workers … … 65 0.63 
34 7430 Textile, garment and related trades work 38 0.37 64 0.62 
40 7440 Pelt, leather and shoemaking trades work … … 6 0.06 
31 8110 Mining and mineral-processing-plant operators … … 41 0.40 
28 8120 Metal-processing -plant operators … … 1 0.01 
42 8130 Glass, ceramics and related plant-operators … … 1 0.01 
38 8140 Wood-processing-and papermaking-plant operators … … 1 0.01 
37 8150 Chemical-processing plant operators … … 22 0.21 
43 8160 Power-production and related plant operators … … 32 0.31 
30 8210 Metal-and mineral-products machine operators … … 40 0.39 
33 8220 Chemical-products machine operators … … 13 0.13 
36 8230 Rubber- and plastic-products machine operators … … 5 0.05 
32 8270 Food and related products machine operation … … 12 0.12 
32 8310  Locomotive engine drivers and related workers … … 6 0.06 
32 8320 Motor- vehicle drivers 1 0.01 1,377 13.29 
25 8330 Agricultural and other mobile plant operatos … … 70 0.68 
12 8340 Ships deck crews and related workers … … 5 0.05 
21 9110 Street vendors and related workers … … 20 0.19 
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Appendix Table 3. Distribution of women and men's occupations 
Treiman's 
Prestige score 





   N % 
 
N % 
23 9120 Shoe cleaning and other street services … … 1 0.01 
21 9130 Domestic and related helpers, cleaners 62 0.60 58 0.56 
13 9140 Building caretakers, window and related work … … 3 0.03 
20 9150 Messengers, porters, doorkeepers and related work 1 0.01 631 6.09 
16 9160 Garbage collectors and related laborers … … 52 0.50 
23 9210 Agricultural, fishery and related labor 15 0.14 61 0.59 
20 9310 Mining and construction laborers … … 904 8.73 
19 9320 Manufacturing laborers 7 0.07 27 0.26 
20 9330 Transport laborers and freight handlers … … 23 0.22 
  Missing … … 4 0.04 
  Not working 8,987 86.75 1,607 15.51 




Appendix Table 4a. Summary statistics of regional variables 
  N Mean SD Min Max 
Women’s rejection of wife beating rate 24 0.059 0.033 0.016 0.132 
Women's work participation rate 24 0.133 0.045 0.055 0.248 
Women's literacy rate 24 0.917 0.074 0.642 0.983 
Notes: Women’s rejection of wife beating refers to w men who believe that domestic 
violence is not justified under any of the seven coditions specified: goes out without 
telling husband; neglects the children; argues withhim; burns the food; insults him; 
disobeys; or has relations with another man. Regions reflect all original 12 
governorates further subcategorized into rural and urban. Unweighted. 
 
Appendix Table 4b. Selected indicators of socioeconomic development and gender norms 












Amman 11.47 97.81 12.01 
Balqa 16.18 93.72 10.9 
Zarqa 7.29 98.19 13.13 
Madaba 17.71 93.76 8.67 
Central region 11.17 97.37 12.05 
Irbid 11.47 97.41 3.5 
Mafraq 11.96 89.84 3.35 
Jarash 9.59 96.39 5.88 
Ajlun 15.24 97.26 3.31 
North Region 11.65 96.12 3.69 
Karak 21.41 92.21 2.91 
Tafiela 14.63 90.92 5.68 
Ma'an 16.68 86.13 2.73 
Aqaba 10.87 91.53 8.87 
South region 16.91 90.47 4.77 
National average 11.78 96.47 9.15 
Note: Weights included. 
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Appendix Table 5. Ordered logistic regression of women's sole authority in family management decisionmaking index on women's 
work 
Variables 












Respondent currently working 0.045 -0.0101 0.0057 0.0027 0.0012 0.0040 
Respondent's educational attainment (ref: no 
education) 
   Primary 0.109 
   Secondary 0.236 
   Higher 0.184 
Respondent's age (years) 0.061 
Respondent's age squared  -0.001 
Husband's educational level (ref: no 
education) 
   Primary 0.014 
   Secondary 0.085 
   Higher -0.083 
Husband currently working 0.145 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.034 
   Middle 0.047 
   Richer 0.145 
   Richest 0.120 
Husband in the household -1.483*** 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.031 
Respondent's husband has other wives 0.177 
Respondent is married to HH head or is head 0.129 
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Appendix Table 5. Ordered logistic regression of women's sole authority in family management decisionmaking index on women's 
work 
Variables 












Respondent related to husband prior to 
marriage -0.023 
Duration of marriage (years) 0.0197** 
Number of adult males -0.052 







Wald Chi 2(df) 328.3 (34) 
N 10344       
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions in which women decide alone. 
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 
a Change in the predicted probabilities of exercising sole authority in family management decisions for a change from not working to 
working while holding all other variables constant t heir means. 




Appendix Table 6. Ordered logistic regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index 
Variables 
  












Respondent currently working 0.225** -0.0034 -0.2020 -0.0262 0.0268 0.0230 
Respondent's educational attainment (ref: none) 
   Primary 0.049 
   Secondary 0.420** 
   Higher 0.640*** 
Respondent's age (years) 0.003 
Respondent's age squared  0.000 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education) 
   Primary -0.060 
   Secondary -0.045 
   Higher 0.187 
Husband currently working 0.061 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.067 
   Middle 0.111 
   Richer 0.324*** 
   Richest 0.322*** 
Husband in the household -0.118 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.016 
Respondent's husband has other wives -0.338** 
Respondent is married to household head or is 
the head 0.233 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.008 
Duration of marriage (years) 0.0193** 
Number of adult males -0.0720** 
 220
Appendix Table 6. Ordered logistic regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index 
Variables 
  












Number of adult females -0.049 
Urban -0.100 







Wald Chi squared  (df) 292.1 (34) 
N 10344       
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions women d cide in conjunction 
with spouses or alone. Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included.  
a Change in the predicted probabilities of exercising shared authority in family management decisions for a change from not working 
to working while holding all other variables constant t their means. 




Appendix Table 7. Ordered logistic regression of women's authority in family 
management decisionmaking index on women's employment status 
Variables Sole (coef) 
 
Shared (coef) 
Women's work (ref.: does not work) 
   Employee 0.002 0.209** 
   Employer -0.308 0.675* 
   Self employed 0.467 0.004 
   Unpaid family worker and unpaid workers 0.796 1.056 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.101 0.053 
   Secondary 0.241 0.422*** 
   Higher 0.197 0.647*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0635* 0.003 
Age squared -0.001 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.008 -0.062 
   Secondary 0.077 -0.049 
   Higher -0.086 0.178 
Husband currently working 0.143 0.058 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.037 0.069 
   Middle 0.048 0.114 
   Richer 0.148 0.328*** 
   Richest 0.122 0.325*** 
Husband in household -1.488*** -0.121 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.030 0.017 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.169 -0.348** 
Respondent is the household head or married to 
head 0.131 0.231 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.026 -0.008 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0190** 0.0193** 
Number of adult males -0.051 -0.109 
Number of adult females -0.006 0.100 
Urban 0.363*** -0.049 
Threshold 
1… 1.170 -3.474*** 
2… 2.604*** -1.313* 
3… 3.754*** -0.019 
4… 5.110*** 2.735*** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 329.9 (37)  297.8 (37) 
N 10344 10344 
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of 
decisions in which women report having sole or shared authority. Region dummies included 




Appendix Table 7a. Ordered logistic regression of wmen's authority in family 
management decisionmaking index on women's employment status 




Women's work (ref.: unpaid family workers and 
unpaid workers)  
   Employee -0.772 -0.833 
   Employer -1.099 -0.368 
   Self employed -0.307 -1.023 
   Women who do not work -0.772 -1.042 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.099 0.0471 
   Secondary 0.235 0.418** 
   Higher 0.190 0.646*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.054 0.00678 
Age squared -0.001 -0.000122 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.012 -0.0649 
   Secondary 0.080 -0.0516 
   Higher -0.085 0.175 
Husband currently working 0.141 0.0596 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.041 0.0669 
   Middle 0.055 0.115 
   Richer 0.156 0.328*** 
   Richest 0.135 0.335*** 
Husband in household -1.476*** -0.133 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.024 0.0148 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.177 -0.338** 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 0.045 0.221 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage -0.026 -0.00679 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0196** 0.0164* 
Number of adult males -0.0746* -0.0493 
Number of adult females -0.041 -0.0874* 
Urban 0.362*** -0.0944 
Threshold 
1… 0.116 -4.507*** 
2… 1.551 -2.346** 
3… 2.700*** -1.053 
4… 4.057*** 1.701* 
Wald Chi2 (df) 332.3 (37)  295.4 (37) 
N 10344  10344 
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions 
in which women report having sole or shared authoriy. Region dummies included but not shown here. 




Appendix Table 8. Ordered logistic regression of women's authority in family 
management decisionmaking on women's relative income 
Variables Sole (coef) 
 
Shared (coef) 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who 
don't work or women with no earnings) 
   Earns about the same or more than husband  0.010 0.346*** 
   Earns less than husband 0.028 0.129 
   Husband has no earnings 0.024 -0.163 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.112 0.052 
   Secondary 0.236 0.419** 
   Higher 0.190 0.639*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.061 0.003 
Age squared -0.001 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.030 -0.058 
   Secondary 0.101 -0.043 
   Higher -0.067 0.196 
Husband currently working 0.144 0.050 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.033 0.070 
   Middle 0.045 0.114 
   Richer 0.144 0.326*** 
   Richest 0.121 0.327*** 
Husband present in the household -1.484*** -0.125 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.030 0.016 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.178 -0.327** 
Respondent is the household head or married 
to head 0.127 0.229 
Respondent related to husband prior to 
marriage -0.023 -0.007 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0195** 0.0194** 
Number of adult males -0.053 -0.0721** 
Number of adult females -0.008 -0.050 
Urban 0.356*** -0.100 
Threshold 
1… 1.142 -3.485*** 
2… 2.576*** -1.324* 
3… 3.725*** -0.0304 
4… 5.080*** 2.723*** 
N 10342 10342 
Wald Chi squared  (df) 328.4 (36) 299 (36) 
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions 
in which women report having sole or shared authoriy. Region dummies included but not shown here. 




Appendix Table 8a. Ordered logistic regression of wmen's authority in family 
management decisionmaking on women's relative income (ref.: women who earn less 
than their husbands) 
Variables Sole (coef) 
 
Shared (coef) 
Women's relative income  
   Women don't work or no earnings -0.0244 -0.13 
   Earns same or more than husband  -0.0143 0.22 
   Husband has no earnings -0.00688 -0.299 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.11 0.0468 
   Secondary 0.23 0.416** 
   Higher 0.183 0.638*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0515 0.00617 
Age squared -0.000556 -0.000114 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.034 -0.0602 
   Secondary 0.104 -0.0452 
   Higher -0.0654 0.193 
Husband currently working 0.142 0.0507 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0375 0.0686 
   Middle 0.0524 0.114 
   Richer 0.152 0.325*** 
   Richest 0.134 0.336*** 
Husband present in the household -1.472*** -0.136 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.0241 0.0138 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.186 -0.317** 
Respondent is HH head/married to head 0.0404 0.217 
Related to husband prior to marriage -0.0221 -0.00548 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0201** 0.0166* 
Number of adult males -0.0766* -0.0505 
Number of adult females -0.0419 -0.0882* 
Urban 0.355*** -0.0967 
Threshold 
1… 0.833 -3.618*** 
2… 2.268*** -1.457** 
3… 3.417*** -0.163 
4… 4.772*** 2.590*** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 330.9 (36) 296 (36) 
N 10342  10342 
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions 
in which women report having sole or shared authoriy. Region dummies included but not shown here. 




Appendix Table 8b. Ordered logistic regression of wmen's authority in family 
management decisionmaking on women’s relative income  
Variables Sole (coef) 
 
Shared (coef) 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who 
earn about the same or more than husbands) 
   Women who don't work -0.0101 -0.349*** 
   Women who earn less than husbands 0.0143 -0.22 
   Husband has no earnings 0.00742 -0.519 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.11 0.0468 
   Secondary 0.23 0.416** 
   Higher 0.183 0.638*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.0515 0.00617 
Age squared -0.000556 -0.000114 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.034 -0.0602 
   Secondary 0.104 -0.0452 
   Higher -0.0654 0.193 
Husband currently working 0.142 0.0507 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.0375 0.0686 
   Middle 0.0524 0.114 
   Richer 0.152 0.325*** 
   Richest 0.134 0.336*** 
Husband present in the household -1.472*** -0.136 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.0241 0.0138 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.186 -0.317** 
Respondent is the household head or married 
to head 0.0404 0.217 
Respondent related to husband prior to 
marriage -0.0221 -0.00548 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0201** 0.0166* 
Number of adult males -0.0766* -0.0505 
Number of adult females -0.0419 -0.0882* 
Urban 0.355*** -0.0967 
Threshold 
1… 0.847 -3.837*** 
2… 2.282*** -1.676** 
3… 3.432*** -0.383 
4… 4.786*** 2.370*** 
Wald Chi2 (df) 330.9 (36) 296 (36) 
N 10342 10342 
Notes: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions 
in which women report sole or shared authority. Region dummies included but not shown here.. 
Weights included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.  
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Appendix Table 9. Ordered logistic regression of women's authority in family 
management decisionmaking on women's occupational prestige 
Variables Sole (coef) 
 
Shared (coef) 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: 
women who don't work, husband works) 
   Both don't work -0.367 0.078 
   Wife less prestige, husband more  -0.103 0.108 
   Wife same/more prestige as husband  0.055 0.287** 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 0.104 0.050 
   Secondary 0.228 0.421** 
   Higher 0.172 0.634*** 
Women's age (continuous) 0.062 0.003 
Age squared -0.001 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.010 -0.058 
   Secondary 0.077 -0.044 
   Higher -0.082 0.195 
Husband currently working (y/n) -0.179 0.137 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 0.034 0.067 
   Middle 0.046 0.109 
   Richer 0.146 0.322*** 
   Richest 0.126 0.324*** 
Husband present in the household -1.482*** -0.118 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.032 0.016 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 0.175 -0.335** 
Respondent is HH head or married to 
head 0.132 0.233 
Related to husband prior to marriage -0.025 -0.008 
Marital duration (continuous) 0.0199** 0.0194** 
Number of adult males -0.051 -0.0720** 
Number of adult females -0.006 -0.049 
Urban 0.360*** -0.098 
Threshold 
1… 0.816 -3.383*** 
2… 2.250*** -1.222* 
3… 3.399*** 0.0717 
4… 4.755*** 2.825*** 
Wald Chi squared  (df) 331.2 (36) 292.5 (36) 
N 10344 10344 
Note: Family management decisionmaking index ranges from 0 -4 reflecting the number of decisions 
in which women report having sole or shared authoriy. Region dummies included but not shown here. 
Weights included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 10. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's work on women's family management decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Respondent currently working 1.023   0.977   0.121***   0.096 
Respondent’s educational attainment (ref: no education)    
   Primary 1.059 2.321* -0.016  
0.243 
   Secondary 1.226 2.131* 0.192***  
0.057 
   Higher 1.170 1.990 0.279***  
0.272 
Respondent's age (years) 1.085* 1.032 0.008  
0.022 
Respondent's age squared  0.999* 1.000 0.000  
0.000 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education)    
   Primary 1.057 0.760 -0.020  
0.120 
   Secondary 1.151 0.719 -0.034  
0.458** 
   Higher 0.993 0.598 0.078  
0.444** 
Husband currently working 1.139 1.647 0.021  
0.341*** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest)    
   Poorer 1.148 0.892 0.0490*  
-0.019 
   Middle 1.178 0.855 0.0534*  
0.140 
   Richer 1.263* 1.258 0.167***  
0.153 
   Richest 1.249 1.148 0.151***  
0.202* 
Husband in the household 0.741 0.280*** 0.064  
0.016 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.954 1.604* -0.014  
0.047 
Respondent's husband has other wives 1.198 1.168 -0.148***  
-0.117 
Respondent is married to household head or is the head 1.061 1.114 0.248***  
0.083 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.951 1.218 -0.009  
0.035 
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Appendix Table 10. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's work on women's family management decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Duration of marriage (years) 1.023** 0.996 0.00716***  
0.0158* 
Number of adult males 0.998 0.876* 0.011  
-0.0691*** 
Number of adult females 0.927 0.910 -0.0396**  
-0.0736*** 
Urban 1.361*** 1.951*** -0.0529*  
0.050 
Constant 0.0882** 0.205 1.996***  
1.342*** 
        
Wald Chi2 (df) 241 (34) 105 (34) … … 
R-squared … … 0.045  
0.116 
N 9111  1233  9111  1233 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision. 
(2) Results of ordinary least squares regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index. Index ranges 
from 0-4. Includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix Table 11. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's employment status on women's family management decisionmaking 
authority 






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Women's employment status (ref.: unpaid family 
workers/unpaid workers)     
   Employee 0.549 0.638 -0.213 -0.411 
   Employer 0.306 
 
-0.010 0.000 
   Self employed 0.731 0.729 -0.263 -0.807 
   Women who do not work 0.544 0.670 -0.326 -0.499 
Women's education (ref.no education)     
   Primary 1.052 2.371* -0.016 0.259 
   Secondary 1.229 2.190** 0.190*** 0.084 
   Higher 1.171 2.062 0.280*** 0.301* 
Women's age (continuous) 1.087* 1.033 0.008 0.023 
Age squared 0.999* 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education)     
   Primary 1.060 0.752 -0.020 0.097 
   Secondary 1.152 0.707 -0.034 0.430** 
   Higher 0.999 0.589 0.076 0.420** 
Husband currently working 1.135 1.638 0.020 0.339*** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest)     
   Poorer 1.152 0.889 0.0494* -0.020 
   Middle 1.179 0.857 0.0543* 0.142 
   Richer 1.267* 1.258 0.168*** 0.153 
   Richest 1.255 1.147 0.151*** 0.201* 
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Appendix Table 11. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's employment status on women's family management decisionmaking 
authority 






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Husband in household 0.743 0.280*** 0.061 0.017 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.953 1.602* -0.013 0.046 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.202 1.154 -0.152*** -0.126 
Respondent is the household head or married to 
head 
1.059 1.116 0.248*** 0.085 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.949 1.215 -0.009 0.033 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.022** 0.996 0.00712*** 0.0156* 
Number of adult males 0.998 0.877* 0.011 -0.0684*** 
Number of adult females 0.926 0.910 -0.0399** -0.0735*** 
Urban 1.366*** 1.947*** -0.0526* 0.049 
Constant 0.156 0.299 2.322*** 1.825*** 
    
Wald Chi2 (df) 243.2 (36) 106.2 (37) … … 
R-squared … … 0.045 0.117 
N 9111 1233 9111 1233 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision.  
(2) Results of ordinary least squares regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index. Index ranges 
from 0-4. Includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 




Appendix Table 12. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative income on women's family management decisionmaking authority  






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn less) 
    
   Women who do not work or women with no earnings  0.989 1.014 -0.0784** -0.064 
   Earns about the same or more than husband 1.014 0.723 0.110** -0.015 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) 0.778 17.26* -0.216 0.436 
Women's education (ref.no education)     
   Primary 1.065 2.344* -0.014 0.239 
   Secondary 1.232 2.121* 0.193*** 0.046 
   Higher 1.179 2.006 0.279*** 0.269 
Women's age (continuous) 1.085* 1.027 0.007 0.022 
Age squared 0.999* 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Husband's education (ref: no education)     
   Primary 1.055 0.789 -0.023 0.140 
   Secondary 1.148 0.754 -0.036 0.480** 
   Higher 0.990 0.620 0.079 0.467** 
Husband currently working 1.131 1.762* 0.014 0.355*** 
Household wealth (ref: poorest)     
   Poorer 1.147 0.882 0.0500* -0.021 
   Middle 1.178 0.842 0.0541* 0.136 
   Richer 1.261* 1.242 0.166*** 0.152 
   Richest 1.248 1.120 0.151*** 0.199* 
Husband present in the household 0.744 0.294*** 0.068 0.027 
Respondent has at least one living son 0.953 1.578* -0.014 0.043 
Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.204 1.168 -0.141*** -0.114 
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Appendix Table 12. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative income on women's family management decisionmaking authority  






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.054 1.120 0.241** 0.086 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 0.951 1.219 -0.008 0.037 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.023** 0.997 0.00727*** 0.0160* 
Number of adult males 0.999 0.877* 0.011 -0.0692*** 
Number of adult females 0.926 0.899 -0.0412*** -0.0762*** 
Urban 1.359*** 1.961*** -0.0526* 0.050 
Constant 0.0901** 0.196 2.092*** 1.385*** 
     
Wald Chi2 (df) 240.7 (36) 111.7 (36) … … 
R-squared … … 0.046 0.117 
N 9110 1232 9110 1232 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision.  
(2) Results of ordinary least squares regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index. Index ranges 
from 0-4. Includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 13. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative occupational prestige on women's family anagement 
decisionmaking authority 






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: Wife less prestige, 
husband more prestige)     













   Wife more prestige or same as husband (includes men 








Women's education (ref.no education)        






























Husband's education (ref: no education)        
























Household wealth (ref: poorest)        

























Appendix Table 13. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative occupational prestige on women's family anagement 
decisionmaking authority 






Variables OR OR Coef Coef 






























































        



















Notes:               
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in at least one family management decision. 
(2) Results of ordinary least squares regression of women's shared authority in family management decisionmaking index. Index ranges 
from 0-4. Shared authority includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 




Appendix Table 14. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's work on women's personal decisionmaking authority  
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Respondent currently working 1.265**   1.58   1.476*   1.155 
Respondent's educational attainment (ref: no education) 
   Primary 1.216 1.685 1.123 1.228 
   Secondary 1.171 1.897* 1.790*** 2.581* 
   Higher 1.321 2.986** 2.126*** 7.770*** 
Respondent's age (years) 1.067 0.869 1.053 0.873 
Respondent's age squared  0.999 1.003* 1 1.001 
Husband's educational level (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.827 0.626 0.631* 0.568 
   Secondary 0.846 0.572 0.739 1.113 
   Higher 0.676* 0.406* 0.732 1.028 
Husband currently working 0.936 0.832 1.028 0.908 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.039 0.871 0.933 0.884 
   Middle 0.792** 0.553** 1.069 1.002 
   Richer 0.822* 1.419 0.806 1.636 
   Richest 0.833 0.784 0.944 2.189 
Husband in the household 0.785 0.210*** 2.327 1.046 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.105 1.45 1.048 1.16 
Respondent's husband has other wives 1.231 1.356 0.755 0.731 
Respondent is married to household head or is the head 1.204 1.154 1.424 1.01 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.037 1.241 1.058 1.211 
Duration of marriage (years) 1.003 0.979 1.014 1.074* 
Number of adult males 1.014 0.915 0.954 1.039 
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Appendix Table 14. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's work on women's personal decisionmaking authority  
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Number of adult females 0.966 1.077 0.934 0.97 
Urban 1.075 1.086 1.139 0.998 
Constant 0.214* 8.775 0.648 17.52 
Wald Chi2 (df) 99.23 (34) 83.05 (34) 104.8 (34) 97.63 (34) 
N 9111 1233 9111 1233 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios. 
(2) Results of logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios. Shared authority 
includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here.   
Weights included. 





Appendix Table 15. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's employment status on women's personal decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Women's employment status (ref.: unpaid family 
workers/unpaid workers) 
   Employee 1.631 0.429 7.635** 1.013 
   Employer 1.263 1.975 
   Self employed 2.38 0.266 92.56*** 0.459 
   Women who do not work 1.302 0.277 4.68 0.829 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.212 1.736 1.127 1.227 
   Secondary 1.174 1.989* 1.814*** 2.612* 
   Higher 1.324 3.143** 2.113*** 7.709*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.067 0.87 1.051 0.874 
Age squared 0.999 1.003* 1 1.001 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.824 0.604 0.627* 0.559 
   Secondary 0.845 0.548 0.736 1.095 
   Higher 0.677* 0.391* 0.74 1.014 
Husband currently working 0.938 0.829 1.041 0.913 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.038 0.868 0.923 0.889 
   Middle 0.790** 0.555** 1.056 1.006 
   Richer 0.820* 1.418 0.793 1.638 
   Richest 0.831 0.781 0.94 2.189 
Husband in household 0.787 0.210*** 2.381 1.05 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.103 1.449 1.039 1.161 
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Appendix Table 15. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's employment status on women's personal decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.235 1.335 0.777 0.734 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.204 1.158 1.427 1.009 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.036 1.237 1.06 1.207 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 0.979 1.015 1.074* 
Number of adult males 1.014 0.916 0.95 1.038 
Number of adult females 0.967 1.077 0.938 0.97 
Urban 1.073 1.083 1.128 1 
Constant 0.163 30.74* 0.14 20.55 
        
Wald Chi2 100.5 (37) 85.45 (36) 123.1 (37) 98.35 (36) 
N 9111 1233 9111 1233 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratio.  
(2) Results of logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratio. Shared authority 
includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown.  
Weights included. 





Appendix Table 16. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's relative income on women's personal decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Women's relative income (ref.: women who earn less)               
   Women who do not work or women with no earnings  0.795 0.675 0.822 1.483 
   Earns about the same or more than husband 0.977 0.954 2.084* 7.380* 
   Husband has no earnings (wife is in paid work) 2.051 … 3.79 … 
Women's education (ref.no education) 
   Primary 1.21 1.653 1.125 1.167 
   Secondary 1.164 1.826 1.790*** 2.471* 
   Higher 1.315 2.918** 2.083*** 7.765*** 
Women's age (continuous) 1.067 0.868 1.052 0.881 
Age squared 0.999 1.003* 1 1.001 
Husband's education (ref: no education) 
   Primary 0.828 0.656 0.624* 0.685 
   Secondary 0.846 0.606 0.731 1.339 
   Higher 0.677* 0.431 0.736 1.281 
Husband currently working 0.956 0.864 1.054 0.899 
Household wealth (ref: poorest) 
   Poorer 1.039 0.868 0.937 0.917 
   Middle 0.792** 0.548** 1.072 1.036 
   Richer 0.825* 1.411 0.81 1.73 
   Richest 0.836 0.778 0.947 2.331 
Husband present in the household 0.779 0.217*** 2.299 1.054 
Respondent has at least one living son 1.107 1.437 1.051 1.145 
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Appendix Table 16. Nuclear versus extended: effects of women's relative income on women's personal decisionmaking authority 
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 




Respondent's husband has co-wives 1.219 1.371 0.754 0.76 
Respondent is the household head or married to head 1.226 1.16 1.446 1.02 
Respondent related to husband prior to marriage 1.038 1.247 1.061 1.223 
Marital duration (continuous) 1.003 0.98 1.015 1.076* 
Number of adult males 1.013 0.914 0.956 1.037 
Number of adult females 0.968 1.069 0.934 0.977 
Urban 1.075 1.089 1.143 0.977 
Constant 0.26 12.45 0.779 8.564 
Wald Chi2 (df) 100.6 (36) 80.42 (35) 114.8 (36) 103.2 (35) 
N 9110 1230 9110 1230 
Notes:  
(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole say in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios.  
(2) Results of logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios. Shared authority 
includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here. Weights included. 





Appendix Table 17. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative occupational prestige on women's personal decisionmaking authority  
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 
Nuclear  Extended Nuclear 
 
Extended 
Variables OR OR OR OR 
Relative occupational prestige (ref.: Wife less prestige, husband more 
prestige)               




















Women's education (ref.no education)        






























Husband's education (ref: no education)        
























Household wealth (ref: poorest)        































Appendix Table 17. Nuclear versus extended: effects of relative occupational prestige on women's personal decisionmaking authority  
  Sole authority(1) Shared authority (2) 
Nuclear  Extended Nuclear 
 
Extended 
























































        















(1) Results of logistic regression of women's sole say in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios.  
(2) Results of logistic regression of women's shared authority in personal decisionmaking reported as odds ratios. Shared authority 
includes women who report deciding in conjunction with spouses or alone.  
Region dummies included but not shown here.  
Weights included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table 18. Estimates of the (logistic) propensity score model 
Variable Coefficient SE 
Respondent's age  (ref. 15-19) 
   20-24 16.20*** (0.304) 
   25-29 17.12*** (0.226) 
   30-34 17.22*** (0.226) 
   35-39 17.26*** (0.206) 
   40-44 17.21*** (0.200) 
   45-49 17.13 0.000 
Respondent's educational attainment (ref.: no education) 
   Primary 0.0333 (0.411) 
   Secondary/Higher 0.504* (0.305) 
Husband currently working 0.0698 (0.157) 
Husband's educational attainment (ref.: no education) 
   Primary -0.426 (0.486) 
   Secondary/Higher 0.273 (0.438) 
Household structure 
   No children 0.494*** (0.189) 
   At least 2 male or 2 female adults in household -0.648*** (0.141) 
Household wealth index (ref.:poorest) 
   Poorer 0.219 (0.171) 
   Middle 0.737*** (0.170) 
   Richer/Richest 1.234*** (0.169) 
Governorate (ref.: Amman) 0.0764 (0.096) 
   Balqa 
   Zarqa 0.630*** (0.147) 
   Madaba -0.353** (0.167) 
   Irbid 0.761*** (0.143) 
   Mafraq 0.228 (0.157) 
   Jarash 0.620*** (0.164) 
   Ajlun 0.278 (0.169) 
   Karak 0.738*** (0.153) 
   Tafiela 1.059*** (0.151) 
  Ma'an 0.724*** (0.154) 
   Aqaba 0.884*** (0.154) 
Rural 0.0791 (0.160) 
Constant -20.62*** (0.448) 
Log likelihood -3445 
N 10357 
Notes: Weights included.  
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